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Risk and tracking error budgeting was originally adopted by large institutional investors, 
including pension funds, plan sponsors, foundations, and endowments. More recently, risk and 
tracking error budgeting have gained popularity among financial advisors, multi-managers, 
fund of funds managers, high net worth individuals as well as retail investors. These techniques 
contribute to the portfolio optimisation process by limiting the extent to which a portfolio can 
deviate from its benchmark with regards to risk and tracking error.  
This is an ambitious paper that attempts to determine the optimal strategy to practically 
implement risk and tracking error budgeting as a portfolio optimisation technique in South 
Africa. This study attempts to bridge the gap between active, passive, and smart-beta 
investment management styles by introducing a low-cost portfolio construction technique, for 
core-satellite portfolio management, which contributes to the risk and tracking error budgeting 
process. Core-satellite portfolios are designed to expose the portfolio to a low-cost primary 
“core” consisting of passive and enhanced index funds, thus systematic risk “beta”, limiting 
the tracking error of the portfolio. The secondary “satellite” component is allocated to active 
and smart-beta managers to exploit expected excess return “alpha”.  
The primary aim of this research is to construct a rule-based product range of core-satellite 
portfolios called “replica portfolios”. The product range builds on the foundation of the 
Association for Savings & Investments South Africa (ASISA) framework. The study identifies 
three “target portfolios” from ASISA’s framework, namely (1) High Risk: SA General Equity, 
(2) Medium Risk: SA Multi-Asset High Equity and (3) Low Risk: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity. 
Through this framework, active managers from each category are shortlisted using a Sharpe 
and Information Ratio filter. A secondary filtering technique, namely Returns Based Style 
Analysis (RBSA) is used to determine the style, R-squared and alpha-generating ability of 
active managers versus the passive asset classes and style indices they seek to replicate. 
Applying Euler’s theorem for homogenous functions, we decompose the risk of the core-
satellite portfolio into the risk contributed by each of its components. The primary mandate of 
the core-satellite portfolios in the product range is to allocate risk and tracking error efficiently 
across several investment management styles and asset classes in order to maximise returns 




The results highlighted that active managers, after fees, predominantly failed to outperform 
their benchmarks and passive building blocks, as identified through RBSA over the sample 
period (October 2009 – September 2019). However, only a small number of active managers 
generated superior risk-adjusted returns and were included in the core-satellite range of 
products. This study recommends to investors that they exploit the “hot-hands effect” by 
investing in specialised, benchmark agnostic active managers who consistently produce  
superior risk-adjusted returns. By blending active, passive and smart-beta strategies, investors 
are exposed to less total risk, less risk per holding and a lower tracking error. The three core-
satellite portfolios developed in this study generated absolute and risk-adjusted returns that are 
more significant than their active and passive counterparts. Fee arbitrage was derived through 
the range of core-satellite products, resulting in tangible alpha over the sample period. The 
study encourages investors to use smart-beta strategies alongside active and passive funds since 
it improves Sharpe and Information ratios while enhancing the original portfolio’s 
characteristics.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
 Research Background  
 
“Perhaps the most important job of a financial advisor is to get their clients in the right 
place on the efficient frontier in their portfolios. But their No. 2 job, a very close second, is 
to create portfolios that their clients are comfortable with.” 
- Harry Markowitz 
This research is undertaken from the viewpoint of a quantitative portfolio manager with 
potential applications to a Robo-advisor (RA) framework. The investment philosophy followed 
in this paper is inspired by John C. Bogle, who founded The Vanguard Group and the first 
index mutual fund in 1975, the Vanguard 500 Index Fund (VFINX). As of June 2019, the 
VFINX had US$492.2 billion in AUM, with an expense ratio of only 0.14 percent (Vanguard, 
2019).  Bogle’s philosophy to successful investing over the long term, according to his original 
book “Common Sense on Mutual Funds” can be summarised according to these basic 
principles:  
1. Identify low-cost investment strategies  
2. Financial advice comes at a cost and investors should consider its added value  
3. Past performance cannot be used to predict further performance in isolation 
4. Past performance can, however, be used to assess risk and consistency  
5. Construct a fund portfolio with a few assets and hold it indefinitely  
Advisors, plan sponsors, foundations, endowments and retail investors are tasked with 
allocating capital most prudently while seeking to generate the highest risk-adjusted returns. 
To accomplish this objective, they need to determine the optimal blend between active, passive 
and style factors. These three methods of investment management have unique characteristics 
that render them advantageous to include in the greater portfolio context. By introducing real-
world investment mandates obtained from the fund classification framework of The 
Association For Savings & Investments South Africa (ASISA), this analysis aims to construct 
a range of holistic, affordable and accessible portfolios that serve various risk profiles. The 




“target portfolios”. Using similar strategic asset allocations (SAA) as the “target portfolios, 
this study develops a product range of core-satellite portfolios called “replica portfolios” to 
mimic the SAA of South African Equity and Multi-Asset funds while reducing total cost. The 
“replica portfolios”, discussed in Section 1.1.2, are designed to increase exposure to good 
tracking error when it is most desirable and to reduce tracking error when it is least desirable. 
The “target portfolio” mandates obtained from ASISA include:  
1. SA General Equity 
2. SA Multi-Asset High Equity, and  
3. SA Multi-Asset Low Equity 
This research intends to answer complex  questions faced by investors such as, what is the ideal 
blend between active managers, passive managers and smart-beta managers in order to achieve 
the highest risk-adjusted return? How should investors manage active risk in the portfolio, 
particularly within the context of active risk, active return and tracking error? 
 
1.1.1 Active vs Passive vs Smart-Beta Background 
 
Active investors are always looking for opportunities to purchase mispriced securities that are 
trading at prices below their intrinsic value as determined by rigorous fundamental analysis. 
Active investors aim to generate profits by selling securities once they reach their actual 
intrinsic value. Sharpe (1991) points out than an active investor’s portfolio will differ from that 
of the passive investor almost all of the time. Active investors act on the perception of 
mispricing, and these perceptions frequently change as market conditions change. Active 
managers, therefore, trade more frequently compared to passive managers, hence the term 
“active”, which results in higher fees. Active investing can be considered a zero-sum-game 
(Sharpe, 1991). On average, actively managed mutual funds underperform after accounting for 
expense ratios (Fama & French, 2010). Fama and French (2010) further note that active 
managers with enough skill to generate positive returns net of fees are outnumbered by active 
managers who fail to generate positive net returns after accounting for expense ratios.  
On the opposite side of the spectrum is the passive investor. Sharpe (1991) describes the 
passive investor as one that invests in every security that forms part of the market portfolio or 




through Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) and low-cost index funds, have grown significantly 
over the past several decades. Furthermore, passive investing has led to significant cost savings. 
Vanguard, one of the industry leaders in the passive investment management environment has 
approximately US$5.2 trillion in global assets under management, as of January 31, 2019, with 
a range of 415 low-cost traditional funds and ETFs. Boston Consulting Group (2019) reports 
that globally active managed assets lost US$1 trillion in AUM in 2018. Today, actively 
managed assets account for just US$1 out of every US$3 of global AUM, compared to US$1 
out of every US$2 of AUM in 2003 (Boston Consulting Group, 2019). 
Active and passive investment styles are clearly on opposite ends of the spectrum when it 
comes to allocating capital. However, the latest addition to investment styles, called 
fundamental indexing, style factors or smart-beta falls somewhere in the middle of active and 
passive investing. Factor investing, or smart-beta investing as a style has been hugely 
successful over the last decade, with the most substantial part of smart-beta AUM growth 
derived by ETF strategies. According to Morningstar (2017), smart-beta AUM for public 
vehicles, mutual funds and ETFs increased from US$280 billion in 2012 to US$999 billion at 
the end of 2017. Moreover, the most significant statistics are found in the growth of the number 
of smart-beta products available to investors. During 2013, 66 new smart-beta ETFs were 
launched to the global market compared to 302 new smart-beta ETFs that were launched in 
2017 (Morningstar, 2017). The success of smart-beta investing can be attributed to its ability 
to bridge the gap between active and passive investing. Arnott, Hsu and Moore (2005) found 
that fundamentally based market portfolios that were constructed using metrics other than 
market capitalisation weighting, including revenue, dividends and book value outperformed 
the S&P500 Index by an average of 1.97 percent per annum over a 43-year time horizon.  
 
1.1.2 Core-Satellite Portfolio Background 
 
Treynor and Black (1973) revolutionised the idea of portfolio selection when they proposed a 
model to construct an optimal portfolio under the assumption that investors consider markets 
to be efficient and securities priced efficiently. However, these investors believe they have 
sufficient information at their disposal to predict the expected returns or abnormal performance 
“alpha” of some of the securities. This model, formally known as the Treynor Black Model 




components. A specified market index is used as the efficient “passive” primary component 
of the portfolio, and these securities are not analysed as they are assumed to be efficient and 
therefore correctly priced.  The secondary “active” component of the portfolio consists of 
securities that are covered by analysts of a portfolio management firm and are deemed 
inefficient as they are not included in the efficient market index. The TBM obtains the optimal 
risky portfolio by blending the securities that are deemed inefficient “active alpha” with the 
efficient market index “passive beta”. The success of the TBM is a consequence of its 
simplicity as it does not require plentiful information, and it is designed to convey the solution 
for the optimal portfolio in a simple algebraic formula. This optimal portfolio would be exposed 
to securities that exhibit forecasted outperformance (𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎 > 0), with zero,  or less exposure 
to securities that exhibit forecasted underperformance (𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎 < 0). Optimal allocations in 
each security are proportional to its expected alpha.  
The desire to improve investment efficiency in recent years has given rise to a core-satellite 
approach to portfolio management (Amenc, Malaise & Martellini, 2004). Core-satellite 
portfolios can be broken down to a “core” component which is usually passive and is managed 
by a mainstream manager and a secondary “satellite” active component, which is allocated to 
less efficient markets and asset classes as expressed by Figure 1.1.  The idea of the passively 
managed core component of the portfolio is to control manager specific risk and to improving 
the overall efficiency of the portfolio and its ability to outperform its benchmark by limiting 
costs. The secondary component of the portfolio, which is allocated to active and smart-beta 
managers, aims to provide additional diversification and to generate outperformance during 
market downturns.  
  
     Source: Authors depiction & Vanguard (2017) 






Core-satellite portfolio management has proven to be a cost-efficient way to control the relative 
risk, also known as tracking error risk within the consolidated portfolio (Amenc, Malaise & 
Martellini, 2004). Risk and tracking error budgeting should be regarded as a double-edged 
sword which can prove to be beneficial or disastrous in the portfolio construction context.  
There is good tracking error, which refers to the outperformance of the portfolio with regards 
to its benchmark and bad tracking error which refers to the underperformance of the portfolio 
to the benchmark (Amenc, Malaise & Martellini, 2004). Advisors, plan sponsors, foundations, 
endowments and retail investors would ideally position their portfolios to be only exposed to 
good tracking error. Vanguard (2017) mentions that many globally renowned financial 
planning practises have embraced and implemented core-satellite portfolio management 
techniques into their business models. 
1.1.3 Robo-Advisor Background  
 
This research aims to propose potential applications of a rules-based Robo-advisor (RA), 
making affordable portfolio optimization accessible to all types of investors. The term Robo-
advisor has become a well-known buzzword with promising growth prospects in store for their 
services. Beketov et al. (2018) describe RAs as an “automated investment platform that uses 
quantitative algorithms and techniques to manage portfolios and is accessible to clients 
online”. A recent study conducted by Deloitte (2018) indicated that South Africans are open 
to using automated financial advice, particularly individuals between the ages of 34-44 and the 
individuals most interested are those who earn less than R750 000 per annum. Van Rooij, 
Lusardi and Alessie (2011) mention that the complexity of financial decision that individuals 
face has increased to unprecedented levels in recent times. One particular shortcoming tends 
to be that individuals are short-sighted when faced with financial decisions which may lead 
them to be ill-prepared for retirement. Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2007) find that low levels 
of income, wealth and financial education predicts nonparticipation in financial markets, 
particularly equity markets, which leads to lower levels of portfolio diversification. Finally, 
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) evaluate the importance of portfolio and asset class 
choice over the life cycle of the investor. They find that nonparticipation in equity markets 
contribute to a significant source of welfare loss throughout the individual’s life compared to 
those who do participate in equity markets. Moreover, they support the popular notion that the 




 Research Problem Statement  
 
The South African financial market offer investors infinite opportunities to allocate capital 
most efficiently. The concept widely known as modern portfolio theory initially described by 
Markowitz (1952), stipulates that investors are typically risk-averse and should, therefore, 
prefer to be invested in the portfolio with the lowest level of risk for a given level of expected 
return. Applying the concept of modern portfolio theory in practice, however, is more a science 
than an art. Investors who wish to allocate capital in a CIS such as a unit trust, or ETF are spoilt 
for choice. It is no easy task to determine which CIS is most suited for advisors, plan sponsors, 
foundations, endowments, retail investors and most importantly, unsophisticated investors.  
The Association For Savings & Investments South Africa (ASISA) was launched in October 
2008 to improve the savings and investment culture as well as make financial services more 
accessible and interpretable to South African investors.  As of March 2019, there were 1599 
unit trust funds available in South Africa. ETFSA indicate that investors can invest in up to 77 
ETFs in South Africa. Comparing these numbers to the number of listed companies on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), the JSE reported 360 listed companies as at June 2019. 
This data suggests that it is far more complicated and challenging for investors to construct a 
portfolio consisting of CISs, compared to a portfolio consisting only of listed securities.  
ASISA (2018) provides a basic framework to help investors choose as to which CIS to include 
in their portfolio. Formally known as the “ASISA standard for fund classification for South 
African-regulated collective investment portfolios”, aims to provide “a framework within 
which portfolios with comparable investment objectives and investment universes are 
grouped”. The framework is an essential tool that enables investors to match their risk profile, 
risk tolerance and return objective to the CIS funds that are most suited to achieve their 
investment goals. However, with 1599-unit trust funds available, we believe a more 
straightforward approach can be proposed to constructing portfolios in South Africa.  
The research problem statement this paper sets out to address is whether specific ASISA fund 
categories within the classification can be allocated towards standardised risk profiles, called 
“target portfolios”. This research attempts to determine the optimal blend between active 
managers (unit trusts), passive managers (ETFs and index funds) and smart-beta funds in order 
to achieve the highest risk-adjusted return, while remaining within the risk profiles and SAA 
restrictions of the ASISA fund classification framework. The desired outcome of this research 




SAA of the “target portfolios” within ASISA’s framework. Investors can use the “replica 
portfolios” within the product range throughout their entire investment careers as they 
encompass high, medium and low-risk portfolios.  
The research implements multidimensional risk and tracking error budgeting. These techniques 
contribute to the portfolio optimisation process by limiting the extent to which a portfolio can 
deviate from its benchmark with regards to risk and tracking error. It enables investors to gain 
maximum exposure to expected alpha “excess return”, while not exceeding a predetermined 
tracking error, total risk budget, and risk budget per holding. Applying Euler’s theorem for 
homogenous functions, we decompose the risk of the core-satellite portfolio into the risk 
contributed by each of its components. The primary mandate of the core-satellite portfolios in 
the product range is to allocate risk and tracking error efficiently across several investment 
management styles and asset classes in order to maximise returns while remaining within the 
specified risk parameters. Euler’s theorem provides a general method for additively 
decomposing risk into individual asset contributions and thus determine the optimal core 
component of each portfolio depending on its risk profile. When does it serve investors to be 
exposed to “good” tracking error, and what are the risks and costs associated with it?  
Finally, the study evaluates the quantitative methodologies that can be found in third and fourth 
generation Robo-advisors. These RAs are superior when compared with  first- and second-
generation RAs since they use proven quantitative methods and algorithms to develop and 
rebalance portfolios. In addition to providing sound financial advice to clients, these RAs 
perform as automated portfolio managers. The study wishes to propose additional, more robust 
methods that can be incorporated by the next generation of RAs to provide an optimised version 
of standardised, prudent and calculated financial advice to both sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors. This will reduce the overall cost of investing, while increasing the 
risk-adjusted returns of portfolios with several risk profiles. 
 Motivation  
 
“Portfolio theory, as used by most financial planners, recommends that you diversify with 
a balance of stocks and bonds and cash that’s suitable to your risk tolerance.” 
- Harry Markowitz 




First and foremost, to the best knowledge of the author in the time of writing, the majority of 
prior research and literature on the subject of portfolio optimisation has been conducted using 
data from developed markets, with little attention being focused to emerging markets and 
specifically the South African market. The concept of mean-variance optimisation, developed 
initially by Markowitz (1959), is regarded as the cornerstone of modern finance theory.  
Jorion (1992) applies portfolio optimisation in practice to the problem of the optimal portfolio 
from the context of a US investor.  Mean-variance analysis, as proposed by Markowitz (1959) 
assumes that investors prefer portfolios with higher expected return in relation to risk. The 
classical approach to mean-variance optimisation can adequately integrate portfolio and return 
objectives with policy and risk constraints. Additionally, mean-variance optimisation’s ability 
to incorporate numerous client constraints make it a remarkably flexible and useful tool in the 
portfolio construction context. The optimal portfolio Jorion (1992) constructed used data from 
seven major developed government markets, with returns being measured in US$. It was 
highlighted that when investors have more assets at their disposal to choose from, a more 
widely diversified portfolio cannot generate returns less than a portfolio of fewer assets (Jorion, 
1992). Studies on portfolio optimisation in developed markets, with particular focus on 
tracking error and asset allocation, conducted by Ammann and Zimmermann (2001) in which 
they investigate the relationship between statistical measures of tracking error and asset 
allocation restrictions within the portfolio. This research addressed numerous issues in practical 
asset management.  
The idea of core-satellite portfolio management as a portfolio optimisation technique has been 
explored by Waring et al. (2000) in which they present a methodology that solves structural 
problems involved when including active managers in the consolidated portfolio. They address 
how active risk, introduced to the portfolio through active managers, can be controlled as well 
as how active and passive managers should be held as a structure within the portfolio. Waring 
et al. (2000) suggest that investors with higher active risk budgets allocate a large portion of 
their capital to active managers while investors with lower active risk budgets allocate the 
majority of their capital to index and enhanced index funds. Markowitz (1959), Jorion (1992), 
Ammann and Zimmermann (2001) and Waring et al. (2000) addressed numerous issues in the 
portfolio optimisation debate. However, their data was restricted to developed markets only. 
Later studies by Amenc, Malaise and Martellini (2004) introduced a dynamic core-satellite 
approach to managing relative risk in the portfolio. Their results indicated that investors would 




has outperformed the benchmark. Their study did however, not include useful data to 
practically implement the dynamic core-satellite approach, which is something the author 
wishes to explore in this paper. 
Secondly, with the literature in mind regarding portfolio optimisation the author intends to 
explore and critically evaluate South African literature and its findings on active portfolio 
management, passive portfolio management and factor investing, or so-called “smart beta”. 
The outcome and conclusions of the analysis of the South African unit trust industry are 
inconclusive (Bertolis & Hayes, 2014). With regards to the success of passive and smart beta 
investment strategies, the findings of Daswa (2016) highlighted that ETF’s across all markets 
failed to replicate their respective benchmark indices successfully. He further noted that the 
tracking error of emerging market ETF strategies was higher compared to ETF strategies from 
developed markets. These findings will be evaluated in order to assess the advantages of 
including passive investment management techniques within the portfolio optimisation 
process. Fundamental Indexation, factor investing, or so called “smart-beta” investment 
management techniques will be explored, particularly in light of the South African market.  
Research by Duyvené de Wit and Polakow (2017) explore whether the sources of value-add 
“alpha” of South African active fund managers are accessible in cheaper formats such as 
smart-beta products. Their findings mention five broad predictions around the future of active 
fund management in South Africa. The most striking prediction is that there will be an 
emergence of more intellectual and smarter investment products available to South African 
investors. It will include a “new flavour” of active managers that use financial engineering to 
generate exposure to non-replicable alpha. This will result in investment skills being devoted 
to generating alpha free of benchmark impositions, forcing active managers who are deeply 
fundamental and research motivated in their investment approach to adopt a quantitative 
“flavour” to stay competitive (Duyvené de Wit & Polakow, 2017). 
Finally, having worked in the investment management industry in South Africa and reporting 
to portfolio managers, financial planners, advisors and investment consultants it was apparent 
that the number of financial products at their disposal was limitless. These products were 
sophisticated and targeted relative returns, while giving little consideration to the risks and 
costs associated with them. It was further evident that wealthy, sophisticated investors with 
larger balance sheets were able to pay considerably more to receive prudent investment advice. 




the findings of Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2007) that low levels of income, wealth and 
education lead to nonparticipation in financial markets as well as lower levels of diversification 
within their consolidated portfolios.  
To summarise, the motivation of this research is to contribute to the investment and savings 
culture in South Africa. By developing a product range of low-cost core-satellite portfolios, 
underpinned by several robust quantitative techniques. The product range is designed to 
potentially be implemented by an RA platform that uses algorithms and big data to propose the 
optimal risky portfolio consisting of active, passive and smart-beta strategies. 
 
 Research Aims  
 
Firstly, this study aims to identify investment mandates from the fund classification framework 
of The Association For Savings & Investments South Africa (ASISA) and determine their 
strategic asset allocation bounds and restrictions.  
The study intends to replicate, as close as possible the asset allocation and risk profiles of the 
these “target portfolios” by developing a product range of low-cost core-satellite portfolios 
called “replica portfolios”. The portfolios are designed to expose the investor to a low-cost 
primary “core” consisting of passive and enhanced index funds, thus systematic risk “beta”, 
limiting the tracking error of the portfolio. The secondary “satellite” component of the 
portfolio is allocated to active and smart-beta managers to exploit expected excess return 
“alpha”.  
The study sets out to evaluate the state of market efficiency of developed stock markets as well 
as emerging stock markets. We are particularly interested in the efficiency of the South African 
stock market and determined to identify the most appropriate investment stagey to use during 
various states of market efficiency. Therefore, the research critically evaluates literature 
surrounding active, passive and smart-beta management, locally and internationally. 
The research intends to evaluate several methodological frameworks to identify active 
managers, including Sharpe and Information Ratios, as well as Returns Based Style Analysis 
(RBSA), introduced initially by Sharpe (1988, 1992). Finally, the research wishes to explore 
multidimensional risk and tracking error budgeting techniques that can be practically 




determine whether this technique of portfolio optimisation can increase risk-adjusted returns 
for South African portfolios. 
 
 Research Structure 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction:  This chapter includes the research background, research problem 
statement, the motivation for undertaking the research as well as the aims the author wish to 
achieve with the research. This chapter is paramount as to why investors should use multiple 
investment strategies within their portfolios.  
Chapter 2 – Literature Review:  This chapter sets out to discuss the evolution and literature 
of portfolio management as it is known today. The chapter evaluates fundamental principles 
including Modern Portfolio Theory, the efficient frontier along with the minimum variance 
portfolio and tangency portfolio. This chapter is extended to evaluate the theory of market 
efficiency and random walk theory, internationally and within South Africa. The literature 
review covers asset pricing models and the validity of conducting fundamental and technical 
analysis when analysing securities. We critically evaluate literature and finding surrounding 
active, passive and smart-beta investment styles in developed and emerging stock markets and 
determine the optimal strategy to generate superior returns in several states of market 
efficiencies. We present a famous case study that attempts to give the reader some insight and 
potential real-life applications of the theory of active versus passive management we have 
discussed so far. This chapter evaluates literature that introduces robust risk and tracking error 
budgeting and how it can be combined within the core-satellite portfolio. The final discussion 
covered in chapter 2 includes Robo-advisors and the cutting-edge quantitative methods they 
use to construct and manage portfolios. 
Chapter 3 – Methodology: This chapter of the research sets out to discuss several 
mythological frameworks. These methodologies including:  
1. Risk Budgeting, Euler’s Theorem and Risk Decompositions 
2. Tracking Error and Tracking Error Budgeting 
3. Information Ratio 
4. Core-Satellite Portfolios, Optimal Manager Allocation Mechanics and Fee Arbitrage 




Each of the above methods will be covered in detail, along with their advantages and 
disadvantages. The desired outcome is to incorporate all of the above when constructing a 
product range of low-cost core-satellite portfolios. The desired outcome is to propose the 
portfolio construction technique developed in this research to Robo-advisors.  
Chapter 4 – Data: Covers the classification framework used throughout this study. This 
chapter discusses ASISA’s asset allocation framework for classifying South African unit trusts 
along with the risk classification framework suggested by PlexCrown (2019). This chapter aims 
to inform the reader about the sources used to obtain the data, data periods and data types. 
Chapter 5 – Data Analysis, Results Discussion and Portfolio Construction: This chapter 
implements the methodologies set out in chapter 3 and develops a product range of low-cost 
core-satellite portfolios. The “replica portfolios” are constructing using the following steps: 
1. Apply Sharpe and Information Ratio filters to shortlist active managers  
2. Returns Based Style Analysis to select the best active managers 
3. Core-satellite portfolios with multidimensional risk and tracking error budgets 
Chapter 6 – Conclusions, Recommendations and Limitations: The final chapter sets out to 
make concluding comments and to summarise the research findings. This chapter is aimed at 
providing the reader with a consolidated synopsis. Research limitations are discussed along 
with recommendations for further research in the field of finance, financial planning, 















Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
 Modern Portfolio Theory  
 
Modern portfolio theory can be considered the cornerstone of the study of portfolio 
management from a scientific perspective, incorporating both economic and quantitative 
methodologies. Harry Markowitz is credited as having founded Modern Portfolio Theory 
(MPT) with his seminal paper “Portfolio Selection”. Markowitz (1952) gives a clear and 
mathematically precise definition for risk and more importantly, an empirical justification for 
the value of diversification as an investment strategy within the portfolio construction context.  
Markowitz (1952) argues that rational investors are typically risk-averse and should, therefore, 
prefer to invest in the portfolio with the lowest level of risk for a given level of expected return. 
Therefore, investors should consider both returns as well as the variance of returns when 
allocating capital to asset classes or securities. The return or expected return is simply a 
measure of performance, while the variance of returns is a measure of the inherent risk of the 
asset class or security.  
Risk aversion, for rational investors, can be expressed as follows: 
- When investors compare two stocks with similar return or expected return profiles, the 
one with the smaller variance (risk) is preferable. 
 
- When investors compare two stocks with the same variance (risk), the one with the 
highest return or expected return is preferable.  
Applying the concept of modern portfolio theory in practice, however, is more a science than 
an art. Suppose the comparison is not as simple as the one highlighted above and security or 
asset class A demonstrates both higher returns or expected return characteristics as well as a 
higher variance compared to security or asset class B.  
The investor now has to make their decision whether to invest in A or B based on the amount 
of risk they are willing to take, also known as their risk tolerance. The investor has to determine 
whether the additional return from investing in security A is worth the additional risk inherent 
in security A. Markowitz (1952) primary contribution to MPT was defining the performance 




Equation 2.1 represents the return for stock 𝑖 from a time interval (𝑡 − 1, 𝑡): 
 
𝑅𝑖 (𝑡) =  
𝑃𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑃𝑖 (𝑡 − 1)




𝑃𝑖 (𝑡) =  the price of stock 𝑖 at time 𝑡.  
Note: this is a random variable, and we donate the expected value by:     
 
𝜇𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐸 [𝑅𝑖 (𝑡)] (2.2) 
 
Considering a portfolio that consists of several securities. The expected return for the portfolio 
can be expressed as: 
 
𝜇𝑃 = 𝐸 [∑ 𝑥𝑖  𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
] = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1




𝑥𝑖  =  represents the percentage of the investment that is invested in stock 𝑖 
 
The variance of a stock or asset is a measure of how much the price changes or fluctuates. For 
an individual stock, the variance in return is expressed as: 
 
Variance (𝑅𝑖) = 𝐸 [(𝑅𝑖 −  𝜇𝑖)








The covariance in return for a two-stock portfolio can be expressed with the following 
equation: 
𝜎𝑖𝑗 = 𝐸 [(𝑅𝑖 −  𝜇𝑖)(𝑅𝑗 −  𝜇𝑗)] (2.5) 
 
The variance in return of a portfolio consisting of several stocks, assets or funds can be 
expressed as: 
 
Variance (𝑅𝑃) =  𝜎𝑃
2 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 𝜎𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗 = x 
𝑇 ∑ x (2.6) 
 
The portfolio that offers the highest possible return for the given level of variance (risk) is 
considered to be efficient. The portfolio optimisation problem can be expressed as: 
 
Minimise      
1
2
x 𝑇 ∑ x −  
1
λ








𝑥𝑖  ≥ 0  for all 𝑖  
 
(2.7) 
In equation 2.7, risk should be small, while returns should be large. The parameter λ >
0 multiplying the second term is a measure of risk tolerance. If λ is small or close to zero, the 
second term dominates and we can conclude that the investor prefers return over risk and 
therefore has a high-risk tolerance or is risk-tolerant. In contrast, if we find that λ is large, the 
second term receives less weight in the portfolio construction process, and we can conclude 
that the investor is risk-averse and favours low risk over return.  MPT is primarily based on the 
theory of efficient markets. If the theory of efficient markets is accurate, then no active portfolio 
manager should be able to generate returns better than that of the market. We aim to explore 




portfolio construction context. Considering the literature around MPT, this study will evaluate 
the way investors evaluate risk and returns. Furthermore, in the light of allocating capital in 
financial markets and the potential inclusion of active portfolio managers, we will evaluate 
empirical evidence to determine whether markets can be regarded as efficient. 
 
 Asset Prices Under Conditions of Risk 
 
2.2.1 The Efficient Frontier 
 
Markowitz (1959), introduces the efficient frontier which aims to solve the optimal level of 
portfolio diversification in maximising returns while minimising risk. At its core, the efficient 
frontier is a graph that represents the relationship between return and risk for a given set of 
portfolios. Specifically, “the efficient frontier represents that set of portfolios that has the 
maximum rate of return for every given level of risk or the minimum risk for every level of 
return”. The portfolio that lies on the efficient frontier must maximise return for a given level 










Source: Reilly and Brown (2012: 189) 




From Figure 2.1 we conclude that every portfolio that lies on the efficient frontier either 
exhibits a higher rate of return of equal levels of risk or lower levels of risk for an equal rate of 
return that another portfolio that plots below the efficient frontier (Reilly & Brown, 2012). 
Portfolio A > C because Portfolio A has a similar return profile compared to Portfolio C, 
however Portfolio A has substantially less risk. Similarly, we find that Portfolio B   > Portfolio 
C because it has a similar risk profile, but Portfolio B has a higher expected rate of return. The 
efficient frontier consists of portfolios of assets rather than individual securities due to the 
assumption of diversification that exists between uncorrelated assets. At the extreme ends of 
the efficient frontier, we find the only exceptions which represent the asset with the highest 
expected return and the asset with the lowest level of risk. A practical application to the 
efficient frontier is illustrated by Figure 2.2: 
Source: Authors depiction using A-Dex Prism 
This practical illustration of the efficient frontier was derived by including four building blocks 
that exist in South Africa and include (1) JSE All-Share Index, (2) Momentum Style Factor, 
(3) Value Style Factor and (4) Low Volatility Style Factor. The benchmark portfolio, in this 
case, is the JSE All-Share Index. Figure 2.2 illustrates a a representative sample of  the feasible 
set which includes 2000 sample portfolios of all possible blends of the selected building blocks 




for the period 2003 - 2018  (Index and Styles) where each is presented in Expected Return, 
Total Risk (measured by annualised standard deviation of returns) and TE (return differentials 
between a portfolio of assets and a defined benchmark). Here we notice that the Momentum 
Style Factor Portfolio (in red) generated an annualised return of 21.88% with a total risk of 
14.82% compared to the JSE All-Share Index (in black) that generated an annualised return of 
15.09% with a total risk of 15.31%. We can therefore conclude that the Momentum Style Factor 
Portfolio is superior to the JSE All-Share Index according to the efficient frontier theory.  
When investors move from the bottom left of the efficient frontier upwards and right, the risk 
(measured by the annualised standard deviation of returns) as well as the returns increase. If 
we analyse Figure 2.2, we notice that for every portfolio or feasible set that offers a level of 
expected return, there is another portfolio that offers the same level of expected return while 
incurring a lower level of risk. Portfolios that plot on the efficient frontier provides investors 
the maximum expected return for a given level of risk.  
Markowitz (1991) argues that the goal for investors is to identify and invest in the portfolio 
that matches their risk tolerance while avoiding or limiting the amount of capital allocated to 
inefficient portfolios. Allocation of capital towards an inefficient portfolio would expose the 
investor to a certain level of risk without acquiring the corresponding optimal level of return. 
This leads us to the next question; how would investors target a point along the efficient frontier 
that satisfies their attitude towards risk? 
 
2.2.2 Minimum Variance Portfolio and Tangency Portfolio  
 
Consider a group of investors who wish to invest in the portfolio that offer the least amount of 
risk, i.e. completely risk-averse and wish to invest without incurring risk and are agnostic about 
the potential expected return implications of the portfolio. These investors would ideally 
identify portfolios or feasible sets that plot on the efficient frontier with the least amount of risk 
as measured by standard deviation, implying the minimum variance.  
This is what is called the minimum-variance portfolio, the portfolio at the left-most tip if the 
efficient frontier that holds independent security or asset class weights of the forecasted 
expected returns of those securities or asset class. Thus, the minimum-variance portfolio is 
designed to minimise risk without an explicit expected return estimation (Clarke, de Silva & 




Figure 2.3 illustrates the minimum-variance portfolio for a feasible set of theoretical portfolios 
as point A on the mean-variance efficient frontier. One important conclusion derived by Clarke, 
de Silva and Thorley (2006) regarding the use of minimum variance portfolios is that these 
portfolios have the potential to add value over the market capitalisation-weighted benchmark. 
We wish to explore this concept in the subsequent chapter in light of the findings made by 
Clare, Motson and Thomas (2013). 
  
        Source: Clare, Motson and Thomas (2013) 
The second group of investors may have alternative preferences when allocating capital. Their 
investment decision is not solely based on the amount of risk they incur as the case of the 
minimum-variance portfolio investors. This group of investors are considered to have a higher 
risk tolerance compared to the previous group; however, they are still what we call rational 
investors since they consider both returns as well as the variance of returns when allocating 
capital to portfolios.  
Sharpe (1966), in his paper “Mutual Fund Performance”, describes the key elements portfolio 
selectors consider as both expected return and risk.  This is in clear contrast to the portfolio 
selector, who prefers the minimum variance portfolio. In selecting the optimal portfolio that 




provides the desired combination of risk and return, the investor needs to specify their 
preferences.  
The final step for the investor would be to select a portfolio that plots on the efficient frontier 
that is deemed most desirable based on their expectations about risk and expected returns. Once 
this portfolio is selected, the investor needs to consider a few crucial aspects. Firstly, the 
forecasted portfolio performance is described by the expected rate of return (𝐸𝑖) and the 
predicted risk or variability expressed as the standard deviation of return (𝜎𝑖).  
Secondly, we assume that all investors can invest in a risk-free investment that generates one 
common interest rate and that these investors can similarly borrow funds at this rate. Third, we 
assume than at any point in time, all investors have the same future predictions about the 
performance of security prices. These conditions lead to the estimation of the capital market 
model, also known as the Capital Market Line (CML).  
Portfolios that plot on the CML becomes the efficient frontier and can be expressed as: 
    
𝐸𝑖 = 𝑝 + 𝑏𝜎𝑖 (2.8) 
            
Where 
𝐸𝑖  =  the portfolio expected rate of return  
𝑝 =  the pure riskless interest rate  
𝑏 =  will be assumed to be positive since investors are risk-averse  
 
This relationship, initially described by Tobin (1958) and formally known as the separation 
theorem, is based on how investors firstly identify the optimal portfolio of risky assets and after 
that decide whether to lend or borrow, depending on their risk tolerance.  
If investors can borrow or lend at a common riskless interest rate 𝑝 and invest in a market 
portfolio with an expected return (𝐸𝑖,  𝜎𝑖), the investor can now allocate capital anywhere 





𝐸 = 𝑝 + (
𝐸𝑖 − 𝑝
𝜎𝑖
)  𝜎 (2.9) 
 
Any portfolio will generate a combination of the expected rate of return (𝐸𝑖) and the predicted 
risk or variability expressed as the standard deviation of return (𝜎𝑖). The optimal portfolio will 
be the one for which (𝐸𝑖 − 𝑝) 𝜎𝑖⁄  is the greatest. Sharpe (1966), initially defines this ratio as 
the reward-to-variability ratio, which has formally become known as the Sharpe Ratio (SR). 
The SR represents the expected return per unit of risk; thus the portfolio with the maximum SR 
as illustrated by point C in Figure 2.3 provides the highest expected return 𝐸𝑖 ,  per unit of risk 
𝜎𝑖 . This is known as the optimal risk efficient portfolio or the “tangency portfolio”, originally 
introduced over 50 years ago by Sharpe (1966), later revised by Sharpe (1994) and considered 
one of the most popular risk metrics in the investment management industry. The SR can also 
be interpreted as the CML since it is a measure of the total risk of the portfolio and most 
appropriate when analysing a portfolio of securities rather than one single security.  







𝑅𝑖  =  the expected return of asset 𝑖 
𝑅𝐹𝑅 =  the risk-free rate of return 
𝜎𝑖 =  the standard deviation of the returns for asset 𝑖 
 
Higher SR’s indicates superior risk-adjusted returns for a portfolio of securities. We construct 
a practical feasible set of portfolios to illustrate the optimal risk efficient portfolio, also known 
as the maximum Sharpe Ratio portfolio or the “tangency portfolio”. The buildings blocks for 
this practical portfolio are identical to those used in the example previously illustrated in 
Figure 2.2. Figure 2.4, however, illustrates a representative sample of the feasible set which 
includes 2000 sample portfolios for the period 2006 – 2009 when the Global Financial Crisis 





Source: Authors depiction using A-Dex Prism 
The results suggest that during the GFC, the maximum SR portfolio (Sharpe Ratio of 0.72) 
consisted out of a blend containing 48 percent Momentum Factor and 52 percent Low Volatility 
Factor. We see that holding the JSE All-Share Index alone over this period would have offered 
little return for its level of risk.  
Evaluating the relationship between the efficient frontier, the minimum-variance portfolio, the 
maximum Sharpe Ratio portfolio and the CML, we conclude that the portfolio optimisation 
principle should take effect when investors know the relationship between risk and return and 
their preference to these two variables. Markowitz (1991) argues the optimal portfolio is the 










 Efficient Market Hypothesis and Random Walk Theory 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) which is widely known in portfolio management 
literature, as defined by Fama (1970) suggests that investors should not be able to outperform 
their peers on a risk-adjusted basis consistently. Reilly and Brown (2012) describe an efficient 
market as one in which security prices rapidly adjust to reflect the arrival of new information, 
and therefore one can assume that the current prices of securities reflect all available 
information about those securities. The question of whether security markets are efficient can 
be regarded as one of the most controversial within the area of investment management and 
investment research. The extensive research, particularly over the past 30 years regarding 
whether capital markets are efficient is vital since the results have material practical 
implications for investors and portfolio managers.  
The EMH theory is based upon the notion that in an efficient market prices “fully reflect” 
available information. This theory is however, subjective and general. Fama (1970), therefore 
advises that a model needs to be designed to define precisely what is meant by the term “fully 
reflect”. One suggested model would be that equilibrium prices “expected returns” are 
generated as per the two-parameter world described by Sharpe (1964).  When investors view 
the outcome of returns of an investment in probabilistic terms which describes the possible 
returns in terms of some probability distribution. In determining whether to proceed and 
allocate capital to a particular investment, the investors are willing to act on the basis of having 
only two-parameters in the probability distribution being: (1) the expected value and (2) its 
standard deviation. The two-parameters probability distribution can be represented by a total 
utility function expressed as: 
 
 U = f (EW,  𝜎W) (2.11) 
Where 
EW =  indicates expected future wealth 
 𝜎W =  indicates the predicted standard deviation of the possible divergence of  





2.3.1 Weak Form EMH and Random Walk Theory 
 
The weak form EMH originally stated that current stock prices fully reflect all market 
information, and therefore, we can assume that historical prices cannot predict future stock 
prices. Current stock prices reflect trading volume data and the historical sequence of that 
particular stock, thus following a “random walk”. One influential theory that has evolved in 
addressing and testing models of stock price behaviour is the theory of random walks. The 
random walk theory states that successive price changes are independent over time. The idea 
of random walks was initially based on the observations of English botanist Robert Brown 
when he noticed that grains of pollen suspended in water had a rapid oscillatory motion when 
viewed under a microscope (Brown, 1828). This phenomenon was also observed in gasses and 
later became known as Brownian Motion. The pioneering work of Robert Brown was largely 
ignored by the scientific community for some time, and it was only in 1900 that the idea of 
Brownian motion or random walk theory surfaced in economic literature. The model of stock 
price behaviour was initially hypothesised in 1900 by Louis Bachelier, in his ground-breaking 
contribution in the construction of a random walk model for both security markets and 
commodity markets.  
On April 1925, a dinner meeting of the American Statistical Association was held in New York, 
with approximately 420 people attending the meeting. The topic to be discussed at the meeting 
was Forecasting Security Prices. The program was closed by Frederick R. Macaulay of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, who observed that there was a striking similarity 
between fluctuations in the stock market and that of a chance curve as obtained by throwing a 
dice (The American Statistical Association, 1925). Further empirical findings on the 
randomness of stock market movements and the ability, or rather inability of investors to 
accurately forecast stock returns were astonishing. Cowles (1933) initially evaluated the results 
achieved by 24 financial publications that forecasted the expected returns of the stock market 
during the period of January 1928 to June 1932. The results showed little evidence of skill in 
predicting the outcome of market prices. Further evidence of the lack of investors forecasting 




years from January 1928 to July 1943 and the remaining 4 forecasters covering 11 years ending 
in 1938 and 1939. The forecasters included 4 well known financial periodicals and 7 well 




The results once again proved to be astonishing as: 




 years, failed to show evidence of their ability to accurately predict the future 
outcome of the stock market as imitated by the Standard & Poor's average of 90 
representative stocks. 
 
- Most remarkably, it was noted that the forecasting agency that produced the best results 
“evidence of skill” for the 15
1
2
 years since 1927, generated a mere 3.3 percent per annum 
return greater than a strategy than simply held stocks composed of the Dow-Jones 
Industrial Average. Cowles (1944) commented, “Under present laws the capital-gains 
tax might wipe out most of this advantage.”  
It was concluded that the success of the forecasting agency over this particular period was not 
completely accidental. Statistical tests indicate a simple application of the “inertia” principle, 
trading at turning points such as buying low after prices for a month averaged higher, and 
selling high after they averaged lower for the previous month, would have resulted in material 
returns which were substantially more significant than those of the forecasting agency (Cowles, 
1944). 
Kassouf (1968) in his article titled “Stock Price Random Walks: Some Supporting Evidence” 
further explores whether stock markets follow random walks. If stock prices follow random 
walks in which future steps, directions or movements of stock prices cannot be predicted based 
on historical price sequences as per the book: A Random Walk Down Wall Street Malkiel 
(1973) then, the price changes per unit of time would have a normal distribution. If the random 
walk theory is an accurate description of reality, then the numerous “technical” or “chartist” 
methods of predicting stock prices are fruitless (Fama, 1995). Moreover, technical and 
fundamental theories are considered by both market professionals and academics to be the 
essence of investment management and security selection. Random walk theorists base their 
beliefs on the premise that stock exchanges are not efficient. As described by Fama (1995), an 
efficient market is one where a large number of rational investors actively compete against one 
another to maximise their profits. These investors intend to predict the future market prices of 




If security prices are independent “random”, we can conclude that buying a security and 
holding it will generate profits that are greater or equal to that of buying a security based on 
historical price changes. The tests for independence have produced consistent and impressive 
results, and Fama (1995) goes as far as to state: “I know of no study in which standard statistical 
tools have produced evidence of important dependence in series of successive price changes”.  
If all of the above holds, stock markets would be unpredictable and successive security price 
changes would be independent of each other, implying they follow a random walk. 
 
2.3.2 Semi-Strong Form EMH and Fundamental Analysis  
 
“A stock is not just a ticker symbol or an electronic blip; it is an ownership interest in an 
actual business, with an underlying value that does not depend on its share price.”  
- Benjamin Graham   
According to the semi-strong form EMH, security prices adjust rapidly to the release of all 
public information and current security prices fully reflect all available public information. 
Numerous studies including Ball and Brown (1968) on the impact of earnings announcements 
and Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) on the impact of stock splits and dividends, confirm 
the notion of the semi-strong form EMH in that no material price changes arise following stock 
splits or earning announcements due to the fact that any relevant information, i.e. earnings 
growth, has already been discounted in the current share price.  
This section of the paper is particularly interested in the theory of fundamental analysis and the 
implications of a semi-strong form EMH on this theory. If investors are determined to construct 
the optimal risky portfolio, it is vital that we understand the components of that portfolio, i.e. 
active vs passive vs enhanced indexation, value vs growth vs quality and fundamental vs 
quantitative. Benjamin Graham is hailed as the father of fundamental analysis, his first book 
titled “Securities Analysis” published in 1934 is considered the foundation of fundamental 
analysis. Fundamental analysis can be defined as the process of analysing all aspects related to 
the economic wellbeing of a company, from its market share to the quality of its management. 
Fundamental analysis can be applied to determine whether a company’s revenue is growing, is 
the company able to repay its debt and is the company generating a profit. In short, we can 




economic data to forecast the future movements of stock prices. Of course, fundamental 
analysis as a method of determining the future movements of share prices encompass several, 
if not hundreds of methods and data points and can include company-specific data as well as 
macro-economic data.   
“Valuation is easy. The tough part is fundamental analysis.” 
- Phil Friedman, former Morgan Stanley Portfolio Manager 
The relevance of fundamental analysis, to the fundamental investor, is centred around the 
notion that in the long term, stock prices tend to revert towards its actual intrinsic value. The 
fundamental investor would use fundamental analysis techniques to determine a company’s 
intrinsic value. If this intrinsic value is above the current market price, the investor will acquire 
the stock because they believe it would rise towards its intrinsic value, i.e. the stock is 
considered to be “cheap”. On the other hand, if the investor determines that the intrinsic value 
to be below the current market price, they would sell the stock because they believe the price 
would decline in value and move towards its intrinsic value, i.e. the stock is considered to be 
“expensive”.  
Pearce and Roley (1985), in their influential paper “Stock Prices and Economic News”, 
evaluate the impact of announcements about macro-economic factors including money supply, 
inflation, real economic activity and the Federal Reserve’s discount rate. Their results are 
impressive and suggest that the impact of macro-economic events on stock price movements 
failed to persist beyond the day of their announcements. Furthermore, the anticipated 
components of macro-economic announcements significantly fail to affect the movements of 
stock prices on a daily basis. These findings are consistent with the theory of a semi-strong 
form efficient market in that security prices adjust rapidly to the release of all public 
information. We conclude that investors who base their investment decision solely on macro-
economic variables and unexpected announcements about them will struggle to outperform 
their peers consistently. There are however, observable drifts in stock prices subsequent the 
announcement of important news for several months (Kothari & Warner, 1997).  
In a study conducted by Shiller (1981) on the reaction of stock prices to changes in dividend 
policy found that stock prices are too volatile in the short term to be explained by changes in 
dividends only. More recent studies on share price reactions following public news by Chan 
(2003) compare returns of shares with public news to similar returns without evidence of public 




in a positive or negative direction, while stocks without news fail to exhibit momentum. The 
results surrounding drifts in stock prices indicate that although security prices in a semi-strong 
efficient market adjust to reflect all information, there is room for active managers to employ 
fundamental analysis to exploit these drifts. Information flows can certainly cause anomalies 
that contradict the semi-strong EMH. 
Benjamin Graham, in his second book titled “The Intelligent Investor” initially published in 
1949, stresses the importance of buying securities when they trade below their intrinsic value. 
This term formally became known as value investing. Methods of identifying these securities 
as described by Graham and Dodd (1934) and Graham (1949) include companies trading at a 
discount to book value, i.e. low price-book value (P/BV) ratios and those having low price-to-
earnings (P/E) ratios. Initial empirical studies conducted by Rosenburg, Reid and Lanstein 
(1985) introduces a B/P (Book Value/Market Price Per Share) strategy in which they buy 
stocks on the New York Stock Exchange with a high B/P ratio and sell stocks with a low B/P 
ratio. They find a positive relationship between the B/P ratio and future stock returns and 
conclude the relationship between publicly available information on the B/P ratio and future 
returns contradict the semi-strong form EMH.  
Fama and French (1992) evaluate the cross-section of expected returns by including variables 
such as market beta, size, earnings-price (E/P) ratio, leverage and the book-market value 
(BV/MV) ratio and find evidence of a positive relationship between BV/MV and average returns. 
Results of Basu (1977), support the original ideas of Benjamin Graham that value investing 
can be implemented as a sound investment strategy and that low P/E stocks generate superior 
risk-adjusted returns compared to high P/E stocks. The “size-effect” is another anomaly that 
points to the misspecification of the CAPM as the results of Banz (1981) show smaller firms 
generated significantly higher risk-adjusted returns compared to larger firms over a period 
spanning forty years. One possible explanation of the “size effect” is the fact that securities 
with small market capitalisations “small-caps” often fail to do exhibit sufficient information 
for risk-averse investors to determine their true risk parameters and expected return 
distributions. Investors would, therefore, choose not to hold securities of very small firms due 
to the lack of information available, and it is the lack of holding these small firms that 






2.3.3 Strong-Form EMH 
 
The final sphere of market efficiency is the strong-form EMH which encapsulates both the 
weak-form and the semi-strong form EMH. The strong-form EMH states that security prices 
reflect all information, including public and private firm-specific information. Research in 
favour of the strong-form EMH include that of Jensen (1969) in that mutual funds, and their 
security analysts fail to generate efficient portfolios as they underperformed the market 
portfolio. The reason for their underperformance is mainly due to a lack of superior forecasting 
ability and that prices of securities behave according to the strong-form EMH. Therefore, these 
prices reflect all available information, public and private. If the strong-form EMH cannot be 
rejected, the implications are that investors who use charts “technical analyst”, investors who 
use company-specific information “fundamentalists” as well as corporate insiders, security 
analysts and professional money managers should not be able to generate above-average 
returns consistently. The majority of studies conducted before 2002 indicate that on a risk-
adjusted basis, highly trained professional money managers failed to generate superior risk-
adjusted returns compared to simply buying the benchmark index. Net of fees, approximately 
two-thirds of mutual funds failed to generate returns better than the market. Moreover, mutual 
funds and security analysts failed to show consistency in their ability to generate superior 
returns. Interestingly, the only group who seem to generate above average returns are the 
largest endowments in terms of AUM. This is due to their ability and willingness to diversify 
their portfolios by investing in a wide variety of assets including hedge funds, FOF’s, real estate 
and global alternative asset classes.  
 
2.3.4 Market Efficiency in Emerging Markets  
 
In order to construct the optimal portfolio using South African mutual funds, ETF’s and style 
factors, we need to evaluate the efficiency of emerging markets before we start implementing 
the most desired investment management strategy. Our research so far has been limited to 
evaluating the efficiency of developed stock markets for which we have established that 
markets are not perfectly efficient.  
A study examining the market efficiency of BRIC countries conducted by Mobarek and 




efficient, particularly over the period 2000 – 2010. Using data for the period 1995 – 2010, they 
find that during the initial period of the study these markets rejected the weak-form efficient 
market as they experienced significant positive autocorrelation in returns, thus not following 
random walks. In the latter part of their study, they find evidence that these markets have 
matured and can be considered efficient up to some extent.  
De Souza et al. (2018) evaluates market efficiency  by including South Africa, the latest 
member included in BRICS to investigate the profitability of technical trading strategies in 
BRICS member countries. They find that on average, the returns obtained from a TA strategy 
was positive. The results suggest that BRICS markets rejected the weak-form EMH and did 
not follow random walks. The study points out that market age and market efficiency is directly 
related since markets evolve to become more efficient over time. Brazil, the second oldest 
market included in the sample, generated the lowest returns using TA, implying the Brazilian 
market is more efficient than the other members. TA strategies in Russia and India generated 
the highest returns because these markets are younger, implying they are less efficient. Based 
on their results, they concluded that the weak-form EMH could be rejected for BRICS 
members. These results suggest that TA, along with fundamental analysis, can be used in 
emerging markets to generate above-average returns, particularly in younger emerging 
markets. Passive strategies should not be used in isolation when investing in these markets. 
Noakes and Rajaratnam (2016) asses the efficiency of the South African market using random 
number generators. Using daily data for the period 2005-2009, they sort the shares in the 
sample according to their size as measured by their market capitalisation values into three 
categories; small, mid and large-cap. They divide the sample into two periods of market 
volatility; stable (March 2005 - July 2007) and unstable corresponding to the GFC (August 
2007 - December 2009). Their results are inconclusive as to whether the JSE can be considered 
efficient or not. Small-cap stocks fail to exhibit random behaviour, while large-cap stocks fail 
to reject randomness. Their findings are similar to Smith and Dyakova (2014) in that efficiency 
is related to size. However, their results point towards size on a stock-specific level and not 
only on an aggregate exchange level. Thus, small stock exchanges, small-cap indices and 
small-cap stocks in Africa and South Africa are less efficient than large stock exchanges, large-
cap indices and large-cap stocks. Stable periods lead to efficiency of JSE listed stocks while 
periods of a financial crisis (GFC) presents evidence against market efficiency. Efficiency and 
non-efficiency for JSE listed stocks can found in groups with similar attributes and 




2.3.5 Conclusion: Market Efficiency in Developed and Emerging Markets  
 
Overall, studies on the efficiency of developed markets have provided support for and against 
the existence of perfectly efficient markets.  We conclude that the evidence of random walks 
supports the idea of the weak-form EMH. There is a large body of evidence that suggest 
additional firm characteristic and factors including BV/MV, P/E and Size explain their returns 
over and above their beta, which contradicts the semi-strong EMH. Our final synopsis is that 
developed markets are not perfectly efficient, and investors should consider incorporating 
passive investment strategies when markets are most efficient and active strategies when 
markets are less efficient. This will give portfolios exposure to beta when the market is efficient 
and alpha when the market exhibit lower levels of efficiency.  
We find that developed markets exhibit higher degrees of market efficiency compared to 
emerging markets. African stock markets, including South Africa, incur periods of non-
efficiency followed by periods of efficiency, thus successive periods of predictability and non-
predictability. Our findings and the concept of the evolution of return predictability are 
consistent with the Adaptive Market Hypothesis (AMH) as described by Lo (2004, 2005,2012) 
in that investors are continually adapting to a changing environment and therefore, their 
investment strategies, techniques and policies are also formulated and adapted with this 
changing market environment in mind.  
When markets are less efficient, profitable opportunities may present itself, which can be 
exploited by active portfolio managers. In the South African market, we encourage investment 
strategies to be dynamic and in line with the concept of AMH. Blending active and passive 
investment management techniques for various asset classes and stocks with heterogenous 
classifications and characteristics would be advantageous for investors allocating capital in the 
South African market.  
Dragota and Tilica (2014) recommend the use of passive investment management strategies 
when markets and asset classes are more efficient, while less efficient markets and asset classes 
render active management strategies beneficial.  This will enable investors to take advantage 






 Active vs Passive Portfolio Management  
 
“Most investors will find that the best way to own common stocks (shares) is through an 
index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following this path are sure to beat the net 
results, after fees and expenses, of the great majority of investment professionals.”  
- Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Chairman’s Letter, 1996, pg 15. 
 
2.4.1 Introduction to Active and Passive Portfolio Management 
 
Active portfolio management is forecasting (Grinold & Kahn, 2000). The sources of 
investment opportunity are essential in the context of active portfolio management.  According 
to the fundamental law of active management, there are two sources of investment opportunity. 
The first is the investors’ ability to forecast the residual return of each asset and asset class. 
The second source is the number of times per year active managers can implement their skill. 
The ability to forecast the residual returns of asset classes or individual securities is measured 
by the information coefficient, which is the correlation between the forecast and the eventual 
returns that were achieved. The information coefficient can be regarded as a measure of the 
level of skill the active manager has. Active investors are always looking for opportunities to 
purchase mispriced securities that are trading at prices below their intrinsic value as determined 
by rigorous fundamental analysis. Sharpe (1991) points out than an active investor’s portfolio 
will differ from that of the passive investor almost all of the time. Active managers trade more 
frequently than passive managers, hence the term “active”, leading to higher fees. Active 
investing can be considered a zero-sum-game (Sharpe, 1991). 
Passive investing, on the other hand, through a market capitalisation-weighted index ETF or 
low-cost index fund aims to track and replicate as closely as possible the returns of a benchmark 
or specific market segment by investing in the securities or sample of securities that compose 
the benchmark or market segment (Rowley, Walker & Zhu, 2019). Any strategy seeking to 
differentiate itself from the benchmark index or market segment should be considered active 
management. Passive investing seeks to minimise the expected deviations of returns from that 
of the benchmark index, on the downside as well as the upside. Over the long term, passive 
investment strategies have proven to be beneficial to investors as it eliminates the need to find 




2.4.2 Active vs Passive Portfolio Management in Developed Markets 
 
Malkiel (1995) in his research titled “Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 
1991” supports the theory that historical price and security information does not lead to 
superior returns and that security prices reflect all available fundamental information in a rapid 
manner. By the 1970s, the EMH had become the accepted standard in the field of academia 
(Malkiel, 1995). However, by the 1980s some anomalies appeared that contradicts the EMH. 
During this period, security prices were not independent, did not follow random walks and 
showed positive correlations over the short term and negative correlations over long periods. 
This behaviour contradicted earlier studies conducted by Kendall (1953) and Osborne (1959) 
who found that serial correlation coefficients of stock returns were close to zero. Furthermore, 
by using fundamental variables such as dividend yields, market capitalisation, (size), P/E ratios 
and P/BV ratios, investors could find and forecast predictability in future stock prices, see Basu 
(1977), Rosenburg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) and Fama and French (1992). These anomalies 
have led to the ongoing debate, do active managers outperform their benchmark and passive 
strategies?  
One of the first studies that assessed the performance and specifically the predictive ability of 
115 open-end mutual funds for the period 1945 – 1964 was conducted by Jensen (1968). His 
study introduced two subsets of “performance measurement” when portfolios of risky 
investments are evaluated. One, the ability of security analysts to successfully predict future 
stock prices. Second, the ability of the portfolio manager to minimise portfolio risk. Therefore, 
the success of portfolio managers and security analysts is measured by their predictive ability. 
We can define this as the ability to generate returns by selecting stocks that produce higher 
returns than those which we could expect for the amount of risk incurred in the portfolio. 
Previous studies by Sharpe (1966) on the performance of mutual funds were based on relative 
measure of performance, i.e. ranking portfolios against each other and not against some 
absolute standard or measure. The study conducted by Jensen (1968) introduced an absolute 
measure to evaluate the forecasting ability of portfolio managers and is derived from the 
application of the CAPM. The model is similar to the SR developed by Sharpe (1966). 
However, this model includes an additional factor called “alpha” which represents the 
additional return produced in excess of what the asset should produce in a state of market 
equilibrium. CAPM indicates the return a security or portfolio of securities should generate for 




independently by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966), which calculates the 
expected return for any security or portfolio of assets as: 
 
𝐸(𝑅𝑗) = 𝑅𝐹𝑅 + 𝛽𝑗  [𝐸(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹𝑅)] (2.12) 
 
Since the expected return 𝐸(𝑅𝑗) of portfolio 𝑗 and the risk-free rate 𝑅𝐹𝑅 vary over periods of 
time 𝑡, we can express the CAPM in terms of realised returns rather than expected return 𝐸(𝑅𝑗): 
 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗  [𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑡] + 𝑒𝑗𝑡 (2.13) 
 
Where 𝑒𝑗𝑡 is a random error term as the equation expresses the rate of return on a security or 
portfolio for a period of time as a linear function of the 𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑡, plus a risk premium 
𝛽𝑗  [𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑡] that depends on the level of systematic risk, i.e. 𝛽𝑗 plus a random error term.  
This leads to the Jensen Alpha measure expressed as:  
 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗  [𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑡] + 𝑒𝑗𝑡 (2.14) 
 
The Jensen measure suggests that superior managers who can consistently forecast stock 
returns should earn higher risk premiums compared to those implied by 𝛽𝑗  [𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑡]. 
Superior performance is detected by including an intercept term with a nonzero constant that 
indicates positive or negative divergence from the model. In Equation 2.14, 𝛼𝑗 indicates the 
managers ability to forecast stock returns. Managers with superior forecasting abilities will 
have significant positive “alpha” 𝛼, compared to inferior managers who will generate returns 
less than those based on CAPM and therefore significant negative “alpha” 𝛼. Finally, 
managers with no forecasting abilities but who are not able to outperform the risk premium 
will equal a simple passive buy-and-hold strategy. 𝛼 in the context of the Jensen measure 
indicates how much of the managers return can be attributed to their ability to generate superior 
risk-adjusted returns by identifying undervalued stocks. Jensen (1968) reports that 115 mutual 
funds, on average failed to possess superior stock-picking abilities in order to outperform a 




less risky portfolios versus the market portfolio. The mean net intercept value, 𝛼 was -0.011. 
Most importantly, Jensen (1968) highlights that before accounting for fees, the mutual funds 
also fail to generate positive intercept values since the average gross 𝛼 was -0.004. For this 
period, a simple passive buy-and-hold strategy would have been more beneficial for the 
average investor compared to using active mutual funds to achieve their investment objective 
given their risk tolerance. Later studies conducted by Henriksson (1984), evaluate the market-
timing performance of 116 mutual funds using monthly return data for the period 1968 – 1980. 
The empirical results derived using parametric and nonparametric tests found that active 
mutual fund managers failed to implement a strategy that times the return on the market 
portfolio (Henriksson, 1984). Moreover, active mutual fund managers were unable to forecast 
larger changes in the value of the market portfolio compared to smaller changes.  In an efficient 
market, information should be freely available, and therefore, security prices should reflect all 
available information (Fama, 1970).  
In an attempt to determine the benefits of active portfolio management in light of the costs 
involved in obtaining information, Ippolito (1989) uses the Jensen measure as per equation 
2.14 to estimate the 𝛼 and 𝛽 for 143 mutual funds for the period 1965-1984. This study is 
comparable to several “first-generation” mutual fund studies that were published in prior 
years. However, it produced results different to those of Sharpe (1966), Jensen (1968) and 
Henriksson (1984). Ippolito (1989) finds evidence that active mutual funds, after accounting 
for fees and expenses, except load charges, outperformed passive strategies on a risk-adjusted 
basis. However, the average alpha produced by active managers is found not be higher than the 
load charges of the active funds. Thus, the positive alpha of active managers is eroded by fund 
expenses, management fees and charges. These results are consistent with the idea of the EMH 
and costly information and the notion that active investing can be considered a zero-sum-game 
(Sharpe, 1991).  Ippolito (1989) does, however, find that active managers that are more active 
than their counterparts, i.e. higher portfolio turnovers, management fees and load charges can 
generate returns that offset the higher charges. This is in line with the notion that that active 
managers are efficient with regard to conducting research and executing trades. Malkiel (1995) 
evaluates mutual fund performance over the period 1971 – 1991 and permits measures of 
survivorship bias which form a substantial portion of the dataset. The results suggest that 
mutual funds underperform their benchmarks before and after accounting for management fees 
in the context of the CAPM. There is however, evidence that suggests the persistence 




Investors would be better off following a simple, low-cost passive strategy compared to finding 
a “hot-hand” active manager, therefore in light of fees, performance and taxes, the advantages 
of passive investing outweigh active (Malkiel, 1995).  Bogle (2010) states that he is a stronger 
believer in passive investing than he was when he created the first index fund in 1975. The 
concept of buying the market portfolio or index started off slowly, but has not only steadily 
gained acceptance by investors but has become a standard that dominates the debates about 
investment strategy, asset allocation and long-term portfolio construction. Bogle (2010) 
expresses his beliefs (Table 2.1 & 2.2) in passive management by presenting the absolute 
returns of average US equity mutual funds vs the S&P500 index for two distinct periods.  
Table 2.1: S&P500 Index vs Equity Mutual Funds (Ended December 31, 1997) 
Annual Returns Periods Ended December 31, 19971 
Period (Years) S&P500 Index Average Equity Mutual Fund Index Advantage 
50 13.10% 11.80% 1.30% 
40 12.30% 11.50% 0.80% 
30 12.50% 10.80% 1.70% 
25 14.30% 13.90% 0.40% 
20 17.40% 15.60% 1.80% 
15 17.20% 13.20% 4.00% 
10 18.60% 15.20% 3.40% 
5 23.10% 18.10% 5.00% 
 
Source: Bogle (2010: 148) 
 
Table 2.2: S&P500 Index vs Equity Mutual Funds (Ended December 31, 2008) 
Annual Returns Periods Ended December 31, 20082 
Period (Years) S&P500 Index Average Equity Mutual Fund Index Advantage 
50 9.20% 8.00% 1.20% 
40 9.00% 7.60% 1.40% 
30 11.00% 9.30% 1.70% 
25 9.80% 7.70% 2.10% 
20 8.40% 6.60% 1.80% 
15 6.50% 4.80% 1.70% 
10 -1.40% -0.90% -0.50% 
5 -2.20% -3.30% 1.10% 
 
Source: Bogle (2010: 148) 
 
1 The average equity fund’s returns include a 0.6 percent reduction for survivor bias and sales charges 




From (Table 2.1 & 2.2) we find that for the 50 years up to 31 December 1997, the S&P500 
Index outperforms the average actively managed equity mutual fund by an average of 2.30% 
in absolute terms over the entire timespan. For the 50 years up to 31 December 2008, the 
S&P500 Index outperforms the average actively managed equity mutual fund by an average of 
1.31% in absolute terms over the entire timespan. The success of passive investing comes down 
to the extremely low-cost, its diversification benefits and the fact that the market capitalisation-
weighted index consists mostly of large, high-grade stocks (Bogle, 2010).  
 
2.4.3 Monkeys vs the Market-Cap Index 
 
The market capitalisation-weighted index does, however, have its downfalls which we would 
like to highlight. Arguments in favour of market capitalisation index are based on the notion 
that the market index is mean-variance efficient. Clare, Motson and Thomas (2013) evaluate 
alternative approaches compared to the traditional market capitalisation-weighted index for the 
period 1968 to 2011. They make use of the fundamental index approach consisting of factors 
that include total annual dividends, total annual cash flow, book value and total annual sales 
from 1000 US companies listed on the NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ. They find that on a risk-
adjusted basis, the fundamental index approach outperforms an index constructed based on the 
market capitalisation method from the same sample of 1000 stocks. Their market capitalisation 
index is derived by using the market capitalisation of each stock divided by the sum of the 
market capitalisation of the entire sample. Moreover, they randomly pick 1000 stocks from the 
sample to create an equally weighted index of 1000 stocks. If the computer program picks a 
single stock twice, its weighting would be 0.2 percent, three times and its weighting would be 
0.3 percent and so on. If the program failed to pick a stock for the particular year, its weighting 
in the index would be zero. They find that US$100 invested at the beginning of 1968 would 
have achieved a terminal value of just under US$5000 if invested in the market capitalisation 
index, compared to just under US$9000 if invested in a randomly selected index of stocks that 







2.4.4 Active vs Passive Portfolio Management in Emerging Markets  
 
When information is very inexpensive, and analysts and traders have precise information at 
their disposal, then price equilibrium exists, and the prevailing prices of securities will exhibit 
almost all of the analysts and trader’s information (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). However, in 
less efficient markets, investors can expect to see greater differences in returns between 
investors who spend large amounts of capital to gain advantageous information and investors 
who do not. In less efficient markets such as emerging markets and the South African market, 
the incentive to acquire advantageous information can be more significant and lead to superior 
returns versus passive strategies. Over the last 25 years, there has been a massive increase in 
the number of investment opportunities available to investors who wish to invest in emerging 
markets.  
General emerging market studies of active equity mutual funds conducted by Huij and Post 
(2011) highlight performance persistence of emerging market equity funds. Their results do, 
however note several differences compared to the results of active US equity mutual funds. 
First, the consensus is that the results of US active mutual funds do not directly resemble the 
results of emerging market active mutual funds. Emerging markets, as highlighted in the 
previous section of this research, seem to be less efficient than developed markets which offer 
active manager the opportunity to general abnormal returns. Using monthly data attained from 
the CRSP Mutual Fund Survivorship-bias free database, they arrive at 137 emerging market 
equity funds that span over the period January 1993 to December 2006. Returns are compared 
to the S&P/IFC investable emerging markets index, which is an unhedged, market 
capitalisation-weighted index. The index includes securities from 22 emerging market security 
exchanges, including South Africa. They use several empirical tests to determine persistence, 
including the portfolio rank approach using monthly returns as well as the Sharpe Ratio and 
the Jensen Alpha time series approach. They find evidence that support performance 
persistency in emerging market equity funds and that funds that generated high (low) returns 
for the previous quarter tend to generate higher (lower) returns in the next month. Additionally, 
they find that the top ninth of active emerging market mutual funds included in their sample 
generates an outperformance of more than 4% per annum relative to the S&P/IFC investable 
emerging markets index and is statistically significant with a t-statistic of 1.95. These results 




Kremnitzer (2012) finds empirical evidence that there is a strong relationship between risk-
adjusted, after fee returns of active emerging market funds relative to passive funds. Using 184 
emerging market funds for the period 2009 – 2011, which represents three years following the 
GFC of 2008. The study finds that active emerging market funds generate on average net 
returns that were 2.87 percent greater than passive strategies. Gottesman and Morey (2007) 
examine numerous diversified emerging market fund specific characteristics. These 
characteristics including expense ratios, fund size, turnover, historical performance, manager 
tenure and Morningstar mutual fund star ratings to determine whether investors can use these 
characteristics to forecast emerging market mutual fund performance. Their study finds that 
only a single characteristic can consistently be used, namely expense ratio to forecast future 
mutual fund performance. Emerging market funds with lower expense ratios predict positive 
future performance and vice versa. They also find limited evidence that the 215 active emerging 
market funds for the period 1997 – 2002 managed to generate higher returns than that of the 
Vanguard Emerging Market Index Fund. This contradicts the findings of Grossman & Stiglitz 
(1980), Huij and Post (2011) and Kremnitzer (2012). 
Initial studies on South African unit trusts when the industry was still in its infancy was 
conducted by Du Plessis (1974) and indicated that fund returns were positively correlated with 
fund risk as measured by systematic risk “beta” when evaluating only two unit trust funds that 
were benchmarked against each other. The first empirical evidence of performance persistency 
in the South African was highlighted by Gilbertson and Vermaak (1982) when they studied 11 
South African unit trusts for the period 1974 – 1981. Their results were that on average, the 
absolute performance of all 11 unit trusts failed to outperform three different benchmarks. 
However, on a risk-adjusted basis using the Treynor, Sharpe and Jenson measures, they found 
that the active unit trusts outperformed all three indices. Moreover, Gilbertson and Vermaak 
(1982) found that one unit trust showed empirical evidence of persistent outperformance versus 
the three benchmark indices as well as the other 10 unit trusts. The results of Bertolis and Hayes 
(2014) indicated that over their entire investigation period of January 1994 to December 2012, 
the risk-adjusted returns of South African unit trusts during stable periods of economic growth 
was not statistically significant from the performance of the aggregate market. Interestingly, in 
contrast with periods of stable economic growth, Bertolis and Hayes (2014) found that South 






2.4.5 The Famous Active vs Passive Bet and its Association to EMH Theory 
 
This research wishes to present a famous case study that attempts to give the reader insight and 
potential real-life applications of the theory of active and passive portfolio management we 
have discussed so far. 
In 2008, at the height of the GFC, legendary investor Warren Buffett, made a US$ 1 Million 
bet in favour of the EMH and passive management. Buffett, issued a challenge to 
Protégé Partners LLC that the Vanguard S&P 500 Admiral fund (VFIAX), a low-cost passively 
managed index fund that aims to replicate the performance of the largest 500 companies in the 
US would outperform the average return of five actively managed hedge funds chosen by 
Protégé Partners LLC over a period of ten years. This was a simple challenge, putting the 
theories of active vs passive management to the test. The outcome; Buffett won. By the end of 
2016, Buffett’s Vanguard S&P 500 Admiral fund (VFIAX) generated a CAGR of 7.1 percent 
per year and a total return of 85.4 percent compared to the average return of the five active 
hedge funds chosen by Protégé Partners LLC, that merely generated 2.2 percent per year and a 
total return of only 22 percent. Buffett attributed his success to the fact that over ten years, a 
simple buy and hold passive strategy would outperform actively managed hedge funds after 
accounting for management fees, performance fees and other expenses.  Protégé Partners LLC 
made a very valid argument in stating that the aim of hedge funds is not solely to outperform 
the benchmark index, its aim, however, is to generate positive returns over a predetermined 
time horizon regardless of the returns that were generated by the benchmark index.  
The intricacies of this famous bet is in line with what our study sets out to examine; how can 
one blend active and passive investment strategies to complement each other when markets are 
not perfectly efficient? 
 
2.4.6 Conclusion: Active vs Passive Portfolio Management in Developed and Emerging 
Markets 
 
Evidence on active versus passive portfolio management in developed and emerging markets 
are in agreement that emerging markets are less efficient than their developed counterparts. 
Emerging markets, including South Africa, present more significant opportunities for active 




informational edge. This research recommends investors, and professional money managers to 
exploit the “hot-hands effect” by investing in active managers who consistently prudence 
superior risk-adjusted returns. Passive strategies remain attractive building blocks for investors 
who wish to invest in low-cost, highly diversified portfolios in emerging markets. 
 
 Bridging the Active Passive Gap with Smart-Beta 
 
“The most evident benefits of smart beta investment styles include its liquidity, 
diversification, extensive investment capacity, cost comparison, representation of the 
broader market, low turnover and ease of implementation and monitoring” 
- Arnott, Hsu and West (2008)  
Smart-beta, fundamental indexation or factor investing is one of the most recent additions to 
the range of investment styles, internationally and locally. Smart-beta, in short, refers to the 
idea of a semi-passive investment strategy than is constructed using specific fundamental 
factors. Factors or styles, formally grouped as clusters, can include volatility, value, size, 
momentum, liquidity, profitability, investment, and high yield. Smart-beta is a low-cost 
alternative to market capitalisation-weighted passive strategies while taking advantages of 
numerous active management traits that compliment the risk budgeting process. Adding factors 
to active and passive strategies improves information ratios while maintaining the portfolio 
characteristics and stock selection alpha of the original strategies (Melas, Nagy, Kumar & 
Zangari, 2019). The numerous advantages of smart-beta have made it a trendy alternative over 
passive and active management, and as investors have become more informed about these 
advantages, they have started adopting this alternative investment strategy. Smart-beta, also 
known as “strategic beta”, “advanced beta”, “beta plus” or “beta prime”, has experienced 
astonishing growth over recent years. Arnott, Hsu and Moore (2005) state that the excess return 
from the fundamental index portfolio compared to the market portfolio (S&P500) can be 
attributed to the following:  
1. The superior construction of the market portfolio,  
2. Price inefficiencies,  
3. Additional exposure to distress risk, or, 




Arnott, Hsu and Moore (2005) concluded that fundamental index portfolios are robust and 
significant due to their mean-variance superiority compared to the market capitalization-
weighted index (S&P500 or JSE All Share). Moreover, if investors are seeking higher mean 
returns and lower total return volatility, and they believe fundamental indices will continue to 
generate robust returns in the future, then investing in fundamental indexation metric market 
indexes, or style clusters will generate higher Sharpe Ratios and will, therefore, be more 
beneficial to the end investor (Arnott, Hsu & Moore, 2005).  Jacobs and Levy (2014) describe 
factor investing as a form of passive investing because it uses rules-based selection and 
weightings with rebalancing at fixed intervals. Besides, smart-beta does not attempt to forecast 
earnings, cash flows, profit margins and risks of individual securities. Some criticism of smart-
beta strategies highlighted by Jacobs and Levy (2014) include the fact that smart-beta strategies 
are neither forward-looking nor dynamic. Factors and their weightings are determined at the 
outset of the strategy using historical data. Figure 2.5 demonstrates the idea of smart-beta and 


















2.5.1 Smart-Beta Factors  
 
Van Heerden (2014) identifies a variety of possible smart-beta factors to consider in the South 
African market. The factors include liquidity, momentum, age, price-to-book value, low risk, 
stock buybacks and management ownership. Van Rensburg (2001), in his seminal paper, “A 
decomposition of style-based risk on the JSE” documents several CAPM anomalies associated 
with smart-beta factors in the South African market. He creates three clusters from the smart-
beta factors, namely value cluster, quality cluster and momentum cluster, which is represented 
by earnings to price, market capitalisation and twelve month past positive returns, respectively. 
Internationally, it has been suggested that the core fundamental factors or clusters that should 
be considered include value, momentum, quality, low volatility, size and yield (MSCI, 2018). 
Morgan Stanley Capital International FaCS developed an international factor classification 
standard that provides a framework for evaluating, implementing and reporting factor 
allocations across six persistent equity risk premia factors that include: value, momentum, 
quality, low volatility, size and yield. MSCI (2018) reports that the MSCI Factor Indexes have 
demonstrated long‐term outperformance compared to their market-capitalization-weighted 
parent indexes. Figure 2.6 illustrates the performance of MSCI Single Factor Indexes Relative 











Source: MSCI (2018) 




Investors can hold smart-beta funds or clusters as tactical allocations with their portfolios 
alongside active and passive market cap investments. Based on current economic conditions, 
market cycles or perception of a particular style factor, investors can rotate in and out of single 
factor index‐based funds. Table 2.3 indicate the benefit of investing in smart-beta factors over 
the long term. 




















Total Return (%) 10.50 12.00 12.20 13.70 11.80 14.50 11.00 
Total Risk (%) 14.40 15.20 13.90 15.50 14.00 15.90 11.50 
Return/Risk 0.73 0.79 0.88 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.96 
Max Drawdown (%) 53.70 55.80 58.80 52.50 44.50 57.90 43.00 
Active Return (%)   1.50 1.70 3.20 1.30 4.00 0.50 
Tracking Error (%)   4.90 5.90 8.00 5.60 6.30 5.90 
Information Ratio   0.30 0.29 0.40 0.23 0.63 0.09 
Source: MSCI (2018) 
The historical disparity in the performance of individuals factors has motivated investors to 
consider combining different factors to achieve smoother performance over the long term. The 
low and even negative correlations between single factor indexes (Table 2.4) point out that 
investors who wish to invest in style factors should consider selectively combining factors, 
since it could reduce the overall volatility and risk of the consolidated portfolio. Additionally, 
blending specific style factors (i.e. momentum) with an active manager who have a style bias 
towards value, could increase the overall diversification of the portfolio. Correlations 
calculated by MSCI (2018) are for periods greater than 40 years and are therefore robust and 
statistically plausible going forward.  
Table 2.4: Active Return Correlations for MSCI Factor Indexes (1975 – 2018) 
  Size Yield Momentum Quality Value Low Volatility 
Size 1.00           
Yield 0.26 1.00         
Momentum -0.11 -0.03 1.00       
Quality -0.19 0.40 0.22 1.00     
Value 0.60 0.48 -0.06 0.10 1.00   
Low Volatility 0.12 0.44 0.11 0.19 -0.03 1.00 





2.5.2 Value Factor in South Africa 
 
Rousseau and van Rensburg (2003) find that the upside to value investing for South African 
investors become both larger and more reliable as their holding period increases. Value 
investors in South Africa are rewarded for their time in the market and not timing the market. 
They find that over more extended periods, value portfolios have more significant upside 
potential in terms of returns rather than downside potential in terms of losses. Rousseau and 
van Rensburg (2003) use dividend-adjusted returns for a sample of JSE stocks that focus on 
large capitalisation stocks over the period January 1982 to August 1998. The sample represents 
the largest 100 shares on the JSE. They use a simulation study methodology in which all shares 
in the sample are ranked according to their P/E ratios. Five time horizons are examined in their 
study where they hold the portfolio for 6, 12, 18, 24 or 30 months. This method provides the 
distributions of the returns of 30 permutations of portfolio formation rules and time horizons. 
They find little divergence in the returns between low P/E and high P/E stocks over a 6-month 
time horizon. However, for periods greater than 18 months, they find that portfolios with low 
P/E’s outperform portfolios with high P/E’s. Additionally, Rousseau and van Rensburg (2003) 
find that it is a small portion of the shares in the sample that constitute the most substantial part 
of the value effect. They conclude that the best value strategy would be to construct a portfolio 
based on shares that were cheap over the previous periods as current low P/E shares are likely 
to exhibit weak price momentum. These results can be used in the context of blending value 
and momentum strategies when constructing a consolidated portfolio of style factors. Van 
Heerden and van Rensburg (2015) find that value portfolios offer significant outperformance 
across all sample periods, irrespective of whether returns are adjusted for risk, making this a 
robust and reliable strategy over the long term. 
 
2.5.3 Momentum Factor in South Africa 
 
Momentum and price reversal effects on the JSE are less documented compared to factors such 
as value, size and growth. Van Rensburg (2001) finds evidence of a possible momentum effect 
on the JSE. Twelve month past positive returns represents the majority of the momentum style 
cluster in South Africa. Later studies conducted by van Heerden and van Rensburg (2015) Use 
cross-sectional regression analyses, factor-portfolio analyses and multifactor analyses for 50 




portfolios successfully outperform over the entire sample period, however on a risk-adjusted 
basis, momentum portfolio fail to outperform. Van Heerden (2014) finds evidence of 
momentum effects, similar to the findings of Van Rensburg (2001), that the momentum style 
is present in South Africa market and can be represented by twelve month past positive returns. 
The momentum effect, is however diminishing when there is a lack of market depth. Market 
depth refers to the ability of market participants to execute relatively large trades without 
causing price fluctuations. 
 
2.5.4 Low-Volatility Factor in South Africa 
 
Volatility is a measure of the variation in returns of stocks. High volatility stocks are considered 
to have more risks associated with them, since the price tomorrow could be utterly divergent 
to the price today, compared to stocks that exhibit lower levels of volatility. The low-volatility 
effect, as explained by Blitz and Van Vliet (2007) refer to investments, particularly shares with 
lower total risk, however without lower returns. They present empirical evidence that stocks 
with low volatility have the ability to generate superior risk-adjusted returns. Blitz, Pang and 
Vliet (2013) investigate the empirical relationship between risk and returns in emerging 
markets since emerging markets have been characterised by high levels of volatility, 
particularly during several crises such as Mexico in 1994, Asia in 1997 and Russia in 1998. 
Using monthly data for the period 1988 – 2010 of stocks from 30 different emerging markets, 
with South Africa forming part of the sample. Initially, the total number of stocks in their 
sample is low. They document clear existence of a volatility effect in emerging markets. 
However, the relationship contradicts the CAPM in that risk and return in emerging markets 
have a flat and even negative relationship. Thus, one can construct portfolios that exhibit low 
levels of volatility without sacrificing potential excess returns.  
 
2.5.5 Conclusion: Smart-Beta Strategies  
 
This research confirms that the success of smart-beta investing is attributed to its ability to 
bridge the gap between active and passive investing. Investors should no longer consider 
whether or not to include smart-beta strategies to their portfolios. Their primary consideration 




 Risk Budgeting and Core-Satellite Portfolios  
 
"Diversification is the only free lunch in investing." 
- Harry Markowitz 
 
Risk keeps investors up at night. The idea of risk budgeting as a portfolio optimisation 
technique has been explored by Waring et al. (2000) in which they present a methodology that 
solves structural problems involved when including active managers in the consolidated 
portfolio. They address how active risk, introduced to the portfolio through active managers, 
can be controlled as well as how active and passive managers should be held as a structure 
within the portfolio. Using S&P500 Growth and Value Index Funds, S&P500 Enhanced Index 
Fund with selection Alpha of 75 bps and three traditional active managers with expected 
selection Alphas ranging from 90 bps to 160 bps with the investor’s benchmark being the 
S&P500. Figure 2.7 illustrates the findings of Waring et al. (2000) in which they determine 
the optimal manager blend for the active risk budget of investors.  
Source: Waring et al. (2000: 93) 
Waring et al. (2000)  suggest that investors with higher active risk budgets allocate ±80 percent 
of capital to active managers, investors with lower active risk budgets allocate ±100 percent of 
capital to Index and Enhanced Index Funds, while investors with moderate risk budgets allocate 




±40 percent (the most substantial portion of their capital) to Enhanced Index Funds, ±25 
percent to Index Funds and the remaining ±35 percent to active managers. Waring et al. (2000) 
answer the perplex question, active versus passive: the portfolio mix explicitly recommends a 
split between active and passive (index strategies) as a natural outcome of the optimisation 
conundrum. Their recommended mix justifies and encourages a substantial allocation to a 
“core” portfolio of low-cost, low active risk funds such as Index and Enhanced Index Funds. 
A recent study conducted by Vanguard (2017) indicate the benefits of core-satellite portfolio 
management are: (1) increases in overall portfolio diversification, (2) reduces overall fund 
management and transaction costs, (3) reduces key person risk as passive investment 
management strategies “core” don’t rely on the skills of security analysts and portfolio 
managers as per the case of active managers, (4) increases in after-tax returns due to lower 
portfolio trading and turnover and (5) less reliance on active fund managers who aim to 
continually pick winning stocks. 
 
 The Rise of Robo-Advisors 
 
Over the past decade, traditional financial advice as we know it has changed dramatically with 
the emergence of Robo-advisors (RA).  RAs are possibly the most disruptive trend in wealth 
and asset management today (Beketov, Lehmann & Wittke, 2018). The term Robo-advisor has 
become a well-known buzzword with promising growth prospects in store for their services. 
Beketov et al. (2018) describe RAs as an “automated investment platform that uses 
quantitative algorithms and techniques to manage portfolios and is accessible to clients 
online”.  
In a white paper published by Deloitte (2016), they highlight that Google search queries for 
“Robo-advisors” generate 423 000 results with close to 100 RAs in 15 countries around the 
world. It is estimated that by 2020, RA’s will manage between US$2.2 trillion and US$3.7 
trillion and by the year 2025, the AUM figure is forecasted to rise to over US$16 trillion, which 
is approximately three times greater than the AUM of BlackRock, the world’s biggest asset 
manager to date. The primary reasons for the tremendous success of RA’s come down to the 
following factors: 





2. Several advantages of RAs over traditional financial advisors (covered later in this 
section), and, 
 
3. Large-scale financial processes such as the implementation of global wealth and the 
adoption of RAs in Asia 
The wealth and asset management industry is evolving. The next generation client is highly 
receptive to digital technologies, vastly educated, prefers to have active and ongoing control 
over their investments and base their decisions on the information from numerous online 
sources rather than a single individual financial advisor. It is estimated that around 49 percent 
of high net worth individuals globally would consider RAs manage some portion of their total 
wealth (Beketov et al. 2018).  The advantages of RAs over traditional financial advisors are 
highlighted by Rosenberg (2019) as: 
1. Lower costs: RAs offer services at much lower costs compared to traditional human 
advisors. Schwab Intelligent Portfolios, charges nothing for its RA service. Investors 
only pay fees from the low-cost funds that are included in the portfolio. It is estimated 
that the average RA globally charges around 25bps – 0.35bps, which is four times 
greater than the average human financial advisor. 
 
2. Global access from multiple devices: RAs provide investors with access to control, 
monitor and construct investment portfolios from multiple devices (smartphones, 
laptops, and tablets). 
 
3. Methodical, quantitative and transparent approaches to constructing sophisticated 
portfolios: RAs use cutting-edge quantitative methods. Some RAs publish 
comprehensive methodological whitepapers that scientifically explain their investment 
strategies, see Wealthfront (2017). 
 
4. RAs have low investment minimums: RAs allow investors to gain financial advice 
affordably while not having to invest a sizeable minimum lump sum. In addition to 
receiving calculated and prudent investment advice regarding factors such as asset 
allocations and investment horizons, investors gain access to low-cost passive and 




RAs can be classified into four broad classifications, as proposed by Deloitte (2016). These 
classifications are dubbed “generations”.  The next generation of RAs and perhaps superior 
are the third and fourth generation of RAs. They use proven quantitative methodologies and 
algorithms to develop and manage portfolios. This study is particularly interested in 
understanding the third and fourth generation RAs who truly take over the work of traditional 
human financial advisors. 
 
2.7.1 What are the Quantitative Methods Inside the Robots? 
 
A recent study conducted by Beketov et al. (2018) investigates the processes followed by third 
and fourth generation of RAs and examines the asset allocation and portfolio optimization 
methods applied in existing RAs worldwide. They analyse 219 RAs that can be regarded as 
third and fourth generation in nature. Their sample comprised of RAs from 28 countries. Thirty 
percent of the RAs are located in the USA, 20 percent in Germany, 14 percent in the UK, 9 
percent in Switzerland and the remaining 27 percent in other countries. All RAs included in 
the study were founded between 1997 – 2017. The average founding year is 2017. Founding 
years can be broken down into: 
- 2017: 15 percent 
- 2016: 48 percent 
- 2015: 16 percent 
- 2014: 14 percent 
The RA with the lowest AUM was US$1 million, while the largest RA in terms of AUM was 
US$93 000 million. The average RA AUM was US$3 739 million, and the median RA AUM 
was US$93 000 million. Beketov et al. (2018) then analyse the occurrence of the methods 
inside RAs, i.e. the methodologies RAs use in constructing the optimal portfolios for their 
clients. For example, the terms ‘‘Modern Portfolio Theory’’ or ‘‘Risk Parity’’ refer to 
methodological frameworks used within the RAs. Other methods, including ‘‘Black–Litterman 
model’’ or ‘‘Fama–French Factor model,’’ refer specifically to these methods. The terms 
“Sample Portfolio’’ and ‘‘Constant Portfolio Weights’’ are classified as general terms since 




Of the initial 219 RAs included in the sample, Beketov et al. (2018) only manage to identify 
73 RAs that provide information regarding their quantitative methodologies in constructing 
portfolios and determining the optimal asset allocation for clients. In these 73 RA systems, they 
successfully find the names of 31 different methodologies used by RAs globally. It is no 
surprise that the most frequently applied methodology among RAs is Modern Portfolio Theory. 







Source: Beketov et al. (2018) 
Among the three most common terms (Table 2.5), only Modern Portfolio Theory can be called 
a quantitative methodological framework. The other two terms are general definitions which 
are unknown to the authors. Using all 2019 RAs in the sample, Beketov et al. (2018) illustrate 
the occurrences of mythological frameworks used by RAs in a word cloud (Figure 2.8) where 









Source: Beketov et al. (2018) 
Methodological Framework Occurrence (%) 
Modern Portfolio Theory 39.7 
Sample Portfolios 27.4 
Constant Portfolio Weights 13.7 
Factor Investing 2.7 
Liability-Driven Investing 2.7 
Risk Parity 1.4 
Full-Scale Optimisation 1.4 
Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance 1.4 
Mean Reversion Trading 1.4 
Other 8.2 




Beketov et al. (2018) conclude that RAs who attempt to use more sophisticated methods when 
constructing portfolios attract higher AUM volumes although these methods are applied less 
often than the more straightforward and more generally defined methods. We can expect to see 
hybrid RAs in the near future that are intended to incorporate more human interaction during 
unusual or crises. Overall, we are confident of seeing several  changes in the RA sector over 
the next five to ten years. The newer and more sophisticated methodologies will be extensively 
introduced in RAs, which are aimed at producing superior returns and can be used as a 
marketing tool to attract new next-generation investors. 
 
2.7.2 Robo-Advisors in South Africa 
 
Compared to the US and the UK, where RAs have been hugely successful in recent years, 
South Africa’s RA market is still in its infancy. This is primarily because few FSP’s have a 
large enough customer base and investment portfolio to achieve the required economies of 
scale that justify the implementation of automated RA’s. However, it is forecasted that by 2023, 
Robo-advisors will manage approximately US$231 million in South African assets, up from 
only US$46 million in 2019. Compared to the United States, where Robo-advisors manage 
approximately US$749,703 million in 2019 (Statista, 2019). There is great potential for growth 
of RAs in South Africa over the next few years.  
Only about 2 percent of South Africans have an annual income of more than R400 000 (SARS, 
2017). Surprisingly, most people in the category have bought a financial product in the previous 
three years which indicate their appetite for financial products. Moreover, the greatest majority 
(>90 percent) acquired professional financial advice before they decided to proceed and 
purchase a financial product (Deloitte, 2018). This tells us South Africans require prudent 
financial advice and they are willing to pay for it. Moreover, a study conducted by Deloitte 
(2018) indicates South Africans are open to using automated financial advice, particularly 
individuals between the ages of 34-44 and the individuals most interested are those who earn 
less than R750 000 per annum. The South African pension market is the largest on the African 
continent, and therefore we have seen companies including Sanlam, Sygnia, ABSA, Anchor 
Capital and OUTvest develop their own RA services. These firms use interactive, web-based 





Chapter 3: Methodology  
 
"Every investment decision should be research-driven." 
- Wim Rauwenhoff, Robeco's first director (1933 to 1960) 
 
 Risk Budgeting  
 
At its core, risk budgeting is a portfolio optimisation technique of setting an acceptable target 
level of risk for the consolidated portfolio (Schneider & Sams, 2009). The idea of risk 
budgeting is to allocate risk efficiently across several risk mandates, investment management 
styles and asset classes in order to maximise returns while remaining within the specified risk 
parameters. The fundamental idea of risk budgeting is to decompose a measure of portfolio 
risk into contributions from the individual asset held in a portfolio of assets. Risk budgeting, 
as a portfolio optimisation technique, sets out to identify the assets that are most responsible 
for risk as well as allocating risk across assets. 
The starting point is always a portfolio decomposition: 
𝑃 = 𝑃1 + 𝑃2 + 𝑃3 (3.1) 
 
Expressing a portfolio 𝑃 as a sum of other portfolios 𝑃𝑖. The 𝑃𝑖’s may be classified as holdings 
of individuals securities, assets, factors or idiosyncratic risks. The goal is to attribute the risk 
of portfolio 𝑃 to the sub-components or holdings 𝑃1, 𝑃2 and 𝑃3 in an additive way. For 
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From 3.2, we can decompose the variance of portfolio returns 𝜎𝑝
2 into:  
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An additive decomposition for 𝜎𝑝 can be defined by dividing each variance contribution by 𝜎𝑝: 












3.1.1 Calculating the Risk of a Multi-Asset Portfolio 
 
Expanding the set of assets in the consolidated portfolio, the risk “variance” of a multi-asset 
portfolio can be expressed as: 
𝜎𝑝















2 + 2𝑤1𝑤2𝜎12 + 2𝑤1𝑤3𝜎13 + 2𝑤2𝑤3𝜎23 (3.6) 
  
We notice that as more assets (N) are added to the portfolio, more covariance terms (N2 − N) 
enter the equation for portfolio risk “variance” 𝜎𝑝
2. The risk of any individual assets becomes 
less important, and we are now more concerned about the co-movement of assets with each 
other. For example, the computational inputs for a 200 share portfolio would have 200 variance 
terms (N), and 19 900 unique covariance terms (N2 − N)/2, thus a total of 20 100 inputs. This 
can be simplified by using an index approach where we ignore the covariance between 
individual assets and estimate how individual assets covaries with an index portfolio and 
therefore infer individual asset covariances.  The market model can be estimated as: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3.7) 
  
Where 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝜀𝑖, 𝜀𝑗) = 0 (𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) is the important diagonality (of residual covariance matrix) 













Using the market model, the computational inputs for a 200 share portfolio would have 200 
beta terms (N), 200 residual risk terms (N) and a single variance of the market term. Thus, a 
total of 401 inputs. 
 
3.1.2 Euler’s Theorem and Risk Decompositions 
 
Leonhard Euler’s theorem for homogenous functions can be used in order to decompose the 
risk of the portfolio into the risk contributed by each of its components. Since we are concerned 
about the portfolio variance 𝜎𝑝
2 and the portfolio standard deviation 𝜎𝑝 as risk measures, we 
can derive functional risk decompositions. Portfolio risk measures that are homogenous 
functions of degree one in the portfolio weights, Euler’s theorem provides a general method 
for additively decomposing risk into individuals asset contributions. 
Euler’s allocation theorem was justified by several authors, including: 
- Litterman (1996) and Tasche (2000) state that Euler’s theorem is fully compatible with 
economically sensible portfolio diagnostics and optimisation. 
- Patrik et al. (1999) state that from a practitioner’s viewpoint, the use of Euler’s theorem 
regarding risk contributions naturally adds up to the portfolio-wide economic capital. 
First, we define a homogenous function of degree one. Homogeneous function; a function 𝑓 is 
homogenous of degree one if for any constant 𝑐: 
 
𝑐. 𝑓(𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑁) (3.9) 
  
So, the key result in the case of volatility, where 𝐶 refers to the covariance matrix: 
 
𝜎𝑝 (𝑤) = (𝑤′𝐶𝑤)
1
2, is: 
       𝜎𝑝 (𝑐. 𝑤) = ((𝑐.  𝑤′)𝐶(𝑐.  𝑤))
1
2 
          = 𝑐. (𝑤′𝐶𝑤)
1
2 





Thus, if every share’s weight in the portfolio is increased by a factor 𝑐, then the portfolio’s 
standard deviation (𝜎) also increases by 𝑐. Euler’s theorem for homogenous functions: let  
𝑓(𝑤1, …,   𝑤𝑛) = 𝑓(𝑤) be a continuous, differentiable and homogenous function of degree one 
in the variables 𝑤. Then,  












In our case, the Marginal Contribution to Risk (𝑀𝐶𝑅𝑖) of asset 𝑖 is expressed as: 
 
𝜎𝑝 (𝑤) = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑀𝐶𝑅𝑖  (3.12) 
  
Deriving the 𝑀𝐶𝑅𝑖: 
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𝜕𝜎𝑝 (𝑤)
𝜕𝑤𝑖















Using Euler’s theorem, we can decompose the risk of a two-asset portfolio. Starting From 
equation 3.10: 
𝜎𝑝 (𝑤) = (𝑤′𝐶𝑤)
1
2 






















2 +  𝑤2𝜎12) /𝜎𝑝 (𝑤)
(𝑤2 𝜎2




Thus from 3.14, we find the 𝑀𝐶𝑅: 
𝑀𝐶𝑅1 = (𝑤1 𝜎1
2 +  𝑤2𝜎12) /𝜎𝑝 (𝑤) 
𝑀𝐶𝑅2 = (𝑤2 𝜎2
2 +  𝑤1𝜎12) /𝜎𝑝 (𝑤) 
 
The next step is to derive the contributions to risk (𝐶𝑅𝑠) from the (𝑀𝐶𝑅𝑖) of asset 𝑖. Recall 
from equation 3.12:  





𝐶𝑅1 = 𝑤1(𝑤1 𝜎1
2 +  𝑤2𝜎12) /𝜎𝑝 (𝑤)  
       = (𝑤1
2 𝜎1
2 + 𝑤1𝑤2𝜎12)/𝜎𝑝 (𝑤) 
 
 
𝐶𝑅2 = 𝑤2(𝑤2 𝜎2
2 +  𝑤1𝜎12) /𝜎𝑝 (𝑤) 
       = (𝑤2
2 𝜎2





Which takes us back to equation 3.4 where we derive an additive decomposition for 𝜎𝑝 : 












 Tracking Error  
 
Active portfolio managers seek to generate returns greater than their benchmarks while 
adhering to the mandates and constraints imposed by their clients. The most common constraint 
is the tracking error (TE), also known as the TE volatility, however, in practice, the terms TE 
and active risk are most commonly used  Tracking error indicates the amount of variability that 
exists among the individual data points that make up the portfolios average positive or negative 
excess return (Vanguard, 2009). When evaluating the consistency of active and passive 
managers, TE becomes an important statistic. TE can be defined using a range of statistical 
measures, including the correlation coefficient, which is regarded as a simple tracking measure. 
TE, active risk or TE volatility is often used in the context of mutual funds, hedge funds, ETF’s 
and index funds and is calculated as the annual standard deviations of return differentials 
between a portfolio of assets and a defined benchmark (ex-post or ex-ante) (Ammann & 
Zimmermann, 2001). The most common tracking error measure (TE1) is frequently used in 
practice and uses the square root of the noncentral second moment of return deviations:  
𝑇𝐸1 =  √





        
Where 
 𝑅𝑃𝑘  =  return of the tracking portfolio in period 𝑘 
 𝑅𝐵𝑘  =  return of the predetermined benchmark portfolio in period 𝑘 
 𝑛 = sample size 
 
The tracking portfolio, P can consist of either active allocations in which the tactical asset 
allocation (TAA) weights change regularly or a passive portfolio in which the TAA and asset 




equation 3.15 is similar to the standard deviation, however, because it is a noncentral measure, 
the measure is also affected by outperformance or underperformance relative to the benchmark. 
Let us assume an active portfolio manager has a TE of 3.5 percent, compared to an index fund 
that has a TE of 0.5 percent we can derive a practical and meaningful interpretation of this in 
that the index fund is tracking its benchmark more accurately compared to the active manager.  
Ammann and Zimmermann (2001) demonstrate the concept using the following simplified 
example: if a portfolio exhibits 20 percent volatility and has a correlation coefficient of 0.95 
with its benchmark, then the tracking error of the portfolio is 6.24 percent. Tracking error in 
this sense can easily be interpreted and applied to calculations of portfolio risk. Active investors 
are rewarded for generating returns higher than that of their benchmarks, passive investors, on 
the other hand, are rewarded for replicating the returns of their benchmarks as closely as 
possible. However, the one common goal shared between these types of investors is to 
minimise specific TE’s. This objective, according to Roll (1992), is called the tracking error 
volatility (TEV) criterion and that investors who attempt to satisfy it fails to produce 
mean/variance efficient Markowitz portfolios. Active portfolios with low TE’s will be 
dominated by portfolios with higher average returns, lower volatilities, but not necessarily 
lower TE’s. Thus, Markowitz efficient frontier portfolios dominate TE efficient portfolios 
(Roll, 1992). 
 
3.2.1 TE Constraints, TE Optimisation and TE Causes  
 
The idea of portfolio optimisation by generating excess returns compared to a benchmark while 
constrained to TE is certainly non-trivial. In our analysis of TE and its contribution to portfolio 
optimisation, active portfolio managers who outperform their benchmarks incur a positive 
expected TE which is simply the absolute difference between the return of either an actively or 
passively managed portfolio and that of its benchmark. The risk related to positive expected TE 
is measured by the volatility of the difference between the active portfolio’s returns and the 
returns of the benchmark, which we express as TE. Investors, using active and passive 
managers should, therefore, have the end goal of generating the highest expected relative return 
while minimising TE. TE, its optimal level and the portfolio’s TE constraints are dependent on 
the risk profile of the investor and whether their investment policy targets outperformance vs 
benchmark, risk-return objective, low volatility or simply zero deviation from the benchmark. 




manage a portfolio’s risk factors and their optimal exposures in line with the client’s risk and 
return objectives. The most apparent causes of TE are due to; (1) the active manager who 
attempts to outperform the benchmark by holding an overweight position in securities vs the 
benchmark and (2) passive mandates replicating the benchmark using only a sample of the 
securities represented in the benchmark. Thomas, Rottschafer and Zvingelis (2013) highlight 
that the factors leading to excessive TE’s for active managers are attributable to: 
1. Management fees, transaction costs, performance-based fees: Active managers 
generally have higher fees due to the security analysts and portfolio managers they 
employ as well as higher transaction costs due to the annual portfolio turnover they 
incur. These factors support the idea that active investing can be considered a zero-sum-
game (Sharpe, 1991). 
 
2. Security selection: Active managers that are benchmark cognisant may sometimes 
hold securities in different weights compared to their benchmark or even securities that 
are not represented in the benchmark.  
 
3. Factor tilts: Active managers may exhibit biases towards individual styles, factors or 
TAA tilts including value, momentum or low-volatility as well as sector 
over/underweights. 
 
4. Cash flow management: Active managers will hold cash positions to accommodate 
daily or monthly inflows and outflows as well as cash positions that can be deployed in 
stocks when they present buying opportunities. This is based on the perception of 
mispricing and that these perceptions frequently change as market conditions change 
(Sharpe, 1991). 
Looking at the causes of TE for passive portfolios such as ETF’s and index funds, it is essential 
to mention that these strategies set out to replicate the benchmark as closely as possible. 
Therefore, passive strategies must minimise TE. However, Thomas, Rottschafer and Zvingelis 
(2013) identify and discuss several factors that cause passive strategies to exhibit TE: 
1. Expense ratios: Although passive strategies have lower fees compared to their active 
counterparts, they still charge fees for replicating the benchmark index. Since there are 




passive strategies. ETF’s and index funds seek to keep expense ratios as low as possible 
in an attempt to minimise the TE of the passive strategy. 
 
2. Execution of transactions and rebalances: The higher the degree of transaction 
execution within the ETF or index fund to replicate the benchmark index, the lower the 
TE. 
 
3. Optimisation: ETF’s and index funds aim to generate the same performance profile as 
the benchmark index. This can either be achieved through full replication in which the 
passive strategy owns all the securities that constitute the index, and this is usually the 
case for larger and more liquid indices found in developed markets. Alternatively, they 
can use optimisation techniques in which they buy a sample of securities that best 
represent the benchmark index based on exposures, risks and correlations. Optimisation 
strategies are more likely to lead to higher TE’s compared to full replication strategies. 
TE is a valuable tool in evaluating manager performance compared to a benchmark. We will 
however, not use TE in isolation as it is best used in combination with other performance 
metrics such as the Sharpe Ratio (SR) and Information Ratio (IR). Portfolio optimisation in its 
purest form is a very general term and can be obtained by: 
1. The most significant excess returns vs the benchmark without taking into account 
portfolio volatility (Roll 1992). 
 
2. Incur the same level of volatility as the benchmark, while generating returns above the 
benchmark (Jorion, 2003)  
 
3. The highest risk-adjusted return while satisfying the TE constraint on the TE frontier 
(Maxwell, Daly, Thomson, & van Vuuren, 2018).  
This idea is synonymous with the findings of Amenc, Malaise and Martellini (2004) and the 
greater portfolio construction problem. When investors restrict their allocations towards active 
strategies due to tight tracking error constraints, they tend to forego opportunities of return 
enhancement and risk reduction. This is usually the case during periods of general market 
downturns as active and absolute return strategies tend to outperform passive investment 




 Information Ratio  
 
Utilising the literature from the Markowitz mean-variance paradigm we discussed in chapter 
2.2, we will now incorporate the information ratio (IR) to our research. The IR is a measure 
that summarises the mean-variance properties of an active portfolio (Goodwin, 1998). The IR 
is often reported on glossy marketing brochures and factsheets of active managers any many 
investors rely heavily on the IR when allocating their capital. The IR is a very powerful tool 
when evaluating active managers and arguably the best standalone measure of the mean-
variance properties of an actively managed portfolio. Simply put, the IR measures an active 
portfolio’s average return in excess of a benchmark portfolio divided by the standard deviation 
of excess returns. Let 𝑅𝑃𝑡 denote the return of an actively managed portfolio in period 𝑡 and 
𝑅𝐵𝑡 the benchmark or index return, then we can derive the excess return 𝐸𝑅𝑡 as: 
𝐸𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝑃𝑡 − 𝑅𝐵𝑡  (3.16) 
We define 𝐸𝑅̅̅ ̅̅  as the arithmetic average of excess returns over the measurement period from 









We also include the standard deviation of 𝐸𝑅 from the benchmark, denoted as ?̂?𝐸𝑅, also known 






3.3.1 What does the Information Ratio have to do with Information? 
 
The IR expresses the average 𝐸𝑅 per unit of volatility in 𝐸𝑅. The ratio is often referred to as 
the "alpha-omega ratio" that stems from the Greek letters 𝛼 and 𝜔 representing 𝐸𝑅 and 
idiosyncratic risk, respectively. However, we want to know what the ratio has to do with 




Starting with a variation of the linear market equation similar to the Jensen Alpha measure 
derived in chapter 2.4: 
 




We can limit an active managers stock picks to a universe of securities or benchmark, and 
therefore, we assume the active manager incurs an equal amount of systematic risk as the 
market portfolio or index, i.e., 𝛽 = 1. We can denote equation 3.19 as: 
 
(𝑅𝑃𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑡) = 𝛼 + [𝑅𝐵𝑡  − 𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑡] + 𝜀𝑡 (3.20) 
 
Rearranged as: 
                  (𝑅𝑃𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑡) − (𝑅𝐵𝑡  − 𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑡)  = (𝑅𝑃𝑡 − 𝑅𝐵𝑡 )  
                                                                     = 𝐸𝑅𝑡 
                            = 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑡 
(3.21) 
Active managers can either generate returns that are superior or inferior to the benchmark index 
by underweighting or overweighting individual securities relative to the benchmark index. 
From equation 3.21, we see that the 𝐸𝑅 generated over the benchmark can be expressed as the 












The risk-adjusted alpha is generated from the under- and overweight security bets based on the 
information about the security or level of skill the manager has, thus the name IR. Grinold and 




theoretical maximum IR (𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥) that can be achieved by active managers. The 𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 consists 
of two components, namely the information coefficient 𝐼𝐶 and the breath of the strategy, 
denoted as 𝐵𝑅. The 𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 can be expressed as: 
 
𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝐼𝐶(√𝐵𝑅) (3.23) 
 
𝐼𝐶 is the correlation between the actual returns of securities and the active managers forecasted 
returns. The 𝐼𝐶 is a measure of a manager’s skill or special information and 𝐵𝑅 the number of 
independent bets taken on forecasts of exceptional returns (Grinold & Kahn, 2000). 𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 
from equation 3.23 is an ex-ante ratio which does not represent the ex-post IR from equation 
3.18. Deriving a strategy’s 𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 becomes complex since most investors do not have access 
to active managers 𝐼𝐶′𝑠 because they require in-depth security level forecasts that are 
proprietary. However, Grinold and Kahn (2000) support the notion of using historical 
information to calculate the ex-post IR from equation 3.18. Our analysis will, therefore, use the 
ex-post IR to assess the value of active managers within the core-satellite portfolio.  
 
3.3.2 What is a Good Information Ratio and Warnings about the Ratio 
 
If active managers achieve IR’s of 0.50, it is “good”. An IR of 0.75 is “very good”, and an IR 
of 1.0 is “exceptional” (Grinold & Kahn, 2000). Additional remarks on the interpretation of 
IR’s are made by Jacobs and Levy (1996) in that good active managers could generate IR’s of 
0.5 while exceptional managers could generate IR’s of 1.0.  
Goodwin (1998) mentions that investors should be aware of the following warnings when using 
the IR to assess the skill of active managers: 
1. One, investors should avoid using the IR when making asset allocation decisions. This 
is because the IR is not a tool that is useful in evaluating asset classes and making 
decisions on how much capital to allocate to a particular asset class. Active equity 





2. The IR does not make any implicit recommendation about the correlation and co-
movements between securities and asset classes. 
 
3. Moreover, the IR fails to take into account the risk tolerance and return objective of 
investors.  
 
4. Finally, the active-passive trade-off should not solely be answered by assessing the IR 
of active managers. This is because active managers may outperform passive 
benchmarks during style-specific cycles. Thus, value managers may outperform 
passive and growth mandates while small-cap manager may outperform large-cap 


























 Core-Satellite Portfolios  
 
The central objective of this section is to derive the optimal blend between active, passive and 
smart-beta managers. Core-satellite portfolios consist of a passive core and active satellites 
(multiple specialist active managers or smart-beta managers). Using the information from 
chapter 3.1 – 3.3, we can determine the optimal allocation between multiple managers. 
 
3.4.1 Optimal Manager Allocation Mechanics 
 
Constructing a core-satellite portfolio using two managers, one active and one passive while 










Where 𝜎𝛼𝑖  (for 𝑖 = 1,2) denotes the TE of manager 𝑖 and 𝑤𝛼𝑖 is the respective weight. The 
marginal contribution to active risk, or TE is expected to change if we increase or decrease the 











Multiplying this expression by 
𝑤𝛼1





















































Using “grid searching”, we can determine the optimal blend between multiple managers by 
constructing several feasible sets or portfolios to find the optimal combinations of building 
blocks. The feasible set that produces the maximum IR or Sharpe Ratio while meeting the risk 
and TE constraints can be regarded as the optimal blend. The optimal bled is characterised by 
an equal ratio of marginal return vs marginal risk across all holdings, this ratio equals the 
optimal IR Scherer (2002: 199), expressed as: 
𝛼1
(𝑤𝛼1𝜎𝛼1










           = 𝐼𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 
(3.28) 
 
Equation 3.28 is the core guideline to optimal multi manager allocation within the greater 
portfolio. The equal contribution to risk portfolio can be derived by rewriting the above 




multiplying the assets by 𝜎𝛼: 
𝑤𝛼1
(𝑤𝛼1𝜎𝛼1



















The foundation of core-satellite portfolios, using TE and variance constraints is that we should 




about the manager to outperform the benchmark. TE will also increase since a larger allocation 
to a single active manager will reduce the covariance i.e. diversification of the portfolio. 
 
3.4.2 Why Multiple Strategies and Managers? 
 
Adding a secondary manager or strategy to a portfolio increases the IR of the overall portfolio 
Scherer (2002: 201). What would happen to the portfolio IR if we include additional 
uncorrelated managers and strategies? And how many would we add? We can decompose these 
























We find that as we include more managers or strategies to the consolidated portfolio, the 
𝐼𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 increases, the increase however is diminishing in nature. Investors should carefully 
consider adding too many active managers as the average alpha in the feasible set is negative 
and active investing can be considered a zero-sum-game (Sharpe, 1991).  Adding additional 
managers will reduce active risk at the expense of incurring negative alphas from inferior 
managers. The aim is to identify and include a small number of superior active managers. The 
arguments in favour of adding managers is specialisation and diversification. Specialisation is 
expressed in the nominator of equation 3.30 and the aim is to include only additional managers 
if we believe they can increase the average alpha of the portfolio. 
 
3.4.3 Core-Satellite: What is the Optimal Satellite Allocation? 
 
The active vs passive vs smart-beta allocation problem comes down to the conviction investors 
have in the satellite component of the portfolio as well as their risk budgets. This can be 
illustrated using the following simplified example: suppose an IFA has the option to invest 
client’s funds between passive, active, or smart-beta strategies with a TE constraint of 2.5 




percent, or the IFA constructs a portfolio consisting of a passive core of ±80 percent with active 
and smart-beta satellites amounting to ±20 percent. Let’s assume the active and smart-beta 
blend has a TE of 5 percent. The coefficient of risk-aversion with respect to relative risk is 𝜆 =
0.1, then the optimal satellite allocation would be: 











The resulting 𝑇𝐸𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 = 5% × 50% = 2.5% 
 
3.4.4 Fee & TE Arbitrage with Core-Satellite  
 
“Beating the market is a notoriously tough game to play. Playing it with one hand tied behind 
one’s back does not seem to be a good starting point.” 
- Amenc, Malaise and Martellini (2004) 
We can utilise core-satellite portfolios to track the benchmark index closely “core” while 
allocating a portion to active and smart-beta managers “satellite” who we believe will generate 
significant levels of alpha. In order for active managers to generate positive excess returns, 
they would need to deviate from their benchmarks, resulting in TE which is not necessarily 
bad. Thus, the idea of “good” and “bad” TE as highlighted by Amenc, Malaise and Martellini 
(2004). Allowing the active and smart-beta managers to deviate from their benchmarks gives 
them the freedom to utilise their skills. We point out that active managers with a 5 percent TE 
constraint, gives them little room to implement market beating strategies. In addition, core-
satellite portfolios provide cost control to the end investor. Fee and TE arbitrage can be 
achieved as follows (Table 3.1). Let’s assume the investor has a 𝑇𝐸𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 = 5% constraint. 
The investor can allocate 100 percent of their capital to an active manager who adheres to this 
constraint. The active manager in this case charges a management fee of 110 basis points. 
Alternatively, the investor can decide to apply the concept of core-satellite portfolio 
construction and allocate 75 percent of their capital to an index tracking product such as an 
ETF or index fund and the remaining 25 percent of their capital to high conviction active and 




tracking portion is 20 basis points and due to the specialist nature satellite allocation, the 
management fee is 130 basis points.  










Our research aims to emphasise that using core-satellite portfolios within the risk mandate of 
the investor will enable the investor to enhance risk budgeting between the core and the satellite 
as well as determine which portion of the portfolio contributes to TE, fees and most 
importantly, mean-variance efficiency of the consolidated portfolio.  
The investor can use core-satellite methods to diversify their portfolios without sacrificing 
potential alpha that is generated by superior active and smart-beta managers (Amenc, Malaise 
& Martellini, 2004). 
 Returns Based Style Analysis  
 
“An asset class factor model can help make order out of chaos.” 
- William Sharpe (1992) 
Returns Based Style Analysis (RBSA), originally introduced by Sharpe (1988, 1992), is 
regarded as an invaluable tool and statistical technique than has gained immense popularity 
among financial advisors, endowments, plan sponsors, investment consultants and potentially 
the next generation of Robo-advisors. RBSA is used by investors to understand the investment 
mandate and objective of active fund managers.  
The foundation and cornerstone of RBSA evolves around the notion that an active fund 
manager uses a particular style (i.e. growth, value, low volatility, quality, small cap, large cap 
Core-Satellite 
 "Core" "Satellite" Core-Satellite 
Weight 75% 25% 100% 
TE 0% 20% 5% (0%x0.75 + 20%x0.25) 
Management Fees 16bps 130bps 44.5bps (16x0.75 + 130x0.25) 
        
Active Only 
      Active 
Weight     100% 
TE     5% 




or perhaps even geographical styles such as global equity, US equity or European equity) to 
manage the fund. This study will incorporate RBSA as a secondary filter to eliminate actively 
managed mutual funds who do not outperform or fail to add value above from the passively 
managed indices or benchmarks available to South African investors. 
RBSA, compared to characteristics-based style analysis (CBSA) does not require portfolio 
holdings as inputs. CBSA requires actual portfolio holdings, compared to RBSA which uses a 
time series of historical portfolio returns.  As input, RBSA uses a time series of historical return 
data and compares it to the return characteristics of various passive indices. Thus, comparing 
the return characteristics of an active manager to the return characterises of several passive 
benchmarks. RBSA is primarily used to determine whether active fund managers add any value 
“alpha” compared to the passive style factors or benchmark indices they seek to replicate or 
mimic in their investment approach.  
RBSA, as proposed by Sharpe (1992) uses a multi-factor model as expressed by equation 3.31: 
 
𝑅𝑖 = [𝑏𝑖1𝐹1 + 𝑏𝑖2𝐹2 + ⋅⋅⋅ +𝑏𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑛] + 𝑒𝑖 (3.31) 
 
Where 
 𝑅𝑖  =  return of unit trust 𝑖 
𝐹𝑗 =  return of each benchmark index 𝑗 
 𝑏𝑖𝑗  = sensitivity of unit trust 𝑖 to benchmark index 𝑗 
 
𝑒𝑖 = non-factor component of return on 𝑖 “error term” interpreted as the     
                         in smaple excess return for unit trust 𝑖 that is not explained by unit trust    
                        𝑖 exposures to the returns of the benchmark index (i.e. it is the difference   
                         between the return of the funds (actual values) and that of a passive  
                        portfolio with the same style (fitted values) 
Equation 3.31, as originally proposed by Sharpe (1992), has the following constraints: 
1. Short selling is prohibited  




Sharpe (1992) uses 12 asset classes in his original regression model. These indices were chosen 
because they could be purchased by investors as a passive strategy which could potentially be 
added to a consolidated portfolio. These indices were also not active in nature and included; 
European stocks, Japanese stocks, US large capitalisation value stocks, US large capitalisation 
growth stocks, US medium capitalisation stocks, US small capitalisation stocks, US treasury 
bills, Intermediate term US government bonds, Long term US government bonds, US corporate 
bonds, Mortgage backed securities and non US bonds.   
In order to implement RBSA, a specified number of monthly return data for active funds, style 
factors and benchmarks are required. Traditionally, monthly return data for 24 months to 60 
months is used. This study will use 36 months of previous monthly data to determine the style 
exposure and time series estimation of active funds over any 36 month rolling window period. 
The output from the 36 month rolling regression is the style exposure of each active fund. This 
will be used to eliminate active managers who fail to add value compared to the style factors 
represented by passive benchmarks or building blocks.  
More than 80 percent of the variation in an actively manage fund can be explained by either 
asset class, style indices or a combination of both factors (Sharpe, 1992). RBSA can be applied 
to multi asset, or more commonly known as balanced funds since approximately 90 percent of 
the monthly return variation can be attributed to style indices and asset classes.  
 
 Statistical Software Used to Implement Methodology: A-DEX PRISM 
 
A-DEX PRISM is a cloud-based tool that allows investment professionals and analysts to 
visualise, design and manage their investment portfolio. The software offers a powerful 
interactive 3-D graphical interface to allocate multidimensional risk budgets across 
investments and asset classes, x-ray existing active funds and create optimised portfolios. 
Potential users are anybody who is a responsible for the allocation of investment funds. A-
DEX PRISM is used extensively in this research to implement the methodology discussed in 






Chapter 4: Data  
 
 Data Overview and Assumptions 
 
The data covered in the study includes active, passive and smart-beta funds that meet the risk 
classification of PlexCrown (2019) SA Unit Trust Risk Classification Framework as 
summarised in  Figure 4.1. 
 
Source: PlexCrown (2019) 
PlexCrown (2019) classifies SA unit trust funds according to their risk. The data in our study 
therefore includes the following classifications of funds, forming the product range available 
to investors: 
1. High Risk: SA Equity General  
2. Medium Risk: SA Multi-Asset High Equity 
3. Low Risk: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity 
We use total monthly returns (TR) for CIS funds on the ASISA framework included in the (1) 
SA Equity General Sector, (2) SA Multi-Asset High Equity Sector and (3) SA Multi-Asset 
Low Equity Sector for the period October 2009 – September 2019 which covers 120 months 
of TR data. The monthly unit trust and benchmark TR’s are obtained from Longboat Analytics 
using their flagship product, Fund Focus. TR data for ETF’s and index funds are also obtained 
from Fund Focus. The asset allocation frameworks set by ASISA enable us to replicate 
portfolios that meet their classifications and in turn meet the greater investment objectives of 
numerous South African investors.  




All funds forming part of the analysis are grouped according to their first tier of classification 
and are South African Portfolios. Therefore, the funds must invest a minimum of 60% of their 
assets in South Africa. The funds may invest a maximum of 30% of their assets outside of 
South Africa. 10% of their assets may be invested in Africa excluding South Africa (ASISA, 
2018). 
 
 High Risk: SA General Equity Funds 
 
SA general equity funds must invest a minimum of 80% of the market value of the portfolios 
in equities. These funds have a maximum capital appreciation mandate. The portfolios in this 
category offer medium to long-term capital growth as their primary investment objective.  
- Standardised Benchmark: FTSE/JSE All Share index (J203T)  
Our research identifies 190 retail general equity funds in SA at 30 June 2019 with a total AUM 
of R276 269 billion. The largest general equity fund is the Allan Gray Equity Fund with an 
AUM of R38 724 billion. The mean AUM of general equity funds is R1 723 billion. We use a 
filtering technique to select equity funds that form part of our analysis. Three AUM brackets 
are formed for general equity funds. These brackets are: 
- Large-sized funds (R10 billion < AUM < R40 billion),  
- Medium-sized funds (R5 billion < AUM < R10 billion) 
- Small-sized funds (R0 billion < AUM < R10 billion) 
Approximately ten of largest funds from each AUM bracket is selected to form part of the 
sample. The funds must be at least older than four years. These funds are included in the 
analysis because they are freely available on several well-known LISPs in South Africa, which 
can be accessed by IFA’s, retail investors and most importantly, Robo-advisors.  
Our sample3 (Annexure A) includes 24 SA general equity funds with a combined AUM of 
R200 944 billion. 
 
 
3 Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund – data only available for (Dec 2011 – Sep 2019). 





 Medium Risk: SA Multi-Asset High Equity Funds 
 
SA multi-asset high equity funds may allocate capital to a wide range of asset classes including 
equities, bonds, money market and listed property. These funds exhibit short term volatility, 
however their aim is to maximise capital growth over the long term. They may therefore invest 
in up to 75% equites (local and international), however, these funds must meet the SA portfolio 
criteria of investing at least 60% of their assets in South African markets.  
- Standardised Benchmark: 75% FTSE/JSE All Share index (J203T) + 25% JSE/ASSA 
All Bond Index (ALBI). The standardised benchmark was derived using the maximum 
ASISA Equity allocation of 75%. 
Our research identifies 219 retail multi-asset high equity funds in SA at 30 June 2019 with a 
total AUM of R586 164 billion. The largest multi-asset high equity fund is the Allan Gray 
Balanced Fund with an AUM of R150 563 billion. The mean AUM of multi-asset high equity 
funds is R2 677 billion. We use a filtering technique to select multi-asset high equity funds that 
form part of our analysis. Three AUM brackets are formed for multi-asset high equity funds. 
These brackets are: 
- Large-sized funds (R20 billion < AUM < R151 billion) 
- Medium-sized funds (R10 billion < AUM < R20 billion)  
- Small-sized funds (R2 billion < AUM < R10 billion) 
Approximately ten of largest funds from each AUM bracket is selected to form part of the 
sample. The funds must be at least older than four years. These funds are included in the 
analysis because they are freely available on several well-known LISPs in South Africa, which 
can be accessed by IFA’s, retail investors and most importantly, Robo-advisors. 
Our sample4 (Annexure B) includes 23 multi-asset high equity funds with a combined AUM 
of R497 464 billion. 
 
4 Alexander Forbes Investments Performer Managed Unit Trust – data only available for (Feb 2011 – Sep 2019). 
PPS Balanced FOF – data only available for (Aug 2011 – Sep 2019). 
Sasfin BCI Prudential Fund – data only available for (Feb 2013 – Sep 2019). 
Satrix Balanced Index Fund – data only available for (Nov 2013 – Sep 2019). 




 Low Risk: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity Funds 
 
SA multi-asset low equity funds may allocate capital to a wide range of asset classes including 
equities, bonds, money market and listed property. These funds incur low levels of volatility 
and aim to maximise capital growth over the long term while generating stable income over 
the short term. They may therefore invest in up to 40% equites (local and international), 
however, these funds must meet  the SA portfolio criteria of investing at least 60% of their 
assets in South African markets.  
- Standardised Benchmark: 40% FTSE/JSE All Share index (J203T) + 40% JSE/ASSA 
All Bond Index (ALBI) + 20% STeFI Composite index. The standardised benchmark 
was derived using the maximum ASISA Equity allocation of 40%. 
Our research identifies 165 retail multi-asset low equity funds in SA at 30 June 2019 with a 
total AUM of R275 890 billion. The largest multi-asset low equity fund is the Allan Gray Stable 
Fund with an AUM of R50 867 billion. The mean AUM of multi-asset low equity funds is R1 
672 billion. We use a filtering technique to select multi-asset low equity funds that form part 
of our analysis. Three AUM brackets are formed for multi-asset low equity funds. These 
brackets are: 
- Large-sized funds (R20 billion < AUM < R55 billion) 
- Medium-sized funds (R10 billion < AUM < R20 billion)  
- Small-sized funds (R2 billion < AUM < R10 billion) 
Approximately ten of largest funds from each AUM bracket is selected to form part of the 
sample. The funds must be at least older than four years. These funds are included in the 
analysis because they are freely available on several well-known LISPs in South Africa, which 
can be accessed by IFA’s, retail investors and most importantly, Robo-advisors. 
Our sample5 (Annexure C) includes 14 multi-asset low equity funds with a combined AUM 









 Index Funds, ETF’s and Benchmarks 
 
TR data for index funds, ETF’s and several benchmarks are included in this study. Index funds 
and ETF’s are used along with active and smart-beta funds to form core-satellite portfolios. 
Benchmarks data is incorporated into the analysis to measure the performance of active, 
passive and core-satellite portfolios as well as to generate descriptive statistics discussed in the 
research methodology.  A total of five index funds and ETF’s (Annexure D) are included as 
passive alternatives along with seven benchmarks (Annexure E). 
 
 
  Smart-Beta and A-DEX PRISM Funds 
 
Monthly smart-beta TR data for the period October 2009 – September 2019 are obtained from 
A-DEX PRISM.  
We use the following three smart-beta funds in our analysis to form part of our product 
range: 
 
1. A-DEX SA Momentum Fund: Please see (Annexure F) for the fund factsheet, along 
with the fund description and objectives.  
 
2. A-DEX SA Value Fund: Please see (Annexure F) for the fund factsheet, along with 
the fund description and objectives. 
 
3. A-DEX SA Low Volatility Fund: Please see (Annexure F) for the fund factsheet, 





Chapter 5: Data Analysis, Results and Portfolio Construction 
 
 Portfolio Mandates and Objectives 
 
The primary aim of this study is to replicate portfolios called “target portfolios” from ASISA’s 
framework. By replicating as close as possible the asset allocation and risk profiles of these 
“target portfolios”, we develop a product range of low-cost core-satellite portfolios called 
“replica portfolios” by blending active, passive and fundamental factors. 
The risk profiles and “target portfolios” identified in this study would typically be included in 
portfolios of South African investors during several life cycles. The portfolios are classified as 
South African portfolios and should, therefore, invest at least 60% of their assets in South 
Africa. These portfolios may invest a maximum of 30% of their assets outside of South Africa 
(ASISA, 2018). 
The risk profiles are: 
1. High Risk: SA Equity General (Minimum 80% of the portfolio in equities) 
Standardised Benchmark: FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) (ASISA, 2018) 
 
2. Medium Risk: SA Multi-Asset High Equity (Maximum 75% of the portfolio in 
equities) 
Standardised Benchmark: 75% FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) + 25% JSE/ASSA 
All Bond Index (ALBI) 
 
3. Low Risk: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity (Maximum 40% of the portfolio in equities) 
Standardised Benchmark: 40% FTSE/JSE All Share index (J203T) + 40% JSE/ASSA 
All Bond Index (ALBI) + 20% STeFI Composite index 
The active funds included in the study form part of the risk classification of PlexCrown SA 
Unit Trust Risk Classification framework as summarised in Figure 4.1. These risk profiles are 
included in the fund classification framework of ASISA with a combined AUM of R1 138 
trillion as of 30 June 2019. Our sample of 61 active funds has a combined AUM of R904 532 
billion as of 30 June 2019. Our sample, therefore, represents 79.46% of all active funds in the 




These active funds are the most popular and frequently used by IFA’s, retail investors and 
potentially Robo-advisors. These funds are freely available on several well-known LISPs in 
South Africa including:  
- Allan Gray Investment Platform 
- Alexander Forbes Investment Platform 
- Glacier (Sanlam) 
- Investec iSelect 
- Momentum Wealth - Fundshop 
Our sample of active funds is a good representation of the most popular active funds that are 
freely available and easily accessible. They can be used by Robo-advisors to construct low-
cost core-satellite portfolios for South African investors using several portfolio optimisation 
methodologies. 
 
 Replica Portfolio Design  
 
The replica portfolios are designed to expose the investor to a low-cost primary “core” 
consisting of passive and index funds, thus systematic risk “beta”, limiting the tracking error 
and cost as measured by TER of the portfolio. The secondary “satellite” component of the 
portfolio is allocated to active and smart-beta managers to exploit expected excess return 
“alpha”. Furthermore, we wish to explore risk budgeting techniques that can be practically 
implemented to reduce the overall risk, measured by the standard deviation of the portfolio.  
The active component of each “replica portfolio” will be selected based on funds size as per 
AUM bracket, Sharpe Ratio, Information Ratio, TE and standard deviation of returns.  The 
passive and smart-beta component will be added to the active component to generate core-
satellite portfolios. We wish to determine whether the core-satellite portfolio can outperform 
the “target portfolios” on a risk-adjusted basis.  
Moreover, the study explores whether core-satellite portfolios can reduce the overall cost as 






 Creating the Replica Portfolios – Step 1 Target Portfolio Data Analysis 
 
5.3.1 Results Discussion - SA General Equity Funds 
 
Of the 24 SA general equity funds included in the analysis, only one, Fairtree Equity 
Prescient Fund, managed to outperform the benchmark (FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T)), on an 
absolute basis over the sample period. The average return for large-sized SA general equity 
funds was 10.01 percent per annum, medium-sized SA general equity funds generated 9.08 
percent per annum, while small-sized SA general equity funds generated an average return of 
9.03 percent per annum. The return of the benchmark was 12.43 percent per annum over the 
sample period. 
23 of the 24 SA general equity funds exhibited less risk, measured by the standard deviation of 
annual returns compared to the benchmark (FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T)). Investec Value 
Fund had a total risk of 18.69 percent per annum, compared to 13.06 percent total risk per 
annum of the benchmark (FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T)). The average risk incurred by large-
sized SA general equity funds was 11.39 percent per annum, medium-sized SA general equity 
funds had a lower standard deviation of 10.73 percent per annum, while small-sized SA general 
equity funds had an average standard deviation of 11.42 percent per annum.  
The average tracking error for large-sized SA general equity funds was 4.66 percent per annum, 
medium-sized SA general equity funds had an average tracking error of 4.66 percent per 
annum, while small-sized SA general equity funds had an average tracking error of 6.76 percent 
per annum.  
Assigning a score to the Sharpe and Information Ratio of each SA general equity fund, we can 
rank each fund (Table 5.1). A lower score represents a superior ratio, while a higher score 
indicates that the manager was not compensated for taking risks or deviating from the 
benchmark. Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund scored one for both the Sharpe (0.53) and 
Information Ratio (2.61), with a total score of two, the fund is classified as the best large-sized 
SA general equity fund. Investec Equity Fund scored one for the Sharpe (0.43) and two for 
the Information Ratio (2.78), with a total score of three, the fund is classified as the best 
medium-sized SA general equity fund. Prudential Equity Fund scored two for the Sharpe 
(0.43) and one for the Information Ratio (2.87), with a total score of three, the fund is classified 




Table 5.1: Target Portfolio Results - SA General Equity Funds 
SA General Equity Funds (10 Billion < ZAR < 40 Billion) ~ 6 funds 
FUND Total Return (% p.a.) Total Risk (% p.a.) Tracking Error (% p.a.) Sharpe Ratio Score Information Ratio Score Total 
Allan Gray Equity Fund 10.76 10.00 5.10 0.42 2 2.09 4 6 
Coronation Top 20 Fund 11.05 12.87 5.18 0.35 3 2.11 3 6 
Old Mutual Investors Fund 9.57 11.24 3.96 0.27 4 2.39 2 6 
Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund 12.84 11.98 4.88 0.53 1 2.61 1 2 
Nedgroup Investments Rainmaker Fund 8.57 10.99 4.59 0.19 5 1.84 5 10 
Abax Equity Prescient Fund 7.25 11.24 4.22 0.07 6 1.69 6 12 
Average  10.01 11.39 4.66 0.31  2.12   
Benchmark (FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T)) 12.43 13.06  0.45     
SA General Equity Funds (5 Billion < ZAR < 10 Billion) ~ 8 funds 
FUND Total Return (% p.a.) Total Risk (% p.a.) Tracking Error (% p.a.) Sharpe Ratio Score Information Ratio Score Total 
Stanlib Multi-Manager Equity Fund 7.87 10.44 3.91 0.13 5 1.98 4 9 
Investec Equity Fund 11.49 11.49 4.09 0.43 1 2.78 2 3 
PSG Wealth Creator FOF 9.20 10.15 5.39 0.27 4 1.68 6 10 
Sanlam (SIM) General Equity Fund 10.62 11.12 3.72 0.37 2 2.82 1 3 
Coronation Equity Fund 11.57 11.66 4.17 0.43 1 2.74 3 4 
Foord Equity Fund 10.24 11.24 5.26 0.33 3 1.92 5 8 
Oasis Crescent Equity Fund 7.43 9.27 7.02 0.10 6 1.04 8 14 
PortfolioMetrix BCI Equity FOF 4.19 10.47 3.73 -0.22 7 1.09 7 14 
Average  9.08 10.73 4.66 0.23  2.01   
Benchmark (FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T)) 12.43 13.06   0.45         
SA General Equity Funds (0 Billion < ZAR < 5 Billion) ~ 10 funds 
FUND Total Return (% p.a.) Total Risk (% p.a.) Tracking Error (% p.a.) Sharpe Ratio Score Information Ratio Score Total 
PSG Equity Fund 11.12 11.23 8.24 0.41 3 1.33 7 10 
Prudential Dividend Maximiser Fund 10.79 10.60 4.14 0.40 4 2.58 2 6 
Stanlib Equity Fund 10.67 10.31 5.67 0.40 4 1.86 4 8 
Investec Value Fund 8.51 18.69 17.28 0.11 7 0.49 10 17 
Marriott Dividend Growth Fund 11.65 9.73 8.49 0.53 1 1.36 6 7 
Prudential Equity Fund 11.20 10.99 3.86 0.43 2 2.87 1 3 
Allan Gray SA Equity Fund 2.97 10.85 4.59 -0.33 9 0.62 9 18 
Stanlib SA Equity Fund 7.88 11.36 4.75 0.12 6 1.63 5 11 
Discovery Equity Fund 6.79 9.97 6.40 0.03 8 1.04 8 16 
Absa Select Equity Fund 8.72 10.48 4.21 0.21 5 2.04 3 8 
Average  9.03 11.42 6.76 0.23  1.58   






























5.3.2 Results Discussion - SA Multi-Asset High Equity Funds 
 
Of the 23 SA multi-asset high equity funds included in the analysis, only one, Rezco Value 
Trend Fund managed to outperform the benchmark (75% FTSE/JSE All Share index (J203T) 
+ 25% JSE/ASSA All Bond Index (ALBI)), on an absolute basis over the sample period. The 
average return for large-sized SA multi-asset high equity funds was 10.15 percent per annum, 
medium-sized SA multi-asset high equity funds generated 9.67 percent per annum, while 
small-sized SA multi-asset high equity funds generated an average return of 8.76 percent per 
annum. The return of the benchmark was 11.49 percent per annum over the sample period. 
All SA multi-asset high equity funds included in the analysis exhibited less risk, measured by 
the standard deviation of annual returns compared to the benchmark (75% FTSE/JSE All Share 
index (J203T) + 25% JSE/ASSA All Bond Index (ALBI)). The average risk incurred by large-
sized SA multi-asset high equity funds was 7.22 percent per annum, medium-sized SA multi-
asset high equity funds had a lower standard deviation of 6.88 percent per annum, while small-
sized SA multi-asset high equity funds had an average standard deviation of 6.97 percent per 
annum. The risk of the benchmark over the sample period was 10.76 percent per annum. 
The average tracking error for large-sized SA multi-asset high equity funds was 5.73 percent 
per annum, medium-sized SA multi-asset high equity funds had an average tracking error of 
5.58 percent per annum, while small-sized SA multi-asset high equity funds had an average 
tracking error of 5.29 percent per annum.  
Assigning a score to the Sharpe and Information Ratio of each SA multi-asset high equity fund, 
we are able to rank each fund (Table 5.2). Prudential Balanced Fund scored one for both the 
Sharpe (0.56) and Information Ratio (2.46), with a total score of two, the fund is classified as 
the best large-sized SA multi-asset high equity fund. Investec Managed Fund scored one for 
the Sharpe (0.68) and two for the Information Ratio (1.84), with a total score of three, the fund 
is classified as the best medium-sized SA multi-asset high equity fund. Stanlib Multi-
Manager Balanced Fund scored four for the Sharpe (0.36) and two for the Information Ratio 
(1.91), with a total score of six, the fund is classified as the best small-sized SA multi-asset 





Table 5.2: Target Portfolio Results - SA Multi-Asset High Equity Funds 
SA Multi-Asset High Equity Funds (20 Billion < ZAR < 151 Billion) ~ 7 funds 
FUND Total Return (% p.a.) Total Risk (% p.a.) Tracking Error (% p.a.) Sharpe Ratio Score Information Ratio Score Total 
Allan Gray Balanced Fund 10.18 6.85 6.72 0.54 2 1.50 6 8 
Coronation Balanced Plus Fund 10.53 7.84 5.30 0.51 4 1.97 3 7 
Investec Opportunity Fund  9.85 6.32 6.55 0.53 3 1.49 7 10 
Foord Balanced Fund 10.12 7.79 6.09 0.46 5 1.64 4 9 
Discovery Balanced Fund 10.46 7.48 5.11 0.53 3 2.02 2 5 
Prudential Balanced Fund 10.78 7.64 4.34 0.56 1 2.46 1 2 
PSG Wealth Moderate FOF 9.10 6.60 5.97 0.39 6 1.51 5 11 
Average  10.15 7.22 5.73 0.50   1.80     
Benchmark (75% FTSE/JSE + 25% ALBI) 11.49 10.76            
SA Multi-Asset High Equity Funds (10 Billion < ZAR < 20 Billion) ~ 5 funds 
FUND Total Return (% p.a.) Total Risk (% p.a.) Tracking Error (% p.a.) Sharpe Ratio Score Information Ratio Score Total 
Sanlam (SIM) Balanced Fund 9.45 7.20 4.46 0.41 3 2.09 1 4 
Old Mutual Balanced Fund 8.86 7.10 4.86 0.33 5 1.80 3 8 
Investec Managed Fund 11.31 7.07 6.07 0.68 1 1.84 2 3 
Old Mutual Multi-Managers Balanced FOF 8.82 6.61 5.29 0.35 4 1.65 4 8 
PSG Balanced Fund 9.92 6.42 7.22 0.53 2 1.36 5 7 
Average  9.67 6.88 5.58 0.46   1.75     
Benchmark (75% FTSE/JSE + 25% ALBI) 11.49 10.76            
SA Multi-Asset High Equity Funds (2 Billion < ZAR < 10 Billion) ~ 11 funds 
FUND Total Return (% p.a.) Total Risk (% p.a.) Tracking Error (% p.a.) Sharpe Ratio Score Information Ratio Score Total 
Stanlib Multi-Manager Balanced Fund 9.13 7.26 4.72 0.36 4 1.91 2 6 
Rezco Value Trend Fund 11.50 7.49 7.91 0.67 1 1.44 9 10 
Satrix Balanced Index Fund 6.94 7.31 3.76 0.06 11 1.82 4 15 
Stanlib Balanced Fund 9.43 7.05 5.33 0.41 3 1.75 6 9 
Marriott Balanced FOF 9.09 5.22 6.97 0.49 2 1.29 10 12 
Sanlam Multi-Managed Balanced FOF 8.94 7.00 4.69 0.35 5 1.88 3 8 
Alexander Forbes Performer Managed UT 8.87 7.01 4.22 0.34 6 2.07 1 7 
Sasfin BCI Prudential Fund 7.22 6.91 5.64 0.10 10 1.26 11 21 
Sygnia CPI +6% Fund 8.88 7.27 4.85 0.33 7 1.81 5 12 
PPS Balanced FOF 8.22 7.10 4.81 0.24 8 1.69 7 15 
Absa Multi-Managed Growth FOF 8.14 7.08 5.34 0.23 9 1.50 8 17 
Average  8.76 6.97 5.29 0.33   1.67     






























5.3.3 Results Discussion - SA Multi-Asset Low Equity Funds 
 
Of the 14 SA multi-asset low equity funds included in the analysis, not one fund managed to 
outperform the benchmark (40% FTSE/JSE All Share index (J203T) + 40% JSE/ASSA All 
Bond Index (ALBI) + 20% STeFI Composite index), on an absolute basis over the sample 
period. The average return for large-sized SA multi-asset low equity funds was 9.14 percent 
per annum, medium-sized SA multi-asset low equity funds generated 8.42 percent per annum, 
while small-sized SA multi-asset low equity funds generated an average return of 8.28 percent 
per annum. The return of the benchmark was 9.80 percent per annum over the sample period. 
All SA multi-asset low equity funds included in the analysis exhibited less risk, measured by 
the standard deviation of annual returns compared to the benchmark. The average risk incurred 
by large-sized SA multi-asset low equity funds was 4.64 percent per annum, medium-sized SA 
multi-asset low equity funds had a lower standard deviation of 4.03 percent per annum, while 
small-sized SA multi-asset low equity funds had the lowest average standard deviation of 3.77 
percent per annum. The risk of the benchmark over the sample period was 7.01 percent per 
annum. The average tracking error for large-sized SA multi-asset low equity funds was 5.32 
percent per annum. Medium-sized SA multi-asset low equity funds had an average tracking 
error of 5.44 percent per annum, while small-sized SA multi-asset low equity funds had an 
average tracking error of 4.42 percent per annum.  
Assigning a score to the Sharpe and Information Ratio of each SA multi-asset low equity fund, 
we are able to rank each fund (Table 5.3). Coronation Balanced Defensive Fund scored one 
for the Sharpe (0.74) and two for the Information Ratio (2.07), with a total score of three. Also, 
with a score of three, is Prudential Inflation Plus Fund. However, Coronation Balanced 
Defensive Fund has a higher annualised tracking error, which means an investor holding the 
fund plus the benchmark will be more diversified. Thus, it is the most attractive large-sized SA 
multi-asset low equity fund.  Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund scored one for both the 
Sharpe (0.68) and the Information Ratio (1.65), with a total score of two, the fund is classified 
as the best medium-sized SA multi-asset low equity fund. Old Mutual Real Income Fund 
scored one for the Sharpe (0.78) and three for the Information Ratio (1.91), with a total score 
of four. Also, with a score of four, is Old Mutual Stable Growth Fund. However, Old Mutual 
Real Income Fund has a higher annualised tracking error, which means an investor holding 
the fund plus the benchmark will be more diversified. Thus, it is the most attractive small-sized 




Table 5.3: Target Portfolio Results - SA Multi-Asset Low Equity Funds 
SA Multi-Asset Low Equity Funds (20 Billion < ZAR < 55 Billion) ~ 3 funds 
FUND Total Return (% p.a.) Total Risk (% p.a.) Tracking Error (% p.a.) Sharpe Ratio Score Information Ratio Score Total 
Allan Gray Stable Fund 8.36 4.71 7.52 0.39 3 1.10 3 6 
Coronation Balanced Defensive Fund 9.57 4.11 4.57 0.74 1 2.07 2 3 
Prudential Inflation Plus Fund 9.50 5.10 3.87 0.59 2 2.43 1 3 
Average 9.14 4.64 5.32 0.57   1.87     
Benchmark (40% FTSE/JSE + 40% ALBI + 20% STeFI) 9.80 7.01   0.48         
SA Multi-Asset Low Equity Funds (10 Billion < ZAR < 20 Billion) ~ 4 funds 
FUND Total Return (% p.a.) Total Risk (% p.a.) Tracking Error (% p.a.) Sharpe Ratio Score Information Ratio Score Total 
Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund 9.65 4.65 5.79 0.68 1 1.65 1 2 
Sanlam (SIM) Inflation Plus Fund 7.97 3.60 5.00 0.41 3 1.57 2 5 
PSG Wealth Preserver FOF 7.74 3.85 4.93 0.32 4 1.55 3 7 
Investec Cautious Managed Fund 8.32 4.02 6.03 0.45 2 1.36 4 6 
Average 8.42 4.03 5.44 0.47   1.53     
Benchmark (40% FTSE/JSE + 40% ALBI + 20% STeFI) 9.80 7.01   0.48         
SA Multi-Asset Low Equity Funds (2 Billion < ZAR < 10 Billion) ~ 7 funds 
FUND Total Return (% p.a.) Total Risk (% p.a.) Tracking Error (% p.a.) Sharpe Ratio Score Information Ratio Score Total 
Stanlib Balanced Cautious Fund 8.10 3.84 4.36 0.41 4 1.84 5 9 
Old Mutual Stable Growth Fund 8.20 3.71 4.01 0.46 3 2.02 1 4 
Absa Absolute Fund 7.80 3.31 4.28 0.39 5 1.80 6 11 
Old Mutual Real Income Fund 8.48 2.54 4.38 0.78 1 1.91 3 4 
PSG Stable Fund 8.10 3.48 4.97 0.46 3 1.61 7 10 
Absa Multi-Managed Preserver FOF 7.79 4.55 4.00 0.28 6 1.92 2 8 
Personal Trust Conservative Managed Fund 9.48 4.98 4.96 0.60 2 1.89 4 6 
Average 8.28 3.77 4.42 0.48   1.86     































 Creating the Replica Portfolios – Step 2 Elimination using RBSA 
 
The second step in designing the replica portfolios that will form part of the Robo-advisor 
product range is to use the Sharpe and Information Ratio results (Table 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3) from 
the active “target portfolios”. We wish to identify the best active manager per risk profile using 
RBSA. This step will use RBSA as a secondary filter to eliminate actively managed mutual 
funds who do not outperform or fail to add value above from the passively managed indices or 
benchmarks available to South African investors. The following funds were identified as the 
best active funds per AUM bracket according to their Sharpe and Information Ratios: 
1. High Risk: SA General Equity  
 
- Large sized SA general equity: Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund  
 
- Medium sized SA general equity: Investec Equity Fund 
 
- Small sized SA general equity: Prudential Equity Fund 
 
2. Medium Risk: SA Multi-Asset High Equity 
 
- Large sized SA multi-asset high equity: Prudential Balanced Fund 
 
- Medium sized SA multi-asset high equity: Investec Managed Fund 
 
- Small sized SA multi-asset high equity: Stanlib Multi-Manager Balanced Fund 
 
3. Low Risk: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity 
 
- Large sized SA multi-asset low equity: Coronation Balanced Defensive Fund 
 
- Medium sized SA multi-asset low equity: Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund 
 
- Small sized SA multi-asset low equity: Old Mutual Real Income Fund 
 
The analysis utilises A-DEX PRISM and the X-RAY function, which uses RBSA as originally 
introduced by Sharpe (1988, 1992). The above active funds are analysed while passive asset 
classes and style indices are used as building blocks. A rolling period of 36 months is used and 
the aim of the analysis is to identify the optimal weights that best fit the passive asset classes 
and style indices over the period that has the lowest tracking error to the return of the active 




return of the active fund versus the return of the “Shadow Fund”. The cumulative difference 
in returns is called “Manager Selection Returns, which generates the unique alpha that active 
managers add over and above the passive asset classes and style indices. Active managers that 
produce alpha should be considered to form part of the core-satellite Robo-advisor product 
range. The following asset classes and style indices are used in the RBSA: 
1. High Risk: SA General Equity 
 
- FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) 
 
- MSCI AC World (ZAR TR) 
 
- A-DEX SA Momentum Factor 
 
- A-DEX SA Value Factor 
 
- A-DEX SA Low Volatility Factor 
 
2. Medium Risk: SA Multi-Asset High Equity 
 
- FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) 
 
- MSCI AC World (ZAR TR) 
 
- ALBI Total Return - Beassa (ALBI) 
 
- A-DEX SA Momentum Factor 
 
- A-DEX SA Value Factor 
 
- A-DEX SA Low Volatility Factor 
3. Low Risk: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity 
- FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) 
 
- MSCI AC World (ZAR TR) 
 
- ALBI Total Return - Beassa (ALBI) 
 
- STEFI Composite Index (STFIND) 
 
- A-DEX SA Momentum Factor 
 
- A-DEX SA Value Factor 
 




5.4.1 RBSA Results High Risk: SA General Equity 
 
Table 5.4: Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund X-RAY Results 
X-RAY Results of Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund (1 Nov 2014 - 1 Sep 2019) 
 Annualised Return (%) Annualised Std Dev (%) Annualised Sharpe Ratio 
Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund 6.87 13.08 0.53 
Shadow Fund 6.98 11.03 0.63 
Fund to Benchmark 1.61 5.48 0.29 
Fund to Shadow -0.11 5.33 0.00 
FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) 5.26 11.4 0.46 
MSCI AC World (ZAR TR) 14.58 15.74 0.93 
Momentum  4.14 12.33 0.34 
Low Volatility 3.18 9.9 0.32 
Value 9.87 13.39 0.74 
Summary and Correlations Results of Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund 
Fund to Shadow Fund to Benchmark 
Alpha (% p.a.) -0.01 Alpha (% p.a.) 2.47 
R-Squared 0.84 R-Squared 0.83 
Correlation 0.92 Correlation 0.91 
Tracking Error (% p.a.) 5.33 Tracking Error (% p.a.) 4.88 
 
From the X-RAY results of Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund (Table 5.4 and Figure 5.4), we 
find that the fund outperforms the benchmark (FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T)) on an absolute 
basis over the period 1 November 2014 – 1 September 2019. Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund 
also outperforms the benchmark (FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T)) on a risk-adjusted basis as the 
annualised Sharpe Ratio of the fund is 0.53, compared to the annualised Sharpe Ratio of the 
FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) of 0.46.  
Comparing Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund to its shadow fund, which consists out of the 
following passive asset classes and style indices: 92% FTSE/JSE All Share, 2.50% MSCI 
World Equity and 5.50% Value, the fund fails to outperform on an absolute and risk-adjusted 
basis. The majority of the variations of returns of Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund can be 
explained by the holdings of the shadow fund, since the R-squared is 0.84.  
The annualised alpha of Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund versus the shadow fund is -0.01, which 
means the fund slightly failed to add value over the passive asset classes and style indices it 





5.4.2 RBSA Results Medium Risk: SA Multi-Asset High Equity 
 
Table 5.5: Investec Managed Fund X-RAY Results 




Annualised Std Dev 
(%) 
Annualised Sharpe Ratio 
Investec Managed Fund 10.16 6.94 1.46 
Shadow Fund 13.37 6.82 1.96 
Fund to Benchmark 2.14 3.4 0.58 
Fund to Shadow -3.21 3.71 -0.79 
Benchmark (SA High Equity UT) 8.02 6.46 1.24 
FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) 10.25 11.2 0.92 
MSCI AC World (ZAR TR) 18.92 14.63 1.29 
ALBI 7.34 7.56 0.97 
Momentum  12.89 11.6 1.11 
Low Volatility 10.07 9.85 1.02 
Value 15.95 12.75 1.25 
Summary and Correlations Results of Investec Managed Fund 
Fund to Shadow Fund to Benchmark 
Alpha (% p.a.) -2.92 Alpha (% p.a.) 2.46 
R-Squared 0.73 R-Squared 0.75 
Correlation 0.85 Correlation 0.86 
Tracking Error (% p.a.) 3.71 Tracking Error (% p.a.) 3.58 
 
From the X-RAY results of Investec Managed Fund (Table 5.5 and Figure 5.5), we find that 
the fund outperforms the benchmark (SA High Equity UT Sector) on an absolute basis over 
the period 1 September 2012 – 1 September 2019. Investec Managed Fund also outperforms 
the benchmark (SA High Equity UT Sector) on a risk-adjusted basis as the annualised Sharpe 
Ratio of the fund is 1.46, compared to the annualised Sharpe Ratio of the SA High Equity UT 
Sector of 1.24.  Comparing Investec Managed Fund to its shadow fund, which consists out of 
the following passive asset classes and style indices: 21.5% FTSE/JSE All Share, 25% 
ALBI, 35.5% MSCI World Equity, 2% Value, and 16% Low Volatility, the fund fails to 
outperform on an absolute and risk-adjusted basis. A large portion of the variations of returns 
of Investec Managed Fund can be explained by the holdings of the shadow fund since the R-
squared is 0.73. This is, however, significantly less than the R-squared of Prudential Balanced 
Fund. The annualised alpha of Investec Managed Fund versus the shadow fund is -2.92%, 
which indicates the fund failed to add value over the passive asset classes and style indices it 
seeks to replicate. Investec Managed Fund, compared to Prudential Balanced Fund is, however 




5.4.3 RBSA Results Low Risk: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity 
 
Table 5.6: Old Mutual Real Income Fund X-RAY Results 
X-RAY Results of Old Mutual Real Income Fund (1 Sep 2012 – 1 Sep 2019) 
  Annualised Return (%) Annualised Std Dev (%) Annualised Sharpe Ratio 
Old Mutual Real Income Fund 7.17 2.5 2.87 
Shadow Fund 8.36 2.53 3.3 
Fund to Benchmark -0.01 3.45 -0.03 
Fund to Shadow -1.19 1.82 -0.62 
Benchmark (SA Low Equity UT) 7.18 4.03 1.78 
FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) 10.25 11.2 0.92 
MSCI AC World (ZAR TR) 18.92 14.63 1.29 
ALBI 7.34 7.56 0.97 
STEFI 6.6 0.26 25.66 
Momentum  12.89 11.6 1.11 
Low Volatility 10.07 9.85 1.02 
Value 15.95 12.75 1.25 
Summary and Correlations Results of Old Mutual Real Income Fund 
Fund to Shadow Fund to Benchmark 
Alpha (% p.a.) -1.12 Alpha (% p.a.) 0.51 
R-Squared 0.54 R-Squared 0.32 
Correlation 0.74 Correlation 0.57 
Tracking Error (% p.a.) 1.82 Tracking Error (% p.a.) 3.08 
 
From the X-RAY results of Old Mutual Real Income Fund (Table 5.6 and Figure 5.6), we 
find that the fund slightly underperforms the benchmark (SA Low Equity Sector) on an 
absolute basis over the period 1 Sep 2012 – 1 Sep 2019. Old Mutual Real Income Fund, 
however, outperforms the benchmark on a risk-adjusted basis as the annualised Sharpe Ratio 
of the fund is 2.87, compared to the annualised Sharpe Ratio of the SA Low Equity UT Sector 
of 1.78.  Comparing Old Mutual Real Income Fund to its shadow fund, which consists out of 
the following passive asset classes and style indices: 12.5% ALBI, 80.5% STEFI, 0.5% 
MSCI World Equity, 3% Low Volatility and 3.5% Momentum, the fund fails to outperform 
on an absolute and risk-adjusted basis. A moderate amount of the variations of returns of Old 
Mutual Real Income Fund can be explained by the holdings of the shadow fund, since the R-
squared is 0.54.  The annualised alpha of Old Mutual Real Income Fund versus the shadow 
fund is -1.12%. However, the R-squared of Old Mutual Real Income Fund is significantly less 
than its counterparts, it indicates the manager includes alternative asset classes to generate 




 Results and Conclusion – Returns Based Style Analysis and X-RAYS 
 
The results of the RBSA and X-RAYS of the three high-risk SA general equity funds, three 
medium-risk SA multi-asset high equity funds and three low-risk SA multi-asset low equity 
funds will be discussed in this section. The results will determine which active fund from each 
risk category will be included as the active component that will form part of the core-satellite 
product range. The active funds that manage to add the most value “alpha” over and above the 
passive asset classes and style indices they seek to replicate will be considered. Alternatively, 
active funds that can generate returns while taking less risk, along with a low correlation and 
low coefficient of determination compared to its benchmark and shadow fund will be 
considered. These metrics indicate the manager has the ability to generate returns while taking 
less risk as well as being agnostic of the composition of its benchmark or competitors.  
 
5.5.1 Conclusion - High Risk: SA General Equity 
 
The three funds from this risk profile that were shortlisted include: (1) Fairtree Equity Prescient 
Fund, (2) Investec Equity Fund and (3) Prudential Equity Fund.  
Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund generated -0.01% alpha per annum versus its shadow fund and 
2.47% alpha per annum versus its benchmark (Table 5.4 and Figure 5.4). The average alpha 
versus shadow fund for this risk profile is -1.35% per annum, while the average alpha versus 
benchmark is 0.63% per annum. Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund had an R-squared of 0.84 and 
a correlation of 0.92 to its shadow fund. What is most notable from the X-RAY of the fund 
(Figure 5.4) is that more than 90% of its style is attributed to the FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T). 
This is significantly higher than the 77.5% FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) component of Investec 
Equity Fund (Annexure G) and the 67% FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) component of Prudential 
Equity Fund (Annexure H). Moreover, Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund’s X-RAY indicates 
2.5% of the fund’s style is attributed to MSCI World Equity, which is significantly lower than 
the 21.5% and 20% MSCI World Equity style found in Investec Equity Fund and Prudential 
Equity Fund respectively. Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund is therefore selected to form part 
of the SA general equity core-satellite portfolio because the manager focuses on investing in 
the South African equity market, where it has a competitive advantage. The fund exhibits a 
value bias. Therefore, blending the fund with low volatility and momentum styles would be 




5.5.2 Conclusion – Medium Risk: SA Multi-Asset High Equity 
 
 
The three funds from this risk profile that were shortlisted include: (1) Prudential Balanced 
Fund, (2) Investec Managed Fund and (3) Stanlib Multi-Manager Balanced Fund.  
Investec Managed Fund generated -2.92% alpha per annum versus its shadow fund and 2.46% 
alpha per annum versus its benchmark (Table 5.5 and Figure 5.5). The average alpha versus 
shadow fund for this risk profile is -3.34% per annum, while the average alpha versus 
benchmark is 1.60% per annum. Investec Managed Fund has an R-squared of 0.73 and a 
correlation of 0.85 to its shadow fund. This is significantly less than the R-squared of Prudential 
Balanced Fund and Stanlib Multi-Manager Balanced Fund, which is 0.90 and 0.88 respectively. 
Their correlation to shadow fund is 0.95 and 0.94, respectively. 
What is most notable from the X-RAY of Investec Managed Fund (Table 5.5 and Figure 5.5) 
is that 35.5% of its style is attributed to MSCI World Equity. This is materially higher than the 
24% MSCI World Equity component of Prudential Balanced Fund (Annexure I) and the 29% 
MSCI World Equity component of Stanlib Multi Manager Balanced Fund (Annexure J). The 
standard deviation of MSCI World Equity is 14.63% per annum, making it the riskiest 
component of the passive asset classes and style indices that form part of these funds. Although 
MSCI World Equity is the most significant contributor to the style of Investec Managed Fund, 
the fund has an annualised standard deviation of 6.94%, which is less than that of Prudential 
Balanced Fund (Annexure I) and Stanlib Multi Manager Balanced Fund (Annexure J) of 
7.42% and 7.36 respectively. The annualised return of MSCI World Equity for the period 1 
September 2012 – 1 September 2019 in ZAR is 18.92%, making it the best performing style 
index active managers can include in their portfolios. 
Investec Managed Fund is selected to form part of the SA multi-asset high equity core-
satellite portfolio since the manager includes a large portion of global equities to the fund while 
minimising the total risk of the fund. This indicates the manager has the skill to reduce total 
risk while not sacrificing returns. Also, Investec Managed Fund has a lower R-squared and 
correlation to its shadow fund compared to its peers. This indicates that the manager has the 
ability and skill to identify and include alternative asset classes to generate returns, which 
justifies its active management fees. The fund exhibits a low volatility bias which is common 
among medium risk funds. Therefore, blending the fund with value and momentum styles 




5.5.3 Conclusion – Low Risk: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity 
 
The three funds from this risk profile that were shortlisted include: (1) Coronation Balanced 
Defensive Fund, (2) Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund and (3) Old Mutual Real Income Fund. 
Old Mutual Real Income Fund generated -1.12% alpha per annum versus its shadow fund and 
0.51% alpha per annum versus its benchmark (Table 5.6 and Figure 5.6). The average alpha 
versus shadow fund for this risk profile is -1.46% per annum, while the average alpha versus 
benchmark is 1.27% per annum. Old Mutual Real Income Fund has an R-squared of 0.54 and 
a correlation of 0.74 to its shadow fund. This indicates that the holdings of the shadow fund 
can explain a moderate amount of the variations of returns of Old Mutual Real Income Fund. 
The R-squared and correlation are significantly less than the R-squared of Coronation Balanced 
Defensive Fund and Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund, which is 0.82 and 0.83, respectively. 
Their correlation to shadow fund is 0.91 and 0.91 respectively. 
What is most notable from the X-RAY and risk profile of Old Mutual Real Income Fund (Table 
5.6 and Figure 5.6) is that 80.5% of its style is attributed to STEFI Composite Index. This is 
materially higher than the 61.5% STEFI Composite Index component of Coronation Balanced 
Defensive Fund (Annexure K) and the 31.5% STEFI Composite Index component of 
Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund (Annexure L). The standard deviation of STEFI 
Composite Index is 0.26% per annum, making it the least risky component of the passive asset 
classes and style indices that form part of these funds. The significant STEFI Composite Index 
component of Old Mutual Real Income Fund helps reduce the total risk of the fund, and 
therefore, the annualised standard deviation of the fund is only 2.5%. The annualised standard 
deviation of Coronation Balanced Defensive Fund (Annexure K) and Nedgroup Investments 
Stable Fund (Annexure L) is 4.46% and 5.07% respectively. 
Old Mutual Real Income Fund is selected to form part of the SA multi-asset low equity core-
satellite portfolio due to the fact that the manager includes a large portion of interest baring 
assets to the fund which generates stable returns along with reducing the total risk of the fund. 
This indicates the manager can meet the needs of low-risk investors by reducing the total risk 
of the fund while not sacrificing returns. Finally, Old Mutual Real Income Fund has a lower 
R-squared and correlation to its shadow fund compared to its peers. This indicates the manager 
has the ability and skill to identify and include alternative asset classes to generate stable returns 




































 Creating the Replica Portfolios – Step 3 Risk and Tracking Error 
Budgeting using Active, Passive and Smart Beta 
 
The final step in creating the range of core-satellite portfolios is to use the active managers that 
were identified through RBSA and blending them with passive and smart-beta strategies. The 
analysis aims to determine the optimal blend between these strategies along with identifying 
whether the core component should consist of active, passive or smart-beta. The following 
parameters are imposed upon the portfolios: 
1. High Risk: SA General Equity 
Maximum Tracking Error: 5.36% per annum (SA GE mean, Table 5.1) 
Maximum Total Risk “standard deviation”: 13.06% per annum (Benchmark6, Table 5.1) 
Maximum Risk Budget “standard deviation” per holding: 35% 
Maximum smart-beta allocation: 15% per style factor 
Maximum equity exposure: 100% 
Maximum offshore exposure: 30% 
 
2. Medium Risk: SA Multi-Asset High Equity 
Maximum Tracking Error: 5.53% per annum (SA MAHE mean, Table 5.2) 
Maximum Total Risk “standard deviation”: 10.76% per annum (Benchmark7, Table 5.2) 
Maximum Risk Budget “standard deviation” per holding: 35% 
Maximum smart-beta allocation: 15% per style factor 
Maximum equity exposure: 75% 
Maximum offshore exposure: 30% 
 
3. Low Risk: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity 
Maximum Tracking Error: 5.06% per annum (SA MALE mean, Table 5.3) 
Maximum Total Risk “standard deviation”: 7.01% per annum (Benchmark8, Table 5.3) 
Maximum Risk Budget “standard deviation” per holding: 30% 
Maximum smart-beta allocation: 15% per style factor 
Maximum equity exposure: 40% 
Maximum offshore exposure: 30% 
 
6The maximum risk parameter for high risk portfolios may not exceed the risk of the FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) 
7 The maximum risk parameter for medium risk portfolios may not exceed the risk of 75% FTSE/JSE + 25% ALBI  









9 Refers to the asset allocation, smart-beta allocation, geographical allocation, total risk, risk contribution per holding and tracking error parameters imposed on the core-satellite portfolio. 
10 Asset allocation and geographical allocation parameters still imply. However, smart-beta limitations, risk contribution per holding and tracking error parameters no longer apply. 
11 Asset allocation and geographical allocation parameters still imply. However, smart-beta limitations, risk contribution per holding and tracking error parameters no longer apply. 
High Risk: SA General Equity (Dec 2011 – Sep 2019) 
FUND Total Return (% p.a.) Total Risk (% p.a.) Tracking Error (% p.a.) Sharpe Ratio     
Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund 12.84 11.98 4.88 0.53     
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund 8.95 12.26 2.67 0.22     
Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF 16.99 14.76 14.42 0.73     
A-DEX SA Momentum Fund 13.86 11.4 8.69 0.67     
A-DEX SA Low Volatility Fund 12.05 9.3 8.57 0.62     
A-DEX SA Value Fund 16.02 11.92 9.45 0.82     
    
 Within Parameters9 Outside Parameters (TE < 6%)10 Outside Parameters (TE < 7%)11 
PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS Allocation (%) Risk Contribution (%) Allocation (%) Risk Contribution (%) Allocation (%) Risk Contribution (%) 
Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund 15.00 15.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund 30.00 31.93 10.00 10.37 0.00 0.00 
Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF 30.00 33.55 26.00 18.30 30.00 20.70 
A-DEX SA Momentum Fund 10.00 7.02 6.00 5.97 2.00 1.95 
A-DEX SA Low Volatility Fund 5.00 8.52 0.00 0.00 2.00 1.58 
A-DEX SA Value Fund 10.00 3.30 58.00 65.36 66.00 75.77 
Portfolio Total Return (% p.a.) 13.73  15.97  16.66  
Portfolio Total Risk (% p.a.) 9.90  9.41  9.36  
Portfolio Tracking Error (% p.a.) 4.65  5.97  6.73  






















12 Fairtree Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio vs Benchmark (FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T)) performance chart can be seen on Figure 5.8.  
13 Fairtree Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio can be seen on its theoretical efficient frontier (Figure 5.7) indicating its risk and return and risk and tracking error trade off. 
Trailing Results12  
  
Fairtree Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio13 Benchmark FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) 
Last 12 Month Ann Returns  4.78% 1.08% 
Last 24 Month Ann Returns  5.81% 2.19% 
Last 36 Month Ann Returns  6.88% 4.80% 
Last 60 Month Ann Returns  8.31% 5.35% 













Figure 5.8: Fairtree Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio vs Benchmark (FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T)) Cumulative Performance 
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Table 5.9: Core-Satellite SA Multi-Asset High Equity Portfolio Results 
Medium Risk: SA Multi-Asset High Equity Building Blocks (Oct 2009 – Sep 2019) 
FUND Total Return (% p.a.) Total Risk (% p.a.) Tracking Error (% p.a.) Sharpe Ratio     
Investec Managed Fund 11.31 7.07 6.07 0.68     
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund 10.62 12.82 4.95 0.32     
Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF 14.59 14.31 14.5 0.56     
A-DEX SA Momentum Fund 16.77 12.01 7.98 0.85     
A-DEX SA Low Volatility Fund 15.19 9.63 7.54 0.9     
A-DEX SA Value Fund 18.51 13.43 8.05 0.89     
Nedgroup Investments Core Income Fund 7.04 0.42 9.23 1.26     
 Within Parameters14 Outside Parameters (TE < 6%)15 Outside Parameters (TE < 7%)16 
PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS Allocation (%) Risk Contribution (%) Allocation (%) Risk Contribution (%) Allocation (%) Risk Contribution (%) 
Investec Managed Fund 41.00 34.08 10.00 8.52 0.00 0.00 
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund 16.00 21.40 5.00 7.53 0.00 0.00 
Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF 17.00 22.94 27.00 37.69 30.00 42.27 
A-DEX SA Momentum Fund 6.00 10.08 5.00 34.25 9.00 39.89 
A-DEX SA Low Volatility Fund 6.00 6.59 6.00 6.31 6.00 11.93 
A-DEX SA Value Fund 10.00 4.90 27.00 5.74 30.00 6.00 
Nedgroup Investments Core Income Fund 4.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 
Portfolio Total Return (% p.a.) 12.46  13.10  13.35  
Portfolio Total Risk (% p.a.) 8.00  7.16  6.98  
Portfolio Tracking Error (% p.a.) 4.91  5.43  5.79  




14 Refers to the asset allocation, smart-beta allocation, geographical allocation, total risk, risk contribution per holding and tracking error parameters imposed on the core-satellite portfolio. 
15 Asset allocation and geographical allocation parameters still imply. However, smart-beta limitations, risk contribution per holding and tracking error parameters no longer apply. 


















Table 5.10: Investec Managed Core-Satellite Portfolio vs Benchmark 
Trailing Results17 
 Investec Managed Robo Core-Satellite18 Benchmark 75% FTSE/JSE + 25% ALBI 
Last 12 Month Ann Returns  5.47% 8.83% 
Last 24 Month Ann Returns  5.55% 7.64% 
Last 36 Month Ann Returns  6.70% 8.02% 
Last 60 Month Ann Returns  8.27% 7.94% 
 
17 Investec Managed Core-Satellite Portfolio vs Benchmark (75% FTSE/JSE + 25% ALBI) performance chart can be seen on Figure 5.11. 
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Table 5.11: Core-Satellite SA Multi-Asset Low Equity Portfolio Results 
Low Risk: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity Building Blocks (Oct 2009 – Sep 2019) 
FUND Total Return (% p.a.) Total Risk (% p.a.) Tracking Error (% p.a.) Sharpe Ratio     
Old Mutual Real Income Fund 8.48 2.54 4.38 0.78     
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund 10.62 12.82 4.95 0.32     
Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF 14.59 14.31 14.5 0.56     
A-DEX SA Momentum Fund 16.77 12.01 7.98 0.85     
A-DEX SA Low Volatility Fund 15.19 9.63 7.54 0.9     
A-DEX SA Value Fund 18.51 13.43 8.05 0.89     
Nedgroup Investments Core Income Fund 7.04 0.42 9.23 1.26     
 Within Parameters19 Outside Parameters (TE < 4.1%)20 Outside Parameters (TE < 4.5%)21 
PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS Allocation (%) Risk Contribution (%) Allocation (%) Risk Contribution (%) Allocation (%) Risk Contribution (%) 
Old Mutual Real Income Fund 45.00 22.51 20.00 8.02 10.00 3.55 
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund 4.00 11.96 2.00 5.78 0.00 0.00 
Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF 12.00 29.09 15.00 38.24 17.00 45.36 
A-DEX SA Momentum Fund 2.00 22.84 2.00 41.03 2.00 44.53 
A-DEX SA Low Volatility Fund 4.00 5.34 1.00 4.98 1.00 4.75 
A-DEX SA Value Fund 9.00 8.19 16.00 1.88 18.00 1.80 
Nedgroup Investments Core Income Fund 24.00 0.00 44.00 0.00 52.00 0.02 
Portfolio Total Return (% p.a.) 9.89  10.19  10.33  
Portfolio Total Risk (% p.a.) 3.61  3.70  3.73  
Portfolio Tracking Error (% p.a.) 3.80  4.02  4.27  




19 Refers to the asset allocation, smart-beta allocation, geographical allocation, total risk, risk contribution per holding and tracking error parameters imposed on the core-satellite portfolio. 
20 Asset allocation and geographical allocation parameters still imply. However, smart-beta limitations, risk contribution per holding and tracking error parameters no longer apply. 



















22 Old Mutual Real Income Core-Satellite Portfolio vs Benchmark (40% FTSE/JSE + 40% ALBI + 20% STeFI) performance chart can be seen on Figure 5.14. 
23 Old Mutual Real Income Core-Satellite Portfolio can be seen on its theoretical efficient frontier (Figure 5.13) indicating its risk and return and risk and tracking error trade off. 
Trailing Results22  
  
Old Mutual Real Income  
Robo Core-Satellite23 
Benchmark  
40% FTSE/JSE + 40% ALBI + 20% STeFI 
Last 12 Month Ann Returns  7.03% 7.76% 
Last 24 Month Ann Returns  6.54% 7.21% 
Last 36 Month Ann Returns  6.83% 7.63% 
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Figure 5.15: Old Mutual Real Income Core-Satellite Portfolio vs Benchmark (40% FTSE/JSE + 40% ALBI + 20% STeFI) Cumulative Performance 




 Results and Conclusion – Risk and Tracking Error Budgeting using 
Active, Passive and Smart Beta 
 
The analysis seeks to develop a product range of low-cost core-satellite portfolios for the 
following risk profiles: 
1. High Risk: SA General Equity 
2. Medium Risk: SA Multi-Asset High Equity 
3. Low Risk: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity 
The range of core-satellite portfolios that were developed have several restrictions and 
limitations24 imposed on them in order to comply with ASISA’s framework. The results and 
conclusion from each “replica portfolio” will be discussed in this section in order to determine 
whether these portfolios have achieved their desired outcome.  
 
5.7.1 Conclusion - High Risk: SA General Equity Core-Satellite Product  
 
The product that was developed is called Fairtree Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio (Table 5.7). 
The primary considerations in developing the portfolio were total risk, tracking error, risk 
contribution per holding along with low total fees as measured by the TIC of the portfolio. The 
secondary objective aimed at optimising the risk-adjusted returns of the portfolio.  The 
portfolio was developed in line with the SAA bounds and restrictions set out by ASISA for SA 
General Equity Portfolios25. 
Applying Euler’s theorem for homogenous functions along with tracking error and total risk 
budgeting, the Fairtree Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio was developed. The portfolio consists 
of six holdings in total (Figure 5.9), of which one is active, two are passive along with three 
smart-beta components. Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund actively manages 15% of the portfolio. 
60% consists of pure passive, of which 30% is allocated to Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund and 30% to 
Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF. Finally, 25% is allocated to A-DEX smart-beta funds. 
The composition of the portfolio indicates that the core consists of passive and smart-beta, low-
cost holdings while the satellite of the portfolio consists of one active manager.  
 
24 Refers to the asset allocation, smart-beta allocation, geographical allocation, total risk, risk contribution per 
holding and tracking error parameters imposed on the core-satellite portfolio. 
25 SA General Equity funds must invest a minimum of 80% of the market value of the portfolios in equities. 30% 




Fairtree Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio generated a net annualised return of 13.73% over the 
period 1 Dec 2011 to 30 Sep 2019. This is significantly higher than the return of the benchmark 
FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) of 9.66% p.a. as well as the net return of Fairtree Equity Prescient 
Fund of 12.84% p.a. The total risk of the portfolio over the sample period was 9.90% p.a., 
which is less than its benchmark of 11.05% p.a. The most substantial risk contribution per 
holding is 33.55%, which stems from Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF, indicating that 
global equity is the most significant contributor to risk. The tracking error vs benchmark of the 
portfolio was 4.65% p.a., which is lower than the mean tracking error of SA General Equity 
funds included in the sample of 5.36% p.a. The Sharpe Ratio of the portfolio over the sample 
period was 0.76, which is higher than the average Sharpe Ratio of 0.26 for SA General Equity 
funds included in the study. Applying a fee analysis, Fairtree Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio 
has a TIC of 0.80% p.a. (Table 5.13). The weighted TIC of the portfolio is significantly less 
than the TIC of comparable actively managed SA General Equity Funds26. 
Table 5.13: Fee Analysis: Fairtree Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio 
 
Finally, the analysis develops additional core-satellite portfolios that do not comply with the 
parameters27. The composition of the portfolios are similar to the findings of Waring et al. 
(2000), in that tracking error and active risk increases as the allocation towards non-passive 
managers increase. The tracking error vs benchmark of these portfolios increase as their 
allocation towards smart-beta funds increases. However, the portfolios generate higher 
absolute returns with lower total risk. Thus, increasing the Sharpe Ratio of the portfolio. This 
phenomenon can be attributed to the cutting-edge quantitative portfolio characteristics of A-
DEX smart-beta funds which support the findings of Arnott, Hsu and Moore (2005).  
 
26 The average TIC of active SA General Equity Funds shortlisted in this analysis is 2.37% p.a. 
27 Asset allocation and geographical allocation parameters still imply. However, smart-beta limitations, risk 
contribution per holding and tracking error parameters no longer apply. 
Fee Analysis: SA General Equity Building Blocks 
PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS Allocation (%) TIC (%) Weighted TIC (%) 
Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund 15.00% 2.71% 0.41% 
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund 30.00% 0.52% 0.16% 
Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF 30.00% 0.68% 0.20% 
A-DEX SA Momentum Fund 10.00% 0.15% 0.02% 
A-DEX SA Low Volatility Fund 5.00% 0.15% 0.01% 
A-DEX SA Value Fund 10.00% 0.15% 0.02% 




5.7.2 Conclusion - Medium Risk: SA Multi-Asset High Equity Core-Satellite Product  
 
The product that was developed is called Investec Managed Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio 
(Table 5.9). The primary considerations in developing the portfolio was total risk, tracking 
error, risk contribution per holding along with low total fees as measured by the TIC of the 
portfolio. The secondary objective aimed at optimising the risk-adjusted returns of the 
portfolio.  The portfolio was developed in line with the SAA bounds and restrictions set out by 
ASISA for SA Multi-Asset High Equity Portfolios28. 
Applying Euler’s theorem for homogenous functions along with tracking error and total risk 
budgeting, the Investec Managed Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio was developed. The 
portfolio consists of seven holdings in total (Figure 5.12), of which two are active, two are 
passive along with three smart-beta components. 45% of the portfolios consist of pure active, 
41% of which is managed by Investec Managed Fund. 4% of the portfolio is managed by 
Nedgroup Investments Core Income Fund, which seeks to replicate the performance of the 
STeFI Composite index, at a low-cost. 33% consists of pure passive, of which 16% is allocated 
to Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund and 17% to Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF. Finally, 22% is 
allocated to A-DEX smart-beta funds. The composition of the portfolio is unlike the Fairtree 
Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio since the core component, in this case, is allocated to active 
managers. The satellite component of the portfolio consists of passive and smart-beta holdings. 
These findings suggest that the inclusion of active managers within the context of multi-asset 
portfolios should be a key consideration for advisors. Particularly if the manager can generate 
positive risk-adjusted returns with a low R-squared. The R-squared of Investec Managed fund 
to its passive asset classes and style indices is 0.73, which is less than its peers29. 
Investec Managed Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio generated a net annualised return of 
12.46% over the period 1 Oct 2009 to 30 Sep 2019. This is higher than the return of the 
benchmark (75% FTSE/JSE + 25% ALBI) of 11.49% p.a. as well as the net return of Investec 
Managed Fund of 11.30% p.a. The total risk of the portfolio over the sample period was 8.00% 
p.a., which is less than its benchmark of 10.76% p.a. The most substantial risk contribution per 
holding is 34.08%, which stems from Investec Managed Fund. This indicates that active risk 
 
28 SA Multi-Asset High Equity Funds may invest in up to 75% equities. 30% of their assets may be invested 
outside South Africa. 





forms the largest contribution to total risk. The tracking error vs benchmark of the portfolio 
was 4.91% p.a., which is lower than the mean tracking error of SA Multi-Asset High Equity 
funds included in the sample of 5.53% p.a. The Sharpe Ratio of the portfolio over the sample 
period was 0.75, which is higher than the average Sharpe Ratio of 0.43 for SA Multi-Asset 
High Equity funds included in the study. Applying a fee analysis, Investec Managed Robo 
Core-Satellite Portfolio has a TIC of 1.11% p.a. (Table 5.14). The weighted TIC of the 
portfolio is significantly less than the TIC of comparable actively managed SA Multi-Asset 
High Equity Funds 30. 
 
Table 5.14: Fee Analysis: Investec Managed Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio 
Fee Analysis: SA Multi-Asset High Equity Building Blocks 
PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS Allocation (%) TIC (%) Weighted TIC (%) 
Investec Managed Fund 41.00% 2.08% 0.85% 
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund 16.00% 0.52% 0.08% 
Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF 17.00% 0.68% 0.12% 
A-DEX SA Momentum Fund 6.00% 0.15% 0.01% 
A-DEX SA Low Volatility Fund 6.00% 0.15% 0.01% 
A-DEX SA Value Fund 10.00% 0.15% 0.02% 
Nedgroup Investments Core Income Fund 4.00% 0.59% 0.02% 
Investec Managed Robo Core-Satellite TIC (%)  1.11% 
 
Finally, the analysis develops additional core-satellite portfolios that do not comply with the 
parameters31. The composition of the portfolios are similar to the findings of Waring et al. 
(2000), in that tracking error and active risk increases as the allocation towards non-passive 
managers increase. The tracking error vs benchmark of these portfolios increase as their 
allocation towards smart-beta funds increases, however the portfolios generate higher absolute 
returns with lower total risk. Thus, again increasing the Sharpe Ratio of the portfolio as in the 
case of SA General Equity portfolios. Once again, this points out the cutting-edge quantitative 
portfolio characteristics of A-DEX smart-beta funds which support the findings of Arnott, Hsu 
and Moore (2005). Unfortunately, SA Multi-Asset High Equity portfolios may not exceed a 
75% allocation towards equities. Therefore, blending a global equity ETF, SA cash product 
and A-DEX smart-beta funds generate the optimal Sharpe Ratio. This blend does, however, 
have a much higher tracking error versus Investec Managed Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio. 
 
30 The average TIC of active SA Multi-Asset High Equity Funds shortlisted in this analysis is 1.75% p.a. 
31 Asset allocation and geographical allocation parameters still imply. However, smart-beta limitations, risk 




5.7.3 Conclusion - Low Risk: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity Core-Satellite Product  
 
The product that was developed is called Old Mutual Real Income Robo Core-Satellite 
Portfolio (Table 5.11). The primary considerations in developing the portfolio was total risk, 
tracking error, risk contribution per holding along with low total fees as measured by the TIC 
of the portfolio. The secondary objective aimed at optimising the risk-adjusted returns of the 
portfolio.  The portfolio was developed in line with the SAA bounds and restrictions set out by 
ASISA for SA Multi-Asset Low Equity Portfolios32. 
Applying Euler’s theorem along with tracking error and total risk budgeting, the Old Mutual 
Real Income Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio was developed. The portfolio consists of seven 
holdings in total (Figure 5.15), of which two are active, two are passive along with three smart-
beta components. 69% of the portfolios consist of pure active, 45% of which is managed by 
Old Mutual Real Income fund. 24% of the portfolio is managed by Nedgroup Investments Core 
Income Fund, which seeks to replicate the performance of the STeFI Composite index, at a 
low-cost. 16% consists of pure passive, of which 4% is allocated to Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund and 
12% to Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF. Finally, 15% is allocated to A-DEX smart-beta 
funds. The analysis points out that the composition of the portfolio is unlike the Fairtree Robo 
Core-Satellite Portfolio or Investec Managed Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio, since active 
managers dominate the core component in this case. The satellite component of the portfolio 
consists of passive and smart-beta holdings. This indicates the inclusion of active managers 
within the context of multi-asset low equity portfolios should be a key consideration for 
advisors, more so than with equity only, or multi-asset high equity portfolios. Particularly if 
the manager has the ability to generate positive risk-adjusted returns with a low R-squared. The 
R-squared of Old Mutual Real Income fund to its passive asset classes and style indices is 0.54, 
which is less than its peers33. 
Old Mutual Real Income Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio generated a net return of 9.89% p.a. 
over the period 1 Oct 2009 to 30 Sep 2019. This is higher than the return of the benchmark 
(40% FTSE/JSE + 40% ALBI + 20% STeFI) of 9.80% p.a. as well as the net return of Old 
Mutual Real Income fund of 8.48% p.a. The total risk of the portfolio over the sample period 
 
32 SA Multi-Asset Low Equity Funds may invest in up to 40% equites. 30% of their assets may be invested outside 
South Africa. 
33 The R-squared of Coronation Balanced Defensive Fund and Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund which is 0.82 




was 3.61% p.a., which is less than its benchmark of 7.01% p.a. The most substantial risk 
contribution per holding is 29.09%, which stems from Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF. 
Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF is the third-largest constituent of the portfolio. However, 
it is the largest contributor to total risk. The tracking error vs benchmark of the portfolio was 
3.80% p.a., which is lower than the mean tracking error of SA Multi-Asset Low Equity funds 
included in the sample of 5.06% p.a. The Sharpe Ratio of the portfolio over the sample period 
was 0.93, which is higher than the average Sharpe Ratio of 0.51 for SA Multi-Asset Low Equity 
funds included in the study. Applying a fee analysis, Old Mutual Real Income Robo Core-
Satellite Portfolio has a TIC of 0.92% (Table 5.15). The weighted TIC of the portfolio is 
significantly less than the TIC of comparable actively managed SA Multi-Asset Low Equity 
Funds 34. 
 
Table 5.15: Fee Analysis: Old Mutual Real Income Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio 
Fee Analysis: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity Building Blocks 
PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS Allocation (%) TIC (%) Weighted TIC (%) 
Old Mutual Real Income Fund 45.00% 1.45% 0.65% 
Stanlib ALSI 40 Fund 4.00% 0.52% 0.02% 
Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF 12.00% 0.68% 0.08% 
A-DEX SA Momentum Fund 2.00% 0.15% 0.00% 
A-DEX SA Low Volatility Fund 4.00% 0.15% 0.01% 
A-DEX SA Value Fund 9.00% 0.15% 0.01% 
Nedgroup Investments Core Income Fund 24.00% 0.59% 0.14% 
Old Mutual Real Income Robo Core-Satellite TIC (%)   0.92% 
 
Finally, the analysis develops additional core-satellite portfolios that do not comply with the 
parameters35. The tracking error vs benchmark and total risk of these portfolios increase as 
their allocation towards smart-beta funds and global equities increase. This increases absolute 
returns that are significant enough to increase the Sharpe Ratios of the portfolios.  SA Multi-
Asset Low Equity portfolios may only invest up to 40% in equities. Therefore, the impact of 
larger equity and global equity allocations are significant when it comes to the total risk and 
tracking error of the portfolio. One of the main shortcomings of global equity allocations within 
low-risk portfolios is their significant contribution to risk. Limiting the extent to which low 
risk portfolios are exposed to global equities should be a primary consideration to advisors.  
 
34 The average TIC of active SA Multi-Asset Low Equity Funds shortlisted in this analysis is 1.37% p.a. 
35 Asset allocation and geographical allocation parameters still imply. However, smart-beta limitations, risk 




Chapter 6: Conclusions, Recommendations and Limitations  
 
 Conclusion: Active vs Passive vs Smart-Beta 
 
Prior, highly acclaimed literature regarding active, passive and smart-beta investment 
management styles provides mixed results. Internationally, financial markets tend to be more 
informationally efficient. Therefore, passive management should form the core of a well-
diversified portfolio. Bogle (2010) states that he is a stronger believer in passive investing than 
he was when he created the first index fund in 1975. On the other hand, Clare, Motson and 
Thomas (2013) find evidence that an equally weighted portfolio of 1000 stocks selected by 
monkeys outperforms the market capitalisation index. US$100 invested at the beginning of 
1968 would have achieved a terminal value of just under US$5000 if invested in the market 
capitalisation index, compared to just under US$9000 if invested in a randomly selected index 
of stocks that might as well have been chosen by monkeys. 
Results surrounding market efficiency in South Africa are inconclusive as to whether the JSE 
can be considered efficient or not. Noakes and Rajaratnam (2016) along with Smith and 
Dyakova (2014) find that efficiency and non-efficiency for JSE listed stocks can be found in 
groups with similar attributes and characteristics such as size and liquidity on a stock-specific 
level. Emerging markets, including that of South Africa, present more significant opportunities 
for active managers to generate abnormal returns using their skill and informational edge. This 
study, therefore recommends and support the notion that investors should exploit the “hot-
hands effect” by investing in active managers who consistently generate superior risk-adjusted 
returns. 
The results from this study indicate that on an absolute basis, active managers from the 
following ASISA frameworks, (1) High Risk: SA General Equity, (2) Medium Risk: SA Multi-
Asset High Equity and (3) Low Risk: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity, predominantly fail to 
outperform their benchmarks over the sample period (October 2009 – September 2019). 
However, this study recommends investors to exploit the “hot-hands effect” by identifying and 
shortlisting active managers who consistently prudence superior risk-adjusted returns versus 
their peers as measured by their Sharpe and Information Ratios. 
The study recommends the use of RBSA as a secondary filter to identify active managers with 




From the nine active managers, three from each ASISA framework who possess the “hot-hands 
effect”, not a single active manager managed to generate alpha over the passive asset classes 
and style indices they seek to replicate. Some active managers, however, manage to generate 
positive risk-adjusted returns with low correlation and low coefficients of determination 
compared to their benchmarks and shadow funds and was therefore considered. These metrics 
indicate the manager has the ability to generate returns while being agnostic of the composition 
of its benchmark or competitors. Additionally, a low R-squared indicate that active managers 
can identify and include alternative asset classes to generate returns, which justifies their active 
management fees.  
For SA General Equity portfolios, investors should consider using active managers who invest 
in South African equities only. The study finds that active manager within South Africa has a 
competitive advantage when it comes to investing in South African companies only, and not 
companies listed on international exchanges. The offshore equity component of SA General 
Equity portfolios should consist solely of passive strategies such as Sygnia Itrix MSCI World 
Index ETF.  
This study encourages investors to include passive building blocks and low-cost index funds 
within SA General Equity and SA Multi-Asset portfolios. The advantages of these holdings are 
threefold in that:  
1. They reduce the total tracking of the portfolio, thus limiting active risk, 
2. They reduce the total cost of the portfolio as measured by TIC, and, 
3. It gives the investors exposure to a well-diversified portfolio of global or local 
securities at reduced costs, 
Finally, the study confirms the findings of Arnott, Hsu and Moore (2005), fundamental index 
portfolios, or “smart-beta” are robust due to their mean-variance superiority compared to the 
market capitalisation-weighted index. Value factor, represented by A-DEX Value Fund, 
momentum factor, represented by A-DEX Momentum Fund and low volatility factor, 
represented by A-DEX Low Volatility Fund generated Sharpe Ratios superior to their active 
and passive counterparts. The study recommends the inclusion of A-DEX smart-beta funds to 
SA General Equity, SA Multi-Asset High Equity and SA Multi-Asset Low Equity portfolios. 
Not only do they reduce the overall cost as measured by the portfolio’s TIC, but they also 




 Conclusion: Low-Cost Core-Satellite Portfolios and Risk and Tracking 
Error Budgeting  
 
The study develops a rule-based product range of low-cost core-satellite portfolios “replica 
portfolios” as initially proposed by Treynor and Black (1973). The idea behind the core-
satellite portfolio is that the optimal portfolio must consist of a blend between active and 
passive components. This concept is later enhanced to incorporate risk and tracking error 
budgeting by Waring et al. (2000) and Amenc et al. (2004). Core-satellite obtains the optimal 
risky portfolio by blending the securities that are deemed inefficient “active alpha” with the 
efficient market index “passive beta”. This study extends the typical core-satellite portfolio to 
include active, passive and smart-beta holdings.  
The study identifies three “target portfolios” from ASISA framework, namely: 
1. High Risk: SA General Equity,  
2. Medium Risk: SA Multi-Asset High Equity, and,  
3. Low Risk: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity,  
The study succeeds in bridging the gap between active, passive, and smart-beta investment 
management styles by introducing a low-cost portfolio construction technique, core-satellite 
portfolio management, which contributes to the risk and tracking error budgeting process.  
Three unique products are developed during the final stage of this study, namely: 
1. High Risk: Fairtree Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio 
2. Medium Risk: Investec Managed Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio 
3. Low Risk: Old Mutual Real Income Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio 
Each product is suited to South African investors during various stages of their investment life 
cycle. The core-satellite product range this study develops is aligned with the findings of 
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) who evaluate the importance of portfolio and asset class 
choice over the life cycle of the investor. Moreover, the core-satellite product range supports 
the popular notion that the portfolio’s share invested in equities should roughly decrease with 
age.  
The results of the three unique core-satellite portfolios support the findings of Jorion (1992), 
that when investors have more assets at their disposal to choose from, a more widely diversified 




The core-satellite range of portfolios developed during this study had several implicit 
objectives that will be discussed throughout the following subsections.  
 
6.2.1 Conclusion: Risk Budgeting with Core-Satellite  
 
All three portfolios developed during this study were subject to robust multidimensional risk 
constraints, which include: 
1. Risk mandate of each portfolio36 
2. Total Risk budget of each portfolio37, and, 
3. Risk contribution per holding38 
The study succeeds in meeting all of the above risk constraints. By implementing these rigorous 
risk constraints, all three portfolios have lower total risk compared to their benchmarks. 
Moreover, the high risk, Fairtree Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio incurs less total risk than the 
average actively managed SA General Equity Fund included in this study. The study, therefore, 
recommends a more significant allocation towards passive and smart-beta managers, compared 
to active managers. In contradiction to the above, the study finds that active managers within 
the SA Multi-Asset High Equity and SA Multi-Asset Low Equity classification can reduce the 
total risk of the portfolio. For this reason, the study recommends a more significant allocation 
to active managers when the risk mandate of the portfolio is medium to low. 
 
6.2.2 Conclusion: Tracking Error Budgeting with Core-Satellite 
 
By imposing a tracking error TE constraint on the product range of core-satellite portfolios, the 
study finds that there is a positive relationship between TE and absolute returns for all three 
portfolios. This objective, according to Roll (1992) is called the tracking error volatility (TEV) 
criterion. Investors who attempt to satisfy it fail to produce mean/variance efficient Makowitz 
portfolios. Active portfolios with low TE’s will be dominated by portfolios with higher average 
 
36 Three unique risk profiles that are subject to ASISA’s strategic asset allocation limitations along with 
PlexCrown SA Unit Trust Risk Classification Framework 
37 The maximum risk of each portfolio may not exceed the risk of its benchmark as measured by its annualised standard 
deviation.  
38 High- and medium risk portfolios are limited to a 35% risk contribution per holding, and low-risk portfolios are 




returns, lower volatilities, but not necessarily lower TE’s. Thus, Makowitz efficient frontier 
portfolios dominate TE efficient portfolios. This study confirms the research of Roll (1992). 
As TE increase, absolute returns increase, along with Sharpe Ratios, caused by allocation 
towards smart-beta strategies that have higher tracking errors, along with higher Sharpe Ratios.  
Large institution investors who are cognisant of benchmarks returns over short time horizons 
are advised to use tracking error budgeting when constructing a portfolio of active, passive and 
smart-beta managers. Large allocations to passive managers will limit the extent of tracking 
error, however at the detriment of higher Sharpe Ratios. Investors with investment time 
horizons in excess of 40 years are encouraged to ignore tracking error budgeting and seek to 
invest in portfolios with maximum Sharpe Ratios only. 
 
6.2.3 Conclusion: Fee Arbitrage with Core-Satellite  
 
A primary motivation for the core-satellite portfolio is fee arbitrage. This study finds evidence 
to support the research of Amenc, Malaise and Martellini (2004) in that one can use core-
satellite portfolios to reduce total fees, and in turn, generate higher alpha. 
All three core-satellite portfolios developed during this study have lower total fees compared 
to the active only component included in the portfolio. The average fee reduction this study 
managed to achieve for high, medium and low-risk core-satellite products as measured by TIC 
versus active only portfolios is 1.91% p.a, 0.97% p.a. and 0.53% p.a. respectively. The fee 
reduction is most significant for the high-risk product since it has the largest allocation to 
passive and smart-beta managers. As total risk is reduced, a larger allocation towards active 
managers become quantifiable, and the fee reduction becomes diminishing. 
The study recommends and strongly encourages investors to construct robust core-satellite 
portfolios with allocations to passive and smart-beta managers. Incremental allocations away 
from pure active managers will lead to fee arbitrage, and potentially more alpha over longer 







6.2.4 Conclusion: Returns with Core-Satellite 
 
The study finds that by using core-satellite portfolios, investors can achieve multiple 
objectives. A result of core-satellite portfolios above from risk budgeting and fee arbitrage is 
its ability to increase absolute and risk-adjusted returns. The product range of three core-
satellite portfolios developed during this study managed to achieve higher absolute and risk-
adjusted returns compared to their benchmarks and active only counterparts.  
On an absolute basis, the study finds that portfolios with larger equity allocations generate 
higher returns. As the equity allocation declines, the absolute return declines. Therefore, 
Fairtree Robo Core-Satellite Portfolio (100% equity) is the most preferred portfolio in 
absolute terms while Old Mutual Real Income Core-Satellite Portfolio (40% equity) is the 
least preferred in absolute terms.  
The study finds that on a risk-adjusted performance basis, as measured by the Sharpe Ratio, 
the portfolio with the lowest equity allocation has the highest Sharpe Ratio. Therefore, Old 
Mutual Real Income Core-Satellite Portfolio (40% equity) is the most preferred portfolio as 
measured by its Sharpe Ratio. The study again recommends large institution investors, pension 
funds, and individuals who depend solely on the income of their portfolios to avoid a portfolio 
fully invested in equities. However, investors with investment time horizons in excess of 40 
years are encouraged to focus on absolute returns, therefore being fully invested in equities.  
 
 Conclusion: Robo-Advisors Applying the Quantitative Methods  
 
Compared to the US and the UK, where Robo-Advisors (RAs) have been hugely successful in 
recent years, South Africa’s RA market is still in its infancy. RAs are perhaps the most crucial 
disruptive trend in wealth and asset management, and it is estimated that around 49 percent of 
high net worth individuals globally would consider RAs to manage some portion of their total 
wealth (Beketov, Lehmann & Wittke, 2018). 
This study evaluates several quantitative methods currently used by RAs globally and in South 
Africa. Surprisingly, the most popular quantitative method within RAs is Modern Portfolio 




employs rigorous quantitative techniques to construct a product range of low-cost portfolios 
and include: 
1. Modern Portfolio Theory (through Sharpe and Information Ratio filters) 
2. Returns Based Style Analysis  
3. Multidimensional Risk Budgeting  
4. Tracking Error Budgeting  
5. Core-Satellite Portfolio Management 
6. Fee Arbitrage  
The study encourages RAs to develop robust, practical and sophisticated products that use the 
quantitative methods proposed in this paper. Not only will it provide cutting-edge financial 
advice, but it will also develop portfolios that clients are comfortable with.  
The RA sector is expected to evolve dramatically over the next five to ten years. Companies 
who remain current in their offering, through the development of more sophisticated 
methodologies, which are aimed at producing superior returns and can be used as a marketing 
tool to attract new next-generation investors. This “next-generation client” is receptive to 
digital technologies, well educated, prefers to have active and ongoing control over their 
investments, and rely on the information from multiple online sources rather than an individual, 
human financial advisor. In turn, RAs who incorporate the methods proposed in this research 
can expect to attract higher AUM volumes. 
 
 Limitations of Research  
 
All research studies can inevitably be improved.  
This study uses prior, highly acclaimed literature and methodologies that form the cornerstone 
of modern finance and portfolio management. History cannot be changed, nor rewritten. 
Investment greats cited throughout this paper such as Harry Markowitz, Benjamin Graham, 
John Bogle, William Sharpe, Eugene Fama, Burton Malkiel and Warren Buffett each have their 
distinctive style or “flavour”. Throughout this research, the author made reference to notable 
quotes from investment greats which should form the cornerstone to any investment decision. 





This research, however, has the following limitations: 
1. Data Period: Due to data limitations, this study only uses monthly data for a period of 
ten years (October 2009 – September 2019) which covers 120 months of TR data. 
Over the past ten years, the South African economy, and particularly the JSE has 
experienced no significant market shock or recession such as the GFC. This period, 
however, displays unique, previously unwitnessed circumstances. In the first five years 
of the data period, 2009 - 2013, the FTSE/JSE All-Share J203T Index return an average 
of 20.36% per annum. The next five years tells an entirely different story as the average 
return for 2014 - 2018 was only 6.21% per annum. This research, for the reasons stated 
above, derived a conclusion using data for the period October 2009 – September 
2019. Using more extended periods of data might enhance the results in the future.  
 
2. Data Sample: The primary aim of this study was to develop core-satellite portfolios 
using active, passive and smart-beta funds. This study, however, narrowed the 
available active managers down by eliminating active managers who did not have a 
performance track record of at least four years of sufficient assets under management. 
The study identifies a total of 574 actively managed unit trusts, with a combined AUM 
of R1,13 trillion. The study uses a sample of 61 active managers with a combined AUM 
of R904 532 million, representing 79.46% of all active funds from the ASISA 
framework covered in this study. The accuracy and validity of this study can be 
improved by including a higher percentage of AUM as part of the data sample. 
 
3. Tax Implications: This study recommends the use of core-satellite portfolios with 
different risk profiles, suited to different types of South African investors. The core-
satellite portfolios developed during this study consists of several asset classes which 
might have different tax implications. Although the tax implications are beyond the 
scope of this study, the author wishes to advise investors that returns may be affected 
by their tax status, age and level of income.  
 
The abovementioned limitations are in no manner insoluble and will enhance the validity of 






 Recommendations for Future Research  
 
This study encompasses several disciplines of academic literature which can be explored in 
future research. Further research will traverse not only a single disciple, but can embody: 
Finance: This study focuses solely on South African core-satellite portfolios (i.e. portfolios 
that need to invest approximately 70 percent of their assets within South Africa). The product 
range of core-satellite portfolios developed in this study consists only of active, passive and 
smart-beta strategies. Further research can investigate the implications of core-satellite 
portfolios when investing in global financial markets. The South African stock market, 
represented by the JSE, is currently ranked the 19th largest stock exchange in the world by 
market capitalisation. Constructing core-satellite portfolios of global assets could yield 
divergent results to those found in this study. Additionally, further research could evaluate the 
risk, tracking error, fee and performance effect of including alternative assets and asset classes 
such as hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, private debt, structured products, 
infrastructure and natural resources within the core-satellite portfolio.  
Financial Planning and Behavioural Finance: By determining a client’s future value of 
liabilities, probability of occurrence and financial biases, further research can develop a low-
cost outcome-based core-satellite portfolio. These portfolios cover the liability as it occurs, 
while generating returns above inflation-adjusted future liability values. There is a parallel link 
between the success of portfolios developed by Robo-advisors and the behavioural inputs 
required to meet the needs and desires of the client. Further research in this field would make 
the quantitative methods proposed in this paper tangible. 
Computer Science: The success of Robo-advisors and the portfolios they propose to clients 
rely on the algorithms and programs developed within the field of computer science. The ability 
to process, store and manipulate data will pave the way of the next generation of RAs. Although 
beyond the scope of this study, further research within the field of computer science, 
computational science and big data with regards to the algorithms within RAs would be 
indispensable. Writing robust algorithms to match a client’s risk and future liabilities to prudent 
core-satellite portfolios with multidimensional risk budgets, tracking error budgets and asset 
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Annexure A: SA General Equity Funds Per AUM Bracket at 30 June 2019 
SA General Equity Funds at 30 June 2019 (10 Billion < ZAR < 40 Billion) ~ 6 funds 
FUND AUM INCEPTION DATE 
Allan Gray Equity Fund R38 724 Billion Oct-98 
Coronation Top 20 Fund R19 942 Billion Oct-00 
Old Mutual Investors Fund R13 253 Billion Oct-66 
Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund R11 680 Billion Nov-11 
Nedgroup Investments Rainmaker Fund R11 251 Billion Jun-00 
Abax Equity Prescient Fund R10 450 Billion Oct-04 
  R105 301 Billion  
SA General Equity Funds at 30 June 2019 (5 Billion < ZAR < 10 Billion) ~ 8 funds 
FUND AUM INCEPTION DATE 
Stanlib Multi Manager Equity Fund R9 666 Billion Oct-98 
Investec Equity Fund R9 162 Billion Nov-87 
PSG Wealth Creator FOF R7 797 Billion Jun-09 
Sanlam (SIM) General Equity Fund R7 503 Billion Aug-05 
Coronation Equity Fund R7 138 Billion Apr-96 
Foord Equity Fund R6 359 Billion Sep-02 
Oasis Crescent Equity Fund R5 513 Billion Jul-98 
PortfolioMetrix BCI Equity FOF R5 298 Billion Jul-14 
  R58 436 Billion   
SA General Equity Funds at 30 June 2019 (0 Billion < ZAR < 5 Billion) ~ 10 funds 
FUND AUM INCEPTION DATE 
PSG Equity Fund R4 739 Billion Dec-97 
Prudential Dividend Maximiser Fund R4 281 Billion Aug-99 
Stanlib Equity Fund R4 156 Billion Jan-70 
Investec Value Fund R3 919 Billion May-97 
Marriott Dividend Growth Fund R3 860 Billion Aug-88 
Prudential Equity Fund R3 442 Billion Aug-99 
Allan Gray SA Equity Fund R3 004 Billion Mar-15 
Stanlib SA Equity Fund R2 929 Billion Aug-94 
Discovery Equity Fund R2 915 Billion Nov-07 
Absa Select Equity Fund R2 629 Billion Mar-13 




Annexure B: SA Multi-Asset High Equity Funds Per AUM Bracket at 30 June 2019 
 
SA Multi Asset High Equity Funds at 30 June 2019 (20 Billion < ZAR < 151 Billion) ~ 7 funds 
FUND AUM INCEPTION DATE 
Allan Gray Balanced Fund R150 563 Billion Oct-99 
Coronation Balanced Plus Fund R88 990 Billion Apr-96 
Investec Opportunity Fund  R44 372 Billion May-97 
Foord Balanced Fund R30 173 Billion Sep-02 
Discovery Balanced Fund R26 625 Billion Nov-07 
Prudential Balanced Fund R23 201 Billion Aug-99 
PSG Wealth Moderate FOF R20 652 Billion Dec-08 
  R384 576 Billion   
SA Multi Asset High Equity Funds at 30 June 2019 (10 Billion < ZAR < 20 Billion) ~ 5 funds 
FUND AUM INCEPTION DATE 
Sanlam (SIM) Balanced Fund R18 649 Billion Feb-95 
Old Mutual Balanced Fund R17 963 Billion Mar-94 
Investec Managed Fund R15 384 Billion Feb-94 
Old Mutual Multi-Managers Balanced FOF R13 574 Billion Jun-01 
PSG Balanced Fund R11 795 Billion Sep-13 
  R77 365 Billion   
SA Multi Asset High Equity Funds at 30 June 2019 (2 Billion < ZAR < 10 Billion) ~ 11 funds 
FUND AUM INCEPTION DATE 
Stanlib Multi-Manager Balanced Fund R6 389 Billion Jan-02 
Rezco Value Trend Fund R5 028 Billion Sep-04 
Satrix Balanced Index Fund R4 303 Billion Oct-13 
Stanlib Balanced Fund R4 216 Billion Aug-94 
Marriott Balanced FOF R2 629 Billion Oct-01 
Sanlam Multi-Managed Balanced FOF R2 317 Billion Mar-99 
Alexander Forbes Performer Managed Unit Trust R2 287 Billion Jan-11 
Sasfin BCI Prudential Fund R2 188 Billion Jan-13 
Sygnia CPI +6% Fund R2 061 Billion Jun-12 
PPS Balanced FOF R2 058 Billion Jul-11 
Absa Multi-Managed Growth FOF R2 048 Billion Feb-07 





Annexure C: SA Multi-Asset Low Equity Funds Per AUM Bracket at 30 June 2019 
 
SA Multi Asset Low Equity Funds at 30 June 2019 (20 Billion < ZAR < 55 Billion) ~ 3 funds 
FUND AUM INCEPTION DATE 
Allan Gray Stable Fund R50 867 Billion Jul-00 
Coronation Balanced Defensive Fund R33 208 Billion Feb-07 
Prudential Inflation Plus Fund R32 536 Billion Jun-01 
  R116 611 Billion   
SA Multi Asset Low Equity Funds at 30 June 2019 (10 Billion < ZAR < 20 Billion) ~ 4 funds 
FUND AUM INCEPTION DATE 
Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund R19 509 Billion Jul-11 
Sanlam (SIM) Inflation Plus Fund R13 345 Billion Apr-99 
PSG Wealth Preserver FOF R10 691 Billion Jun-09 
Investec Cautious Managed Fund R10 162 Billion Apr-06 
  R53 706 Billion   
SA Multi Asset Low Equity Funds at 30 June 2019 (2 Billion < ZAR < 10 Billion) ~ 7 funds 
FUND AUM INCEPTION DATE 
Stanlib Balanced Cautious Fund R6 959 Billion Jan-09 
Old Mutual Stable Growth Fund R6 432 Billion Jul-07 
Absa Absolute Fund R5 835 Billion Nov-06 
Old Mutual Real Income Fund R5 434 Billion Apr-06 
PSG Stable Fund R4 617 Billion Sep-11 
Absa Multi-Managed Preserver FOF R3 472 Billion Feb-07 
Personal Trust Conservative Managed Fund R3 121 Billion Aug-08 




Annexure D: Index Funds and ETF's 
 
Annexure E: Benchmarks 
 
SA Equity Benchmarks 
NAME TR DATA DATES 
FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) Oct 2009 - Sep 2019 
PlexCrown SA Equity General Index Oct 2009 - Sep 2019 
    
Global Equity Benchmarks 
NAME TR DATA DATES 
MSCI AC World (ZAR TR) Oct 2009 - Sep 2019 
    
SA Multi-Asset Benchmarks 
NAME TR DATA DATES 
75% FTSE/JSE All Share index (J203T) + 25% JSE/ASSA All Bond Index (ALBI) Oct 2009 - Sep 2019 
40% FTSE/JSE All Share index (J203T) + 40% ALBI + 20% STeFI Composite index Oct 2009 - Sep 2019 
PlexCrown SA Multi Asset High Equity Index Oct 2009 - Sep 2019 
PlexCrown SA Multi Asset Low Equity Index Oct 2009 - Sep 2019 
  
 
SA Equity Passive 
NAME AUM (30/06/2019) TR DATA DATES 
Satrix ALSI Index Fund R717 Million Feb 2013 - Sep 2019 
STANLIB ALSI 40 Fund R829 Million Oct 2009 - Sep 2019 
      
Global Equity Passive 
NAME AUM (30/06/2019) TR DATA DATES 
Sygnia Itrix MSCI World Index ETF R8 015 Billion Oct 2009 - Sep 2019 
      
SA Bond Passive 
NAME AUM (30/06/2019) TR DATA DATES 
Sygnia All Bond Index Fund R671 Million Mar 2015 - Sep 2019 
      
SA Income Passive 
NAME AUM (30/06/2019) TR DATA DATES 
Nedgroup Investments Core Income Fund R45 645 Billion Oct 2009 - Sep 2019 














































From the X-RAY results of Investec Equity Fund, we find that the fund outperforms the benchmark 
(FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T)) on an absolute basis over the period 1 September 2012 – 1 September 
2019. Investec Equity Fund, however fails to outperforms the benchmark (FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T)) 
on a risk-adjusted basis as the annualised Sharpe Ratio of the fund is 0.86, compared to the annualised 
Sharpe Ratio of the FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) of 0.87. 
Comparing Investec Equity Fund to its shadow fund, which consists out of the following passive asset 
classes and style indices: 77.5% FTSE/JSE All Share, 21.5% MSCI World Equity, 0.5% Value and 
0.5% Low Volatility, the fund fails to outperform on an absolute and risk-adjusted basis. The majority of 
the variations of returns of Investec Equity Fund can be explained by the holdings of the shadow fund, 
since the R-squared is 0.85. The annualised alpha of Investec Equity Fund versus the shadow fund is -
1.29, which means the fund materially failed to add value over the passive asset classes and style indices 
it seeks to replicate.  
Investec Equity Fund, compared to Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund is less likely to outperform the passive 
asset classes and style indices it seeks to replicate. This is most likely due to the fact that Investec Equity 
Fund invests a large portion of its assets in global equities. The fund manager may not have a competitive 
advantage when it comes to investing in global equities. 
 
 
X-RAY Results of Investec Equity Fund (1 Sep 2012 – 1 Sep 2019) 
 Annualised Return (%) Annualised Std Dev (%) Annualised Sharpe Ratio 
Investec Equity Fund 9.87 11.53 0.86 
Shadow Fund 11.33 10.39 1.09 
Fund to Benchmark 0.15 4.51 0.02 
Fund to Shadow -1.46 4.41 -0.29 
FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) 9.72 11.2 0.87 
MSCI AC World (ZAR TR) 19.45 14.59 1.33 
Momentum  12.28 11.61 1.06 
Low Volatility 10.09 9.79 1.03 
Value 15.48 12.72 1.22 
Summary and Correlations Results of Investec Equity Fund 
Fund to Shadow Fund to Benchmark 
Alpha (% p.a.) -1.29 Alpha (% p.a.) -0.13 
R-Squared 0.85 R-Squared 0.88 
Correlation 0.92 Correlation 0.94 














Prudential Equity Fund X-RAY Results 
X-RAY Results of Prudential Equity Fund (1 Sep 2012 – 1 Sep 2019) 
 Annualised Return (%) Annualised Std Dev (%) Annualised Sharpe Ratio 
Prudential Equity Fund 9.18 10.5 0.87 
Shadow Fund 12.25 9.92 1.24 
Fund to Benchmark -0.54 4.08 -0.16 
Fund to Shadow -3.07 3.43 -0.81 
FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) 9.72 11.2 0.87 
MSCI AC World (ZAR TR) 19.45 14.59 1.33 
Momentum  12.28 11.61 1.06 
Low Volatility 10.09 9.79 1.03 
Value 15.48 12.72 1.22 
Summary and Correlations Results of Prudential Equity Fund 
Fund to Shadow Fund to Benchmark 
Alpha (% p.a.) -2.76 Alpha (% p.a.) -0.44 
R-Squared 0.89 R-Squared 0.89 
Correlation 0.95 Correlation 0.95 
Tracking Error (% p.a.) 3.43 Tracking Error (% p.a.) 3.86 
 
From the X-RAY results of Prudential Equity Fund, we find that the fund fails to outperform the 
benchmark (FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T)) on an absolute basis over the period 1 September 2012 – 1 
September 2019. Prudential Equity Fund, however takes less risk than the benchmark and therefore the 
annualised Sharpe Ratio of the fund is 0.87, which is the same the annualised Sharpe Ratio of the 
FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) of 0.87. 
Comparing Prudential Equity Fund to its shadow fund, which consists out of the following passive asset 
classes and style indices: 67% FTSE/JSE All Share, 20% MSCI World Equity, 9% Value, 0.5% Low 
Volatility and 3.5% Momentum, the fund fails to outperform on an absolute and risk-adjusted basis. The 
majority of the variations of returns of Prudential Equity Fund can be explained by the holdings of the 
shadow fund, since the R-squared is 0.89. The annualised alpha of Prudential Equity Fund versus the 
shadow fund is -2.76, which means the fund materially failed to add value over the passive asset classes 
and style indices it seeks to replicate.  
Prudential Equity Fund, compared to Fairtree Equity Prescient Fund is less likely to outperform the passive 
asset classes and style indices it seeks to replicate. This is most likely also due to the fact that Prudential 
Equity Fund, like Investec Equity Fund, invests a large portion of its assets in global equities. The fund 















Prudential Balanced Fund X-RAY Results 
X-RAY Results of Prudential Balanced Fund (1 Sep 2012 – 1 Sep 2019) 
 Annualised Return 
(%) 
Annualised Std Dev 
(%) 
Annualised Sharpe Ratio 
Prudential Balanced Fund 9.82 7.42 1.32 
Shadow Fund 13.23 7.37 1.8 
Fund to Benchmark 1.8 2.03 0.85 
Fund to Shadow -3.41 2.42 -1.27 
Benchmark (SA High Equity UT) 8.02 6.46 1.24 
FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) 10.25 11.2 0.92 
MSCI AC World (ZAR TR) 18.92 14.63 1.29 
ALBI 7.34 7.56 0.97 
Momentum  12.89 11.6 1.11 
Low Volatility 10.07 9.85 1.02 
Value 15.95 12.75 1.25 
Summary and Correlations Results of Prudential Balanced Fund 
Fund to Shadow Fund to Benchmark 
Alpha (% p.a.) -3.07 Alpha (% p.a.) 1.95 
R-Squared 0.9 R-Squared 0.93 
Correlation 0.95 Correlation 0.96 
Tracking Error (% p.a.) 2.42 Tracking Error (% p.a.) 2.41 
 
From the X-RAY results of Prudential Balanced Fund, we find that the fund outperforms the benchmark 
(SA High Equity UT Sector) on an absolute basis over the period 1 September 2012 – 1 September 2019. 
Prudential Balanced Fund also outperforms the benchmark (SA High Equity UT Sector) on a risk-adjusted 
basis as the annualised Sharpe Ratio of the fund is 1.32, compared to the annualised Sharpe Ratio of the 
SA High Equity UT Sector of 1.24.   
Comparing Prudential Balanced Fund to its shadow fund, which consists out of the following passive asset 
classes and style indices: 49% FTSE/JSE All Share, 23% ALBI, 24% MSCI World Equity, 0.5% 
Value, 3% Low Volatility and 0.5% Momentum, the fund fails to outperform on an absolute and risk-
adjusted basis. The majority of the variations of returns of Prudential Balanced Fund can be explained by 
the holdings of the shadow fund, since the R-squared is 0.90.   
The annualised alpha of Prudential Balanced Fund versus the shadow fund is -3.07%, which means the 


















Stanlib Multi Manager Balanced Fund X-RAY Results 
X-RAY Results of Stanlib Multi Manager Balanced Fund (1 Sep 2012 – 1 Sep 2019) 
 Annualised Return 
(%) 
Annualised Std Dev 
(%) 
Annualised Sharpe Ratio 
Stanlib Multi Manager Balanced Fund 7.8 7.36 1.06 
Shadow Fund 12.23 7.63 1.6 
Fund to Benchmark -0.22 1.44 -0.11 
Fund to Shadow -4.43 2.66 -1.52 
Benchmark (SA High Equity UT) 8.02 6.46 1.24 
FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) 10.25 11.2 0.92 
MSCI AC World (ZAR TR) 18.92 14.63 1.29 
ALBI 7.34 7.56 0.97 
Momentum  12.89 11.6 1.11 
Low Volatility 10.07 9.85 1.02 
Value 15.95 12.75 1.25 
Summary and Correlations Results of Stanlib Multi Manager Balanced Fund 
Fund to Shadow Fund to Benchmark 
Alpha (% p.a.) -4.04 Alpha (% p.a.) 0.39 
R-Squared 0.88 R-Squared 0.97 
Correlation 0.94 Correlation 0.98 
Tracking Error (% p.a.) 2.66 Tracking Error (% p.a.) 1.61 
 
From the X-RAY results of Stanlib Multi Manager Balanced Fund, we find that the fund fails to 
outperform the benchmark (SA High Equity UT Sector) on an absolute basis over the period 1 September 
2012 – 1 September 2019. Stanlib Multi Manager Balanced Fund also fails to outperforms the benchmark 
on a risk-adjusted basis as the annualised Sharpe Ratio of the fund is 1.06, compared to the annualised 
Sharpe Ratio of the SA High Equity UT Sector of 1.24.   
Comparing Stanlib Multi Manager Balanced Fund to its shadow fund, which consists out of the following 
passive asset classes and style indices: 42.5% FTSE/JSE All Share, 27% ALBI, 29% MSCI World 
Equity, 0% Value, 0% Low Volatility and 1.5% Momentum, the fund fails to outperform on an 
absolute and risk-adjusted basis. A large portion of the variations of returns of Stanlib Multi Manager 
Balanced Fund can be explained by the holdings of the shadow fund, since the R-squared is 0.88.  
The annualised alpha of Stanlib Multi Manager Balanced Fund versus the shadow fund is -4.04%, which 
means the fund materially failed to add value over the passive asset classes and style indices it seeks to 
replicate. Stanlib Multi Manager Balanced Fund, compared to Investec Managed Fund, is less likely to 
















Coronation Balanced Defensive Fund X-RAY Results 




Annualised Std Dev 
(%) 
Annualised Sharpe Ratio 
Coronation Balanced Defensive Fund 8.34 4.46 1.87 
Shadow Fund 9.57 3.86 2.48 
Fund to Benchmark 1.16 1.46 0.75 
Fund to Shadow -1.23 1.9 -0.59 
Benchmark (SA Low Equity UT) 7.18 4.03 1.78 
FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) 10.25 11.2 0.92 
MSCI AC World (ZAR TR) 18.92 14.63 1.29 
ALBI 7.34 7.56 0.97 
STEFI 6.6 0.26 25.66 
Momentum  12.89 11.6 1.11 
Low Volatility 10.07 9.85 1.02 
Value 15.95 12.75 1.25 
Summary and Correlations Results of Coronation Balanced Defensive Fund 
Fund to Shadow Fund to Benchmark 
Alpha (% p.a.) -1.12 Alpha (% p.a.) 1.59 
R-Squared 0.82 R-Squared 0.89 
Correlation 0.91 Correlation 0.94 
Tracking Error (% p.a.) 1.9 Tracking Error (% p.a.) 1.39 
 
From the X-RAY results of Coronation Balanced Defensive Fund, we find that the fund outperforms the 
benchmark (SA Low Equity UT Sector) on an absolute basis over the period 1 September 2012 – 1 
September 2019. Coronation Balanced Defensive Fund also outperforms the benchmark (SA Low Equity 
UT Sector) on a risk-adjusted basis as the annualised Sharpe Ratio of the fund is 1.87, compared to the 
annualised Sharpe Ratio of the SA Low Equity UT Sector of 1.78.   
Comparing Coronation Balanced Defensive Fund to its shadow fund, which consists out of the following 
passive asset classes and style indices: 14.5% FTSE/JSE All Share, 61.5% STEFI, 17.5% MSCI World 
Equity, 3% Value, 2% Low Volatility and 1.5% Momentum, the fund fails to outperform on an 
absolute and risk-adjusted basis. The majority of the variations of returns of Coronation Balanced 
Defensive Fund can be explained by the holdings of the shadow fund, since the R-squared is 0.82.   
The annualised alpha of Coronation Balanced Defensive Fund versus the shadow fund is -1.12%, which 



















Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund X-RAY Results 
X-RAY Results of Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund (1 Sep 2012 – 1 Sep 2019) 
 Annualised Return 
(%) 
Annualised Std Dev 
(%) 
Annualised Sharpe Ratio 
Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund 8.11 5.07 1.6 
Shadow Fund 10.46 4.35 2.4 
Fund to Benchmark 0.93 2.41 0.37 
Fund to Shadow -2.35 2.11 -1.01 
Benchmark (SA Low Equity UT) 7.18 4.03 1.78 
FTSE/JSE All Share (J203T) 10.25 11.2 0.92 
MSCI AC World (ZAR TR) 18.92 14.63 1.29 
ALBI 7.34 7.56 0.97 
STEFI 6.6 0.26 25.66 
Momentum  12.89 11.6 1.11 
Low Volatility 10.07 9.85 1.02 
Value 15.95 12.75 1.25 
Summary and Correlations Results of Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund 
Fund to Shadow Fund to Benchmark 
Alpha (% p.a.) -2.13 Alpha (% p.a.) 1.72 
R-Squared 0.83 R-Squared 0.74 
Correlation 0.91 Correlation 0.86 
Tracking Error (% p.a.) 2.11 Tracking Error (% p.a.) 2.38 
 
From the X-RAY results of Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund, we find that the fund 
outperforms the benchmark (SA Low Equity UT Sector) on an absolute basis over the period 
1 September 2012 – 1 September 2019. Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund, however fails also 
outperforms the benchmark on a risk-adjusted basis as the annualised Sharpe Ratio of the fund 
is 1.60, compared to the annualised Sharpe Ratio of the SA Low Equity UT Sector of 1.78.   
Comparing Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund to its shadow fund, which consists out of the 
following passive asset classes and style indices: 5.5% FTSE/JSE All Share, 16% ALBI, 
31.5% STEFI, 34% MSCI World Equity and 13% Low Volatility, the fund fails to 
outperform on an absolute and risk-adjusted basis. The majority of the variations of returns of 
Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund can be explained by the holdings of the shadow fund, since 
the R-squared is 0.83.  The annualised alpha of Nedgroup Investments Stable Fund versus the 
shadow fund is -2.13%, which means the fund materially failed to add value over the passive 
asset classes and style indices it seeks to replicate. 
 
